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Abstract 
This research addresses the investigative strategies that police officers from 
traditional police departments pursue when dealing with social media in their 
investigations. There are a variety of ways in which social media can feature 
within a case. This study focused only on one of these - the social media 
material generated by the actors (victims, witnesses and suspects) within an 
investigation. It identifies the decisions that officers make when presented 
with social media within an investigation and what drives officers to make 
those decisions. It utilises the most up to date guidelines for good practice in 
relation to digital evidence centrally available to officers in England (ACPO, 
2012) in order to provide a benchmark against which to compare officers’ 
decisions and rationale. Due to difficulty in identifying established theory on 
investigator decision-making around social media encountered in 
investigations, grounded theory was adopted to analyse the primary data 
collected. This methodology is well-suited to building theory in a relatively 
unexplored field (Glaser, 1978; Schreiber, 2001; Goulding, 2002). Two police 
forces provided data for the research these being Thames Valley Police and 
Avon and Somerset Constabulary with two different data collection methods 
being used. The first was the collection and examination of crime reports and 
the second comprised of semi-structured interviews with investigators. In 
laying out the decision- making process that officer’s use, the research 
highlights where the opportunities lie for best practice and how to influence 
the behaviour of investigators in the future. The research identified social 
media as a new problem for investigators with unique facets to it. However, it 
found that investigators were using heuristics to inform their decision-making 
process. In so doing they were applying strategies to social media that are 
were not adequate to deal with it when considering their objectives. 
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Chapter 1 - Thesis Overview 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the current era of information-technology the use of the internet has 
become ever more prevalent. It affects almost every feature of people’s 
lives, from making transactions, storing personal and business information, 
advertising, exchanging legal documents to various forms of communication. 
A large part of internet use is concerned with social media. Social media 
began to have a mass public appeal from the early 2000’s, the following 
marking the development of some of the better-known platforms: Wikipedia 
(2001), Myspace (2003), Facebook (2004), Flickr (2004), Bebo (2005) 
YouTube (2005), Twitter (2006). These and other social media platforms 
have allowed for the sharing of diverse types of information between 
individuals and communities including, music, education, movies, 
photographs and personal information. Along with many other platforms they 
have succesfully permeated everyday personal aspects of people’s lives, 
who through those platforms also lose a measure of their privacy 
(Silverstone & Haddon, 1996; Trottier, 2012; Goldsmith, 2015). By 
encroaching into the personal aspects of people’s lives they have also 
become intertwined in the everyday criminal conduct of individuals (O'Keefe 
& Clarke-Pearson, 2011; Hinduja & Patchin, 2013; Wall & Williams, 2013). 
Examples of such criminal conduct range from the grooming of children 
(Wall, 2001; Jewkes & Andrews, 2005; Holt & Bossler, 2012; Gilespie, 
2015), cyberbullying (Kwan & Skoric, 2013; Kokkinos, Baltzidis, & Xynogala, 
2016), commuincation relating to terrorism (Mahmood, 2012; Weimann, 
2014) to burglars using social media to identify when persons are on holiday 
so that they can target their houses whilst they are away (Rose, 2011; Weir, 
Toolan & Smeed, 2011).  
Social media’s impact on policing was however delayed until the latter part of 
that decade (Crump, 2011; Trottier, 2012). Information that would previously 
not have been disclosed has slowly drifted into the public domain (Wall & 
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Williams, 2013) and become available for the police to both see, collect and 
use in their investigations (Trottier, 2012; Goldsmith, 2015). Furthermore, not 
only is the information available but the police in England and Wales are 
under an obligation under the Criminal Procedures Investigatons Act 1996 
(CPIA, 1996) to pursue all reasonable lines of enquiry. If a social media 
platform holds material that is relevant in an investigation then it may well be 
a proportionate line of enquiry to attempt to obtain that material. 
However social media platforms are numerous, different in nature and 
constantly evolving (Quan-Haase, 2008; Hogan & Quan-Haase, 2010; 
Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010; Kim, Jeong, & Lee, 2010; Lenhard, Purcell, Smith, 
& Zickuhr, 2010; Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 2011).  
Previous research has suggested that front line police lack the skills and 
knowledge to deal with social media evidence (Jewkes & Andrews, 2007; 
Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Nicol, Innes, Gee, & Feist, 2004). Coupled with this is 
the difficulties that government agencies have with accessing social media 
content that is not publically available on profiles. The reasons for this are 
numerous. Social media providers are loathe to engage with law 
enforcement agenices for reasons of both cost (Hunton, 2009; Kardasz, 
2012) and reputation (Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 2011). 
This is further complicated by the providers being in different jurisdictions to 
the law enforcement agencies seeking information from them (Duggan, 
Ellison, Lampe, Lenhart, & Madden, 2015), which in turn requires cross 
border co-operation (Brenner, 2007; Hutnon, 2009; Jewkes, 2013; Bryant & 
Stephens, 2014). Two further related issues arise. The first is that the 
majority of the information sought by the police is held in cloud storage 
systems and traditional approaches to evidencing digital evidence cannot be 
easily applied to these external systems (Garfinkel, 2010; Ward, 2011; 
DeSousa, 2013). The second is that by attempting to access external 
devices via communications links, legislation pertaining to communications 
data, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA, 2000) may be 
invoked creating further barriers for the police to obtaining the information 
they seek (Locke, Cooke, & Jackson, 2013; Qi & Edgar-Nevill, 2011; 
Edwards & Urquhart, 2016). All of these factors have the potential to cause 
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social media as a source of information and evidence for the police to be 
problematic.  
Although social media is often associated with cybercrime, in this research 
the focus is on social media in criminal investigations in general and not 
cybercrime specifically. Social media incidence in an offence may not 
necessarily fall under the umbrella of cybercrime (Ward, 2007; Stuart, 2014). 
However, cybercrime offences have been noted to have a significant 
occurrence of social media (Wall, 2001; Jewkes & Andrews, 2005; Holt & 
Bossler, 2012; Gilespie, 2015). As such whilst cybercrime is not the direct 
focus of this research an overlap between the two exists, and so literature 
and previous studies on cybercrime were an important consideration. 
Academic research around the issue of cybercrime and police investigation 
is present, wide spread and has a strong focus on proposed models of 
investigation and frameworks that investigators can follow (Reith, Carr, & 
Gunsch, 2002; Casey, 2004; O'Ciardhuain, 2004; Perumal, 2009). They 
often include a strong technical aspect concentrating on devices that can be 
physically seized and then forensically examined (Casey, 2002; Carrier, 
2003; Lyle, 2003; Baggili, Mislan & Rogers, 2007). As such, a large segment 
of this literature appears to be aimed at forensic investigators rather than 
general law enforcement practitioners. It is recognised however that 
cybercrime impacts on investigation strategies outside of the confines of 
digital forensic examination (Hunton, 2009). Information and communications 
technology is seen as moving from the realm of specialist forensic 
investigations into general everyday policing.  
However, there is a limited understanding of how detectives in particular 
identify strategies and the reasons for doing so in order to deal with social 
media. This research addresses the investigative strategies that police 
officers from traditional police departments pursue when dealing with social 
media in their investigations. It identifies the decisions that officers make 
when presented with social media within an investigation and what drives 
officers to make those decisions. It utilises the most up to date guidelines for 
good practice in relation to digital evidence centrally available to officers in 
England (ACPO, 2012) in order to provide a benchmark against which to 
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compare officers’ decisions and rationale. In laying out the decision- making 
process that officer’s use, the research highlights where the opportunities lie 
for best practice and how to influence the behaviour of investigators in the 
future. 
The overall aim of the research is to ascertain how social media impacts on 
officers’ investigative strategies within their investigations. There are a 
variety of ways in which social media can do this. This study focused only on 
one of these - the material generated by the actors (victims, witnesses and 
suspects) within an investigation. The reason for this focus is driven by the 
researcher’s own experience as a detective working in a Criminal 
Investigations Department (CID). The incidence of social media in their 
investigations posed questions as to how social media should be dealt with. 
These questions could not be adequately answered by colleagues or 
supervisors and as a consequence the researcher became interested in how 
social media is addressed in reactive investigations.  
 
2. Research questions 
This research was designed around five questions. Together they sought to 
ascertain the impact of social media on investigations and the investigative 
strategies that police officers from traditional ‘detective’ departments pursue 
when dealing with it in their cases. They further looked to understand the 
decision-making processes behind those strategies. They then sought to 
identify the most up to date guidelines for good practice in relation to ‘social 
media as evidence’ available to officers and finally ask what 
recommendations could be made for policy and practice. The five questions 
are explored in more detail below:  
The first question was to identify ‘what proportion and type of investigations 
are impacted upon by social media?’. Social media was judged to have had 
an impact on an investigation where social media content was generated by 
the actors involved in the investigation. Social media content was further 
reduced into three categories: relevant material (CPIA, 1996), evidence in 
the investigation, evidence critical to the outcome of the investigation. How 
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investigations were impacted upon by social media was assessed in terms of 
a percentage of the total number of cases investigated by officers.  
The second question was to identify ‘what types of strategies detectives 
and investigators deploy when they encounter social media in a criminal 
investigation?’. This objective focused on identifying the practical decisions 
that officers made when they came across social media. 
The third question went further and sought to understand ‘what are the 
decision-making processes behind the strategies chosen by detectives 
when dealing with social media?’. In so doing an understanding was sought 
as to why officers pursued a certain strategy to fill a gap in our knowledge. 
First, if it is not understood why a decision is made, it is difficult to make a 
judgement on how sound that decision is. Secondly, this knowledge is 
required, if a meaningful attempt is to be made at altering decisions that are 
made by investigators. It was envisaged that these first three objectives 
would be achieved by two separate data collection methods.  
Both data collection methods focused on investigations conducted by 
officers who are working in ‘detective’ roles. The first method examines 
crime reports generated or dealt with by officers in those departments. The 
second utilises interviews with officers on those departments. The rationale 
for focusing on detectives was driven by the previous small-scale studies 
conducted by the researcher, which gave an indication that detectives are 
more likely to deal with social media than their uniformed colleagues. 
Information from four different departments was sought for research data 
regarding investigations that had been conducted. They were from CID, 
Child Abuse Investigation (CAIU), Domestic Abuse Investigation (DAIU), and 
finally the authorities’ bureau. The reason for choosing the first three 
departments, as opposed to any others, is that they are the most heavily 
populated departments with an investigative (detective) role. The final 
department – the authorities’ bureau is a point of contact for officers 
requesting permissions for communications data of any type and they act as 
an advisory resource. It was chosen as they deal with any applications 
concerned with RIPA (2000) which is noted as having the potential to be 
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invoked when officers seek social media content held by providers (Locke, 
Cooke, & Jackson, 2013; Qi & Edgar-Nevill, 2011; Edwards & Urquhart, 
2016).   
Two police forces provided data for the research, these being Thames Valley 
Police and Avon and Somerset Constabulary. The purpose of obtaining data 
from more than one police force was to identify whether there are any 
differences in the data stemming from the culture and organisation of 
different police areas. 
The fourth question posed was to identify ‘what bench mark exists for 
investigators to assist them in choosing their strategies?’. To allow for an 
assessment of the strategies chosen by the officers, a bench mark is needed 
for comparison. A way of achieving this was to identify guidelines already in 
existence for dealing with digital evidence. The guidelines must not be so 
abstract that no tangible investigative strategy can be identified for 
investigators. A set of guidelines (ACPO, 2012) fitting these criteria was 
found to be provided by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).  
The final question was to identify ‘what recommendations can be made to 
investigators as to their strategies when they come across social media?’. 
The strategies offered by the guidelines were compared against those that 
officers were noted as having used themselves. The data obtained was 
scrutinised to ascertain any themes that are raised across different 
departments and different police areas. An analysis was conducted to 
determine any differences between the strategies suggested by the 
guidelines and those used by officers and then to identify best practice from 
the two. Best practice was constructed against three criteria: 
1) That the material gathered through the strategies identified could be 
relied upon in court as evidence if so required.  
2) That the strategies identified would provide for the easiest possible 
collection of the material. 
3) That strategies identified would allow for the least resource intensive 
collection of the material.  
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Having identified the decision-making process, recommendations were 
made in how to achieve that best practice. 
 
3. Thesis Structure 
The remainder of the thesis comprises of 5 chapters. Chapter 2 details the 
literature that was reviewed and was found to be relevant throughout the 
course of the study. The focus in this chapter is on problem solving models 
and decision making. In so doing the individual steps of problem solving 
models are examined. Then issues that social media poses to law 
enforcement agencies are explored. Subsequently an analysis is conducted 
of three specific heuristics - decision making rules that are noted as being 
particularly pertinent to policing. Finally, the ACPO guidelines and their 
suggested strategies in relation to social media are discussed. 
Chapter 3 explains the methodology that was used together with the data 
collection methods. Due to difficulty in identifying established theory on 
investigator decision-making around social media encountered in 
investigations, grounded theory was adopted to analyse the primary data 
collected. This methodology is well-suited to building theory in a relatively 
unexplored field (Glaser, 1978; Schreiber, 2001; Goulding, 2002). Within 
grounded theory, the subjective position of the researcher is important in 
data analysis (Goulding, 2002; Mruck & Mey, 2007). In this study, the 
researcher is also an investigator with experience in working on criminal 
offences that involve social media. The impact of this insider perspective has 
been identified as being significant in the small-scale projects taken to date 
by the researcher and this position is explored in more detail. The rationale 
for using the two separate data collection methods is discussed as are their 
individual strengths and weaknesses.  
Chapter 4 concerns itself with the analysis of the data obtained from the 
crime reports. It describes the categories of offence which are found to 
contain social media. Crime reports from each police area are examined 
separately, as are they for the three distinct departments of CAIU, CID and 
DAIU before being compared against one another. Strategies for dealing 
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with social media are identified and then their frequency is correlated against 
whether social media constitutes relevant material, evidence, or critical 
evidence to the outcome of an investigation. 
Chapter 5 analyses the data captured from the interviews conducted with 
investigators. From the data are drawn a number of findings. These include 
the aims and objectives of investigators, how they view social media in terms 
of distinct properties, strategies that they use when dealing with social media 
and the rules that are utilised by officers when making a decision as to which 
strategy to choose. The findings in chapters 4 and 5 draw on the literature 
reviewed and are cross referenced against each other.  
Chapter 6 evaluates the study, highlights the main conclusions regarding the 
impact of social media on investigator decision-making strategies from the 
data analysis and makes suggestions based on the results of the research. It 
identifies unique and original ideas that have been found during the course 
of the research. On the basis of this it makes recommendations as to the 
content of guidelines and equipment and practices that could be made 
available for investigators. The following chapter examines the literature that 
was reviewed prior and during the research. Significant due to the grounded 
theory methodology employed in this research was the timing of the 
literature review and this is discussed initially.  
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 Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 
1. Introduction 
To begin with the timing of the literature review is discussed and the 
significance of when a review takes place when using a grounded theory 
approach. This provides an explanation as to why the evaluation of the data 
against existing academic literature was an ongoing process througout the 
course of the research and did not fully take place prior to the start of data 
collection. 
Literature pertaining to the research aims was reviewed with each research 
question being considered individually. The researcher failed to uncover any 
literature that would inform the first question posed, which concerend itself 
with identifying the proportion of investigations impacted upon by social 
media within the parameters set by this study. The second and fourth 
research questions were found to be closely related when applied to a 
review of existing academic and professional knowledge. As such, they were 
considered jointly after literaure relating to the third research question was 
scrutnised. This third question sought to identify the decision making 
processes behind investigators’ choice of individual strategies. Literature 
found to be relevant to this centred around decision making and problem 
solving. The individual steps of problem solving models were found to mirror 
investigators’ behaviour seen in the data collected during the research. 
These steps included recognising social media as a problem, identifying its 
facets, defining the goals of the decision makers as investigators, and 
identifying rules by which decisions were made. Ten facets of social media 
were identified by investigators that defined social media as a ‘problem’. 
Each of these is considered against existing literature. Four investigator 
goals were noted in the data collected from the interviews. These concerned 
the collection of evidence for court, identifying the suspect for the purposes 
of the investigation, maintaining the engagement of the victim and the 
safeguarding of individuals. These goals have previously been recognised 
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as relevant to investigators and police officers in general. Literature 
concerning these investigator goals is reviewed and their application to 
social media considered. Finally, three heuristics were identified as the main 
decision-making rules which investigators used. These were: Confirmation 
Bias, the Availability Heuristic, and the Representiveness Heuristic. These 
decision making rules and how investigators applied them to social media in 
their investigations is examined. 
The second and fourth research questions identified strategies suggested for 
and used by officers. A review of academic and professional literature found 
processes present for dealing with digital forensic evidence. Issues with 
these processes when trying to apply to them to cloud based computing are 
analysed, the impact that this may have on the collection of social media 
evidence is reviewed and their general suitability for mainstream 
investigators considered. The ACPO (2012) guidelines were found to best 
address the question of a bench mark for strategies to be employed when 
investigators come across social media. The ACPO (2012) guidelines are 
outlined and subsequently analysed.  
 
2. The timing of a literature review when using grounded theory 
In submitting a proposal for research the purpose of an initial review into 
existing literature is in order to identify gaps in existing knowledge 
(Hutchinson, 1993) and secondly to avoid methodological and conceptual 
hazards that have already been recognised (McGhee, Marland, & Atkinson, 
2007). The knowledge however that a researcher holds and their prior 
experience regarding the area that is being researched is an important 
consideration when using a grounded theory approach (Glaser, 1978; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1994). This in turn has implications for when a literature 
review is conducted. The reason for this is that within grounded theory 
although the theory is seen to emerge from the data collected (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1992), the researcher is a key component of the 
emergence of that theory as the theory is created through and by them 
(Cutcliffe, 2000). The literature review will affect the researchers knowledge 
16 
 
and so the timing of the literature review will have the potential to impact on 
the emergence of theory (McGhee, Marland, & Atkinson, 2007; Cutcliffe, 
2000). As such reflection is critical for the researcher otherwise there is a 
risk that any theory construction is not impartial and overly influenced by the 
researcher’s previous experiences and knowledge (Cutcliffe, 2000; Kennedy 
& Lingard, 2006; McGhee, Marland, & Atkinson, 2007). 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) argued for reviewing literature early in the 
research for a number of reasons including: the stimulation of theoretical 
sensitivity; providing a secondary source of data; stimulation of thought in 
the researcher; and providing validity for the research. Glaser (1992) 
disagreed with this approach and in particular awareness of professional 
literature prior to the research and prior to codes and categories emerging 
from the data in order to prevent the emergence of new theory being 
affected by current knowledge. The approach adopted in this research as to 
when a literature was undertaken was that advocated by Strauss and Corbin 
(1990). The choice of this approach being adopted as opposed to that 
advocated by Glaser (1992) was influenced by three factors. The first of 
these factors is the process that is in place through which a proposal for 
research is submitted to the university, specifically the requirement for it to 
be accepted by the ethics committee prior to any research being undertaken. 
This has been noted by Strauss & Corbin (1998) as a structural barrier to not 
undertaking a literature review prior to any research being endorsed by a 
university. Secondly, the researcher’s position as an insider researcher 
(Brannick & Coghlan, 2007; Drake & Heath, 2011), meant that a certain 
amount of professional knowledge in the area that the research was being 
conducted in was already held by the researcher. Thirdly the researcher had 
previous academic experience on decision making theory relating to 
economic theory.  
In order to and whilst constructing the proposal for the research, literature 
was reviewed on decision making and strategies used in relation to social 
media and digital evidence specifically within the field of criminal justice, to 
idenfity whether the proposed research addressed a gap in current 
knowledge. Subsequently the knowledge regarding decision making that 
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was already known to the researcher through previous academic and 
professional experience was formalised through a review of normative and 
prescriptive models and heuristics. Accepting that this knowledge was 
already present in the researcher and that there was potential for it to 
influence theory building, further knowledge concerning decision making was 
sought to broaden the outlook of the researcher and in order to stimulate 
thought as suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990). 
  
3. Literature pertaining to decision making 
The third research question sought to ascertain the decision-making process 
behind the strategies deployed by investigators. This question sought to 
understand why a strategy has been chosen and the decision-making 
process behind the choice of a particular strategy. How a strategy is defined 
in the context of this thesis is in line with the meaning ascribed to it by 
Freedman (2013) and is detailed in the glossary.  
Literature surrounding decision making is widespread amongst different 
academic (Dorfman, 1997, Jones, 2004; Chibnik, 2011) and professional 
(Cole, 2005; O’Neal, 2012; Moriarty, 2015) disciplines and can be divided 
into three categories: Heuristics (Elio, 2002; Gigerenzer, 2008), Normative / 
prescriptive models (Crozier & Raynard, 1997; Koksalan, Wallenius, & 
Zionts, 2011) and Positive or descriptive models (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; 
Crozier & Raynard, 1997; Koksalan, Wallenius, & Zionts, 2011). Whilst 
Heuristics can be subsumed within descriptive models, they are distinct 
enough that it is useful to identify them as a separate way to describe 
decision making. Furthermore, heuristics specifically have been identified as 
important in the way that investigators within the police make decisions 
(Adhami & Brown, 1996; Smith & Flanagan, 2000; Youngs & Canter, 2006; 
Stelfox, 2009; Rossmo, 2009; Zalman & Carrano, 2014; Smith & Tilley, 
2015). Aspects of normative / prescriptive models of decision making were 
known to the researcher from the sphere of economic theory because of 
previous academic undertakings and heuristics because of professional 
learning prior to the research being commenced.  
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Normative or prescriptive models look to identify the optimal decision given a 
certain set of circumstances (Crozier & Raynard, 1997; Camerer, 
Issacharoff, Loewenstien, O'Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003). Such models can 
assist decision makers to identify this optimal choice where a decision is 
required. Positive or descriptive models in contrast seek to describe, 
understand and model the actual choices that are made by individuals 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Crozier & Raynard, 1997; Koksalan, Wallenius, & 
Zionts, 2011). Heuristics describe rules that individuals fall upon when asked 
to make decisions often when faced with an inability to process all the 
information at their disposal. They explain some decision making, offering a 
quicker way for an individual to make a decision with less information whilst 
offering a degree of optimisation (Simon, 1955; Elio, 2002; Gilovich & Griffin, 
2002; Snook & Cullen, 2008).  What all these models of decision making 
have in common is that a distinct set of circumstances has been identified 
within which a choice is being made by the decision maker. The parameters 
in which the choice is being made are well defined and often observed under 
laboratory conditions. These models were examined against the data 
obtained from the interviews. It became clear however that they did not 
adequately explain the process that investigators were undergoing when 
coming across social media, and with reference to heuristics only offered a 
partial explanation. 
 
4. Problem Solving vs. Decision Making 
Four goals became apparent for investigators from the coding of the data 
obtained from the interviews that could not, other than ordering them from 
one to four as preferences when faced with a choice, easily be overlaid onto 
the models of decision making identified above. As such, a wider search 
took place within literature of how individuals approach not just decisions in 
specific settings but more widely situations where choices are made. This 
literature search took place during and after the coding process and thus 
was more in line with the approach advocated by Glaser (1992). That the 
literature reviewed prior to the coding process was rejected by the 
researcher as explaining what was found in the data was seen positively in 
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the context of the grounded theory methodology used. It demonstrated that 
that literature and models that the researcher believed to be relevant at the 
start of the research did not influence the researcher when seeking 
theoretical models to explain patterns in the data. 
The core issue seen throughout this thesis and identified during the coding 
and analysis of the data is not solely that of decision making but more 
broadly problem solving. Therefore, in order to understand the findings, it is 
necessary to have an understanding of the literature surrounding problem 
solving. Models outlining situations where individuals are faced with an issue 
that is not clearly defined were found to be more aptly suited to the scenarios 
described during the interviews and how investigators approached social 
media. These models fall under the heading of ‘problem solving’ but are also 
in some cases described as ‘decision making’ models although they differ 
significantly to the models described earlier. There are many definitions of 
‘decision making’ and ‘problem solving’ when considering situations where 
there is an undefined problem facing an individual with various overlapping 
characteristics identified under both definitions (Frauenknecht & Black, 2010; 
Hickson & Khemka, 2013). As an example, the definition of ‘decision making’ 
offered by Izzo, Pritz and Ott (1990) involves (1) stating what the problem is 
(2) setting out what choices are available to deal with the problem, (3) 
identifying what the consequences of each choice are, and (4) selecting the 
preferred or best choice to deal with the identified problem. This is similar to 
the definition of ‘problem solving’ as put forward by Wilson and Kirby (1984) 
which involves (1) defining the decision that has to be made, (2) collecting 
information on the issue, (3) considering what options are available to deal 
with the issue, (4) identifying the preferred option of how to deal with the 
decision, (5) planning and carrying out the chosen course of action, and 
finally (6) assessing the outcome of the decision that was made. 
The interchangeable nature of the meaning assigned to problem solving and 
decision making in these models where there is an undefined problem facing 
an individual creates potential for any analysis of data against theoretical 
concepts to become confused (Frauenknecht & Black, 2010). This is 
particularly the case in view of the decision-making models described at the 
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start of this chapter which differ in nature to that described for example by 
Izzo, Pritz and Ott (1990).  To avoid confusion, a set definition first of 
problem solving and secondly of decision making was used in this research. 
The intention in doing this was not to attempt to give preference to particular 
definitions of problem-solving and decision-making over others, but rather 
set out the definition for the purpose of clarity and applying clearly 
identifiable frameworks to what has been noted in the data. 
The definition of problem solving as put forward by Pretz, Naples, & 
Sternberg (2003) was adopted. This model is represented in five clear and 
separate stages that an individual progresses through when encountering an 
unidentified problem, the model being cyclical in nature. These stages are as 
follows: 
• Recognition that a problem exists 
• Defining or framing the problem 
• Identify the goals 
• Developing a strategy to reach goals. 
• Evaluation of actions in relation to the goals  
In this definition, decision making is seen as being subsumed within the 
problem solving process but not fully constituting it (Shogren, et al., 2008; 
Frauenknecht & Black, 2010). Although this definition has been chosen, the 
five steps noted in the model or close approximations to them are seen in 
other problem-solving models (Bransford & Stein, 1984; Sternberg, 1985). A 
well-defined problem may have a relatively straightforward way to reach the 
goals of the person presented with it. However, if the problem is not well 
defined then the person who is presented with it must first frame what the 
problem is, subsequently identify goals that they wish to reach and then 
develop a strategy to achieve them. Factors that are found to influence this 
process are knowledge, cognitive processes, ability and structural context 
(Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003).  
Decision Making for the purpose of this research is also defined in 5 
separate stages as: “a process used to make choices among contending 
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courses of actions and includes the following steps: (1) identify possible 
options, (2) identify possible consequences for each option, (3) evaluate 
desirability of each consequence, (4) assess likelihood of consequences, 
and (5) use a “decision rule” that identifies the best option and maximizes 
well-being based on current beliefs and knowledge” (Frauenknecht & Black, 
2010, p.113). 
In the definition of decision making as depicted by Frauenknecht & Black 
(2010) similarly to problem solving as put forward by Pretz, Naples, & 
Sternberg (2003), there are clear and separate stages that an individual 
progresses through. However, the steps involved in decision making as 
defined by Frauenknecht & Black (2010) can be subsumed or form part of 
the stages encapsulated in the problem-solving model as put forward by 
Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg (2003).  
 
5. Identifying social media as a distinct and unique problem 
The two definitions of ‘problems solving’ and ‘decision making’ as used in 
this research detail two distinct situations that an individual may experience. 
In the first, there is a ‘fuzzy’ scenario (Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003) 
where the problem is not initially clear to the person who comes across it. 
This scenario falls under the definition of problem solving. In the second 
scenario, the problem is well defined to the individual. This scenario falls 
under the definition of decision making. Where a person comes across a 
situation where a problem is not well defined, they must first recognise it as a 
problem and subsequently define it (Getzels, 1982). An individual may not 
even recognise the situation or scenario that they come across as presenting 
a problem (Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003) and it has been suggested that 
a significant amount of domain-specific expertise is required before an 
individual is able to recognise and define the boundaries of a problem 
(Simonton, 1999; Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003). As such, there was a 
possibility that there would exist a correlation between the length of time 
investigators had served in the police or worked in detective roles and 
whether social media was recognised as a ‘problem’ and this was examined.  
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Recognition of a problem, as a first step in this process is often easier 
though than defining its boundaries. Having recognised a problem, the next 
stage as put forward in the model by Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg (2003) 
involves framing or defining it. This stage is influenced by knowledge, 
cognitive processes, ability and structural context (Pretz, Naples, & 
Sternberg, 2003). The study did not address cognitive processes or measure 
the ability of the investigators.  
 
5.1 Distinctive facets of social media in relation to investigation 
Social media has been noted as providing a number of issues for law 
enforcement agencies. Providers are seen to fail to engage with the police. 
There are two drivers of this behaviour identified in literature. The first is that 
of cost (Hunton, 2009; Kardasz, 2012). Responding to law enforcement 
requests inevitably requires person hours to provide the information 
requested. The preservation of information also illicits costs in the form of 
hardware. The second is that of reputation. Each social media provider has a 
unique identity which is coupled with the reputation that it has (Kietzmann, 
Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 2011). A part of this repution relies on the 
privacy that a social media platform offers its users and in particular privacy 
from government agencies (Barnes, 2006; Etzioni, 2016). Privacy as a 
marketing feature has become central to high-tech companies including but 
also beyond social media (Etzioni, 2016). There exists a fear that if this 
privacy is surrendered to state law enforcement agencies then users will 
move to a different social media application based in a state or region where 
that privacy is protected or not infringed upon (Greenberg, 2016). The most 
recent high profile case involving a tech company and the government is that 
of Apple’s refusal to comply with a court order to assist the FBI in overriding 
the security features of the latest i phone (Etzioni, 2016).  
This lack of response to law enforcement agencies has been noted not only 
on a voluntary basis but also when law enforcement agencies have applied 
for information using subpoenas and search warrants (Hodge, 2006; Boyd & 
Ellison, 2007; Ward, 2011; Kardasz, 2012). Although this refers to 
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applications through criminal justice mechanisms in the United States and 
not England in Wales, the majority of social media applications that are used 
in the UK are based in the United States (Duggan, Ellison, Lampe, Lenhart, 
& Madden, 2015).  As such they lie outside of the jurisdiction of UK law and 
any requests that rely on legislation that compels service providers based in 
the United States to divulge information takes place through judicial 
mechanisms in the United States. That co-operation between law 
enforcement agencies across different legal jurisdictions is required causes 
barriers in itself to the effective investigation of crime (Brenner, 2007; 
Hunton, 2009; Jewkes, 2013; Bryant & Stephens, 2014). In response, social 
media providers including Facebook, MySpace and Twitter have created 
their own protocols which dictate the information that they will provide in 
response to law enforcement requests (Trottier, 2012). This demonstrates a 
measure of their independence and ability to dictate rather than be dictated 
to. Law enforcement agencies however are pushing for greater access in 
both Canada and the United States to the content that social media 
providers hold through legislative and judicial measures (Trottier, 2012).  
Whether social media is different in nature to previous types of 
communications data such as physical letters, telephone calls or e mails has 
been debated in U.S. courts of law (Hodge, 2006; Petrashek, 2010; Gagnier, 
2011). This research failed to identify any criminal cases in Crown Court in 
England and Wales pertaining to the same issue.  
Further to this the changing nature of social media has been widely 
acknowledged (Quan-Haase, 2008; Hogan & Quan-Haase, 2010; Kaplan & 
Haenlein, 2010; Kim, Jeong, & Lee, 2010; Lenhard, Purcell, Smith, & 
Zickuhr, 2010; Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 2011). When 
new forms of social media develop they become an unknown quantity to 
investigators who need to acquire new knowledge in order to be able to 
adequately understand and frame them, as identified in the third category 
above. Although this research challenges the notion that the police lack the 
knowledge and skills to effectively deal with digital evidence (Jewkes & 
Andrews, 2007; Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Nicol, Innes, Gee, & Feist, 2004) or a 
new scenario that they have previously not dealt with (Stelfox & Pease, 
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2013) the acquisition of new knowledge nevertheless takes time and effort 
which competes with the normal demands on time that investigators have to 
manage (Innes, 2003).  
The social media content of a given user account unless specifically or 
incidentally recorded on a physical electronic device of a user is held in a 
cloud based system or external storage (Garfinkel, 2010; Ward, 2011; 
DeSousa, 2013). The issue of how to access this information for any given 
account poses difficulties for the investigator (Ryan & Shpantzer, 2002; 
Sommer, 2004). Traditional approaches to collecting electronic evidence 
focus on seizing a physical electronic device and then creating an image of 
that device (Casey, 2002; Carrier, 2003; Ryan & Shpantzer, 2002; Lyle, 
2003; Mocas, 2004; Baggili, Mislan, & Rogers, 2007; Biggs & Vidalis, 2009; 
Damshenas, Dehghantanha, Mahmoud, & Solahuddin, 2012). The image 
can then be presented in court as an exact duplicate of the original. It is 
argued that a copy of the data present on a device is not adequate and that 
a mirror image needs to be created in order for a court to accept any 
electronic data as evidence (Ryan & Shpantzer, 2002; Mocas, 2004; 
Damshenas, Dehghantanha, Mahmoud, & Solahuddin, 2012) otherwise the 
reliability and validity of the evidence can be challenged in court (Ryan & 
Shpantzer, 2002; Mocas, 2004).  
This is the same advice that is provided to the police through the ACPO 
(2012) guidelines (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009; Damshenas, Dehghantanha, 
Mahmoud, & Solahuddin, 2012). That traditional approaches to recording 
electronic evidence were not applicable to social media was identified by 
investigators. The data that comprises the social media accounts of users is 
held on external to user electronic storage devices (Garfinkel, 2010; Ward, 
2011; DeSousa, 2013) as identified above mainly in the United States 
(Duggan, Ellison, Lampe, Lenhart, & Madden, 2015).  These electronic 
devices cannot be seized and cannot be copied directly by UK law 
enforcement agencies. Whilst some data may be retained on electronic 
devices such as laptops, pads and smart phones in the memory cache 
(Garfinkel, 2010; Said, Al Awadhi, & Guimareas, 2011; Geddes & Pooneh, 
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2016), this will be incidental and a reflection of what the user has last viewed 
rather than the sum total of what is contained in their social media account. 
 
6. Investigator goals 
The identification of goals for individuals is the third step in the problem-
solving model as put forward by Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg (2003). The 
following four goals were found to be both well documented in literature on 
investigators and pertinent to findings of the research as ranked aims of 
officers. These aims were identifed through the coding process from the data 
obtained from interviewing investigators: 
1. Safeguarding individuals 
2. Maintaining the engagement of the victim. 
3. Identifying the suspect for the purposes of the investigation.  
4. Collecting evidence in such a way that it would be accepted in court.  
Each of these goals is explored in more detail below.  
 
6.1 Collecting evidence in such a way that it would be accepted in court.  
The collection of evidence for the purpose of satisfying prosecution 
requirements and subsequently the criminal court is a well-recognised and 
established objective of detectives and investigators (Maguire, 2003; Stelfox 
& Pease, 2005; Tong & Bowling, 2006; Stelfox, 2009). There are number of 
drivers for this objective.  
First, even though a suspect may have been identified and arrested, there is 
a need for evidence to be collected. In England and Wales, it falls to the 
prosecuting agency to offer proof in the vast majority of criminal cases that 
the defendant has committed the offence, rather than the defendant proving 
that he is not guilty of the offence (Connor, 2009).  This evidence must be 
collected in a way that is acceptable to a court (Stelfox & Pease, 2005; Tong 
& Bowling, 2006; Stelfox, 2009) before it can be put before a jury. Whether 
evidence is acceptable to a court is determined by several pieces of 
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legislation (Flanagan, 2008). This includes: The Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (PACE 1984); The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
(CPIA 1996); The Humans Rights Act (HRA 1998); The Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA 2000) and the Investigatory Powers Act 
2016 (IPA 2016). The latter, although clearly able to encompass social 
media communications data, was not found in the context of this research to 
generate any significant changes to legislation contained within RIPA (2000). 
Should evidence not be collected in line with those Acts then the court has 
the power to exclude the evidence, which may in turn threaten any potential 
prosecution (Stelfox, 2009). It is therefore not enough for an investigator 
simply to collect material but it must be collected in a manner which is 
acceptable and in line with legislation, which in itself takes considerable skill 
(Maguire, 2003). The Human Rights Act (HRA 1998) and The Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA 2000) have been identified as impacting on 
the ability of the police to collect evidence from suspect social media profiles 
when using covert profiles or tactics to do so (Locke, Cooke, & Jackson, 
2013; Qi & Edgar-Nevill, 2011; Edwards & Urquhart, 2016). However, there 
is a lack of literature concerning non-covert access to profiles of suspects 
and victims that is specific to the UK.  
Evidence of cybercrime in general is more difficult to collect than traditional 
crime due to its physical absence at the locality of the offence (Wall & 
Williams, 2013). The difficulties in doing so are identified above when 
considering the facets that social media poses as an issue: social media 
providers’ failure to engage with the police (Barnes, 2006; Hunton, 2009; 
Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 2011; Kardasz, 2012; Etzioni, 
2016; Greenberg, 2016), a lack of legislation in relation to social media 
providers (Hodge, 2006; Boyd & Ellison, 2007; Brenner, 2007; Hunton, 2009; 
Ward, 2011; Kardasz, 2012; Jewkes, 2013; Bryant & Stephens, 2014; 
Duggan, Ellison, Lampe, Lenhart, & Madden, 2015), and the issue of 
‘accessing social media’ (Ward, 2011; DeSousa, 2013). 
Secondly, the police are required in law to pursue all reasonable lines of 
enquiry and collect and retain material that is relevant to the investigation 
that is obtained during those enquiries as set out in s.22, CPIA 1996. The 
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courts as a consequence of this legislation require the retention of material 
whether that assists or undermines the prosecution case in offering proof of 
the suspect’s guilt. The reason for the introduction of this legislation is as a 
result of high profile wrongful convictions where the police were shown to 
have ignored, failed to investigate, failed to record or manufactured evidence 
to ensure a conviction (Jones, Grieve, & Milne, 2008; Milne, Poyser, 
Williamson, & Savage, 2010).  The collection of material which may 
subsequently be introduced as evidence assists investigators in building a 
narrative to explain the events that they are investigating, which includes 
identifying what offences if any have taken place and suspects (Maguire, 
2003).  
Thirdly, there has been a drive to professionalise the police service (Stelfox, 
2007; Flanagan, 2008) initially through the National Policing Improvement 
Agency (NPIA) and subsequently through the National College of Policing. A 
significant part of this drive to professionalise the police has focused on the 
collection of evidence. This has been conveyed to officers either through 
manuals and guidance (ACPO 2000; 2005; 2005a, 2006; 2012) or through 
training for example in the introduction of the Professionalising Investigation 
Programme (Stelfox, 2007). This guidance and training sets out standard 
operating procedures which place a requirement on investigators to both 
collect evidence and provide practical steps to do so.  Further to what has 
been provided to the police as professional guidance there is also a 
significant amount of academic literature on proposed models of 
investigation and frameworks that investigators can follow (Reith, Carr, & 
Gunsch, 2002; Casey, 2002, 2004; Carrier, 2003; Lyle, 2003; O’Ciardhuain, 
2004; Baggili, Mislan & Rogers, 2007; Perumal, 2009). Whilst it was evident 
during the interviews that investigators were not clear on the details 
contained within the guidance produced around dealing with digital media 
(ACPO, 2012), there was an appreciation expressed by each of the 
investigators interviewed that there were such rules in place and 
explanations offered of why such rules existed. Given the outlined statutory 
requirement for investigators to preserve material for court which if 
admissible may be presented as evidence; statuary rules setting out how 
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material can be collected by the police; and training that instructs officers to 
preserve and collect evidence, it is not surprising that investigators have 
identified collection of evidence for court as an aim with regard to social 
media.   
6.2 Identifying the suspects 
In addition to dealing with the collection and retention of material, s.22, CPIA 
1996 defines an investigation as seeking to identify whether a person should 
be charged with an offence, or, if they have been charged with an offence, 
whether they are guilty of it. If consideration is given as to whether someone 
should be charged with an offence then they become a suspect in the 
investigation. In so doing, CPIA 1996 sets out the goals of officers 
undertaking an investigation. Whilst not specifically directing officers to 
identify suspects, in order to consider whether a suspect should be charged, 
they first need to be identified, and so this step of suspect identification is a 
prerequisite of what is required of officers in an investigation as set out by 
the law.  
The goal of suspect identification has, however, been recognised previous to 
the enactment of this legislation in some of the earliest studies that 
specifically examined the work of detectives. These studies focused on the 
efficacy of detective work and the contribution that detectives had on solving 
crime (Isaacs, 1967; Greenwood, 1970; Greenwood, Chaiken, & Petersilia, 
1976; Eck 1983) rather than explicitly on the decision-making processes 
used by them. The authors examined the ability of detectives to identify the 
suspect in a case (Isaacs, 1967), whether the suspect was arrested 
(Greenwood,1970), the amount of work or detective effort that was involved 
(Greenwood, Chaiken, & Petersilia, 1976) and whether a case had a 
successful resolution (Greenwood, Chaiken, & Petersilia, 1976; Eck 1983). 
The choice however of using suspect identification and ‘clearances’ in court 
as a function of the success of detective work was made by the researchers 
in these studies, as opposed to being identified by the detectives themselves 
and the organisation for which they worked. Greenwood (1970) for example 
writes:  
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“The apprehension of criminal offenders is central to the criminal justice 
system” and “Few will disagreee, however, that killers, rapist, robbers, 
thieves, and those who commit violent attacks should be arrested and 
punished. This is one reasons that this study is confined to programs leading 
to the arrest of the most serious criminal offenders” (Greenwood, 1970, p.1). 
This may well have reflected public opinion of what was seen as the role and 
primary aim of the police at the time that this research took place (Braga, 
2008) and it is difficult to argue against the need to arrest serious offenders. 
However, in their development these studies (Isaacs, 1967; Greenwood, 
1970; Greenwood, Chaiken, & Petersilia, 1976; Eck 1983) other than to 
change the emphasis from whether the suspect was identified to whether 
they were arrested or succesfully convicted in court, did not alter the focus 
from the suspect as the function of the success of detective work. 
Furthermore, these studies form the basis of subsequent literature (Bayley, 
1998, 2002; Tong & Bowling, 2006) that identified detective work as 
‘suspect-centred’.  
Other research (Brandl & Frank, 1994; Maguire, 2003) though has 
questioned the measurement of the effectiveness of detective work in terms 
of focusing solely on arrests or clearances. It was highlighted that the 
weakness of focusing on arrests was that an investigation may uncover that 
an offence did not actually take place (Brandl & Frank, 1994), or that during 
the investigation the victim had withdrawn or made a wish that they did not 
want the suspect to be arrested (Brandl & Frank, 1994). In those 
circumstances an arrest would not be appropriate, but yet the work of the 
detective had by other measures been effective. In so doing, although Brandl 
& Frank (1994) did not identify this explicitly as an aim for detectives in their 
work, the third goal identified in this research was touched upon, which was 
importance of the victim and maintaining their engagement in the 
investigation. Maguire (2003) whilst giving a system level explanation as to 
why the identification of suspects is a central aim of investigative 
departments also identifies other aims of detective work including the 
collection of intelligence.  
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Social media has been credited with being used to identify suspects in a 
number of police investigations (Trottier, 2012). During the Vancouver riots 
of 2011 images of rioters captured on the phones of members of the public 
were subsequently posted on Facebook and used by the police to identify 
suspects. However suspect identification through social media can be 
achieved with other means than just by photographic evidence. The content 
of suspect social media profiles are often scrutinised for information by law 
enforcement agencies to obtain more information about them (Cheng, 2010; 
Lynch, 2010; Kerrigan, 2011; Denef, Kaptein, Bayerl, & Ramirez, 2012), 
including who their friends and family are (Trottier, 2012) leading to their 
identification and physical location. Furthermore, telecommunications data 
such as IP addresses can identify the physical location where suspects are 
or have used social media, that can subsequently lead to their arrest (Schell, 
Martin, Hung, & Rueda, 2007; Kao & Wang, 2009; Brunty & Helenek, 2015). 
Whilst collection of evidence and identification of the suspect have been 
identified as clear goals of investigators in this study, they do not hold 
primacy against the remaining two discussed below. 
 
6.3 Maintaining engagement with victims 
Police attitudes and behaviours towards victims have changed significantly 
over the last 30 years (Temkin, 1997) becoming more positive (Stelfox, 
2009) and resulting in a more positive experience for victims at the hands of 
the police (Temkin, 1997; 1999). The identification of maintaining victim 
engagement as the secondary aim of investigators is in line with this change. 
In particular, the way that victims of rape and sexual offences are treated 
appears to have been influenced through significant changes that were 
introduced in the late 1980s as a result of criticism of police practices (Adler, 
1991; Lees & Gregory, 1993; Temkin, 1999; Jordan, 2001; Horvath & Brown, 
2009). This included the introduction of special examination suites, greater 
numbers of female investigators and training programmes that challenged 
perceptions of rape victims (Temkin, 1997). Training for officers in the police 
has also been noted to shift towards more postitive attitudes with regard to 
victims with intellectual disabilities (Bailey, Barr, & Bunting, 2001). Further to 
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this, studies which have focused on investigators’ choice as to when victim 
interviews should take place, evidence sensitivity and concerns about victim 
care on the part of the police (McMillan & Thomas, 2013).  
The growing importance of the victim in the criminal justice process has also 
been reflected in legislation that has been enacted, beginning with the first 
Victim’s Charter published in 1990, revised in 1996 with a new code coming 
into force in 2013 (Ministry of Justice, 2013). Whilst these studies show a 
more positive experience from the perspective of victims, other research on 
investigator beliefs shows an attitude of suspicion towards victims of rape 
and serious sexual assault whilst acknowledging that there are policies in 
place to encourage belief in the victim (O'Keeffe, Brown, & Lyons, 2013). 
Other studies have highlighted a tension between the ‘responsibilities of the 
police’ and the ‘needs of the victim’ (Jordan, 2001) showing the aims of 
investigation and the victim to be competing.   
Attempting to evidence social media often resulted in investigators wishing to 
seize the electronic device on which the victim had accessed social media 
on, and in so doing taking it away from them. This was often at odds with the 
wishes of the victim and thus created a barrier to maintaining their 
engagement. This reflects the strong attachment of individuals to their 
electronic mobile communications devices and specifically mobile phones 
(Oksman & Rautiainen, 2003; Rosen, 2004; Campbell, 2007; Green & 
Haddon, 2009; Vandebosch & Van Cleemput, 2009). The attitudes of 
investigators in this study appear to suggest that first of all, engaging and 
maintaining a relationship with the victim is the second goal (out of four) of 
officers when ranked and when dealing with cases that involve social media. 
Secondly, whilst a tension clearly exists between the needs of the 
investigation and the needs of the victim, the needs of the victim take 
primacy over the needs of the investigation in all the cases discussed. This 
may represent a shift in attitudes towards victims by investigators.  
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6.4 Safeguarding individuals 
There are different focuses on how to identify individuals that require 
‘safeguarding’.  (Madoc-Jones, Hughes, & Humphries, 2015). Some 
literature identifies at risk groups (Walkalte, 2007) including children, adults 
with learning disabilities, elderly persons (Stevens, 2013) or individuals in 
particular social circumstances (Madoc-Jones, Hughes, & Humphries, 2015) 
whilst other literature focuses on the type of crime that the individual has 
been a victim of, for example violent crime and sexual offences (Madoc-
Jones, Hughes, & Humphries, 2015). It is recognised that assessing the 
needs of a victim is a complex task (Simmonds, 2009) but that the 
requirement for safety and protection from future victimisation is a key need 
for victims (Spalek, 2006; Walklalte, 2007). During the course of the 
interviews questions were not posed as to how officers defined safeguarding 
as it was not until the interviews were concluded and the coding process was 
quite advanced that the significance of ‘safeguarding’ became apparent.  
The importance of ‘safeguarding’ as a concept in policing has emerged and 
developed as the police, its activities and how it is structured has shifted 
towards a ‘problem orientated’ approach (Eck & Spelman, 2005). The shift 
towards safeguarding has been gradual and sustained (Richardson-Foster, 
Stanley, Miller, & Thomson, 2011) and is most evident in the areas of 
domestic violence, children, adults with learning disabilities, elderly persons. 
Following a similar pattern to that described above regarding victims of rape, 
police were subject to substantial criticism around their response to domestic 
violence and the needs of the victim during the 1980s and 1990s, which led 
to an improvement in both identifying victims and tending to their needs 
(Buzawa & Buzawa, 2002; Richards, Letchford, & Stratton, 2008; 
Richardson-Foster, Stanley, Miller, & Thomson, 2011; Madoc-Jones, 
Hughes, & Humphries, 2015).  
Over time the focus from female and adult victims has widened to 
encompass children (Burton, 2000; Shields, 2008) and legislation was 
introduced, which places obligations on public agencies including the police 
to protect vulnerable children and adults (Adoption and Children Act 2002; 
Children Act 2004; Laming, 2009). The response to these requirements has 
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been seen in the creation of Multi Agency Safeguarding Hubs in which the 
police are embedded whose role is to: 1) identify risk, 2) identify victims and 
intervene in order to, 3) reduce harm to individuals, families and 
communities (London Borough of Merton, 2014). Through these hubs a high 
volume of referrals are made to social services by police officers (Rivett & 
Kelly, 2006). Officers are also required to undertake risk assessments on 
both adults and children present at domestic incidents (HM Government, 
2010) and studies have shown that officers attending domestic violence 
incidents consider the welfare of children and adults present (Buzawa & 
Buzawa, 2002; Richards, Letchford, & Stratton, 2008; Richardson-Foster, 
Stanley, Miller, & Thomson, 2011). The comments made by investigators in 
this study shows them identifying risk, seeking to identify victims at risk and 
attempting to reduce the harm to them. This demonstrates that 
‘safeguarding’ as a concept is being applied to investigations involving social 
media and not just in the confines of domestic violence incidents. 
Safeguarding was identified as the most important aim in investigations that 
involved social media. However the concept of safeguarding is not simply 
tied to protecting victims from interaction with social media through 
education (Fleming, Greentree, Cocotti-Muller, Elias, & Morrison, 2006; 
Griffith & Roth, 2007; Savirimuthu, 2012), increasing privacy settings 
(Fleming, Greentree, Cocotti-Muller, Elias, & Morrison, 2006; Griffith & Roth, 
2007; Savirimuthu, 2012), or blocking other users from making contact with 
them (Fleming, Greentree, Cocotti-Muller, Elias, & Morrison, 2006; Griffith & 
Roth, 2007; Savirimuthu, 2012). It also relates to using social media to 
identify the location of a victim (Schell, Martin, Hung, & Rueda, 2007), 
identifying whether there are any other victims in danger (Carr & Hilton, 
2011), and locating the suspects (Schell, Martin, Hung, & Rueda, 2007; Kao 
& Wang, 2009; Brunty & Helenek, 2015) in order to prevent serious harm 
from coming to victims. All of these aspects of safeguarding were identified 
from the coding of the interview transcripts.  
Within UK policing structures, protecting and safeguarding has been 
organisationally placed under the remit of Public Protection Units or 
departments (Sherlock & Cambridge, 2009; Coliandris, 2015). The exact 
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structures and names between different police areas vary but Public 
Protection Units invariably encompass the areas of Child Abuse 
Investigation, Dangerous, Violent and Sex Offenders, Vulnerable Victims 
and Domestic Abuse Investigation (Sherlock & Cambridge, 2009; Coliandris, 
2015). The areas where safeguarding applies has continued to expand with 
the internet being recognised as being an area of risk and posing a threat to 
individuals (Coliandris, 2015; Wate & Boulton, 2015). Given this substantial 
cultural, organisation and statutory shift, it is not suprising that safeguarding 
was evidenced as an important consideration for investigators in this 
research.  
 
7. Decision rules used by investigators when choosing how to physically 
secure evidence 
When considering how to physically secure social media evidence 
investigators who were interviewed were shown to rely on their previous 
experiences. They directly transposed their experience from past events 
relating to the collection of non social media evidence and applied it to social 
media. This pertained to taking statements, photographing, obtain screen 
shots of and printing off social media content. The ability of an individual to 
associate a new situation with a past one is well documented (Orasanu, 
Martin, & Davison, 2001; Moriarty, 2015; Cookson, 2017). A perfect match is 
not required with a previous situation for the individual to make use of the 
rules that they used in the previous incident (Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 
2001; Moriarty, 2015; Cookson, 2017). This is true of the use of previous 
situations by investigators to inform their behaviour around social media 
even though as discussed above social media poses a new problem for 
investigators with facets that make it unique and different from previous 
problems encountered by them.  
A number of heuristics have been identified that shape individuals behaviour 
in relation to police work. Heuristics have been portrayed in both positive 
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Snook & Cullen, 2008; Rossmo, 2009) and 
negative ways (Findley & Scott, 2006; Zalman & Carrano, 2014). From a 
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negative perspective heuristics have been singled out as the central cause 
of a number of miscarriages of justice and labelled under a catch all term of 
‘tunnel vision’ (Findley & Scott, 2006; Snook & Cullen, 2008; Rossmo, 2009; 
Zalman & Carrano, 2014). Conversely the positive perspective on heuristics 
is that whilst legislation prescribes that officers are evidence gatherers and 
should pursue all proportionate lines of enquiry (CPIA, 1996) officers are 
constrained by: the amount of time and information (either a lack or excess 
of) that is available to them, their experience, distractions to their work, a 
lack of resources and co-ordination with other personnel (Youngs & Canter, 
2006; Snook & Cullen, 2008; Rossmo, 2009; Zalman & Carrano, 2014). For 
this reason, it is not only impossible for officers to examine all possible lines 
of enquiry and all possible suspects, but also not desirable (Snook & Cullen, 
2008). In these instances, where the investigators are bound by non optimal 
circumstances, heuristics allow for effective decisions to be made (Snook & 
Cullen, 2008; Rossmo, 2009).  Whilst this previous work on heuristics has 
focused on lines of enquiry that investigators pursue and their approach to 
suspects (Findley & Scott, 2006; Rossmo, 2009; Rassin, 2010; Stelfox, 
2009; Smith & Tilley, 2015), witnesses (Ask & Granhag, 2007) and what 
evidence they gather, this research identifies that heuristics are also evident 
in the process that investigators use to gather evidence and specifically 
evidence found within social media.   
Three heuristics were identified during this research as cognitive biases 
influencing officers to use previous approaches to evidence collection when 
considering how to physically evidence social media. These are 
Confirmation Bias, the Availability Heuristic, and the Representiveness 
Heuristic. Although labels have been attached to these heuristics or biases, 
such as ‘confirmation bias’, it should be noted that different authors use 
slightly overlapping defnitions and terminology (Klayman, 1995; Nickerson, 
1998; Findley & Scott, 2006). This research does not seek to address the 
superiority of one term over another when applied to a particular concept but 
uses specific labels for the purpose of clarity.  
Confirmation or verification bias describes the behaviour of individuals 
searching for information that confirms their view or hypothesis in such a 
36 
 
way that it impedes their ability to challenge that view or hypothesis 
(Klayman, 1995; Nickerson, 1998; Oswal & Grosjean, 2004). It has been 
widely recognised that police officers seek evidence that confirms their 
hypothesis of a set of events or that build a case against a suspect that they 
have in mind for an offence (Findley & Scott, 2006; Rossmo, 2009; Rassin, 
2010; Stelfox, 2009; Smith & Tilley, 2015) as well as their approach to 
witnesses (Ask & Granhag, 2007). By doing so, they effectively speed up the 
process of investigation. However, at the same time they do so to the 
detriment of keeping an open mind to other scenarios that may have taken 
place and what a witness may offer. This bias is also evident in relation to 
how the evidence is collected. By putting emphasis on cues around social 
media that correspond to previous experiences and disregarding cues that 
identify social media as a different and unique type of evidence, investigators 
avoid cognitive dissonance. This enables investigators to continue using 
known methods of evidence collection without having to build a new mental 
model and consider new ways of collecting and evidencing social media.  
The Availability Heuristic describes the tendency of individuals to utilise 
information, tactics or strategy that is easily available. By doing so, officers 
can make more effective use of their time by gathering evidence which is 
easily available and less resource- intensive to collect. The weakness that 
manifests itself is that evidence, which may be pertinent and point to a 
different hypothesis and suspect, but which is not readily available, is 
overlooked (Rossmo, 2009; Stelfox, 2009). This heuristic has been widely 
acknowledged as having a bearing on the evidence that police officers 
collect (Ask & Granhag, 2005; Rassin, Eerland, & Kuijpers, 2010). It can also 
be applied to using a strategy or tactic that has been recently used to collect 
evidence (Ask & Alison, 2010; Kebbell, Muller, & Martin, 2010; Moriarty, 
2015).  
The representativeness heuristic (Garb, 1996; Brannon & Carson, 2003; 
Moriarty, 2015) describes individuals comparing the similar features of a 
previous situation that they have been in to a current one and on that basis 
using the same decision-making rationale to reach an outcome. Investigators 
during the interviews spoke about cases that they had taken to court and 
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strategies and tactics that were used in those investigations not with regard 
to social media material but other electronic evidence. They then applied 
those same strategies and tactics to social media based on their positive 
experience in court. Whilst this type of behaviour can be seen as driven by 
the representativeness heuristic (Stelfox, 2009; Moriarty, 2015) it is also 
reflective of professional learning cycles (Dewey, 1933; Argyris & Schön, 
1978; Kolb, 1984; Gibbs, 1988; Johns, 1995; Brookfield, 1998; Thompson, 
2000; White, Fook, & Garnder, 2006) and inductive reasoning (Keane & 
Eysenck, 2010). Professional learning cycles incorporate past professional 
experience into present practice, whilst models of inductive reasoning allow 
individuals to reach conclusions based on the expanding of a particular 
observed set of circumstances into a generalisation (Sloman & Lagnado, 
2005; Bryant, 2009a, Keane & Eysenck, 2010). Although heuristics describe 
the decision making of individuals based on previous experience, they may 
not include all of the individual’s current knowledge and experience. As such 
heuristics may distort an individual’s inductive reasoning by for example only 
identifying readily available knowledge to support a conclusion (availability 
heuristic) or identifying knowledge in line with a conclusion that the individual 
is seeking to confirm (confirmation bias). Furthermore, heuristics need not 
require a conscious process of reasoning. The closeness of various models 
describing human thought processes, in this case inductive reasoning 
(Sloman & Lagnado, 2005; Bryant, 2009a, Keane & Eysenck, 2010), 
heuristics, reasoning by analogy (Holyoak, 2005; Bryant, 2009a) and 
professional learning models has been identified as showing that such 
models are somewhat arbitrary in delineating and camouflaging what are 
similar forms of thinking (Keane & Eysenck, 2010). All of these models fall 
under the umbrella of ‘positive’ or ‘descriptive’ models that seek to describe 
and understand the actual choices that are made by individuals (Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1981; Crozier & Raynard, 1997; Koksalan, Wallenius, & Zionts, 
2011). Whilst not excluding the validity of models of inductive reasoning and 
reasoning by analogy or their potential application to decision rules 
employed by investigators during the problem-solving process, clearly 
identifiable examples of such rules were not visible in the data. 
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8. ACPO (2012) guidelines and strategies for investigators to use when 
encountering social media found within professional and academic literature 
The second research question sought to identify strategies that investigators 
used when they came across social media in their investigations. This 
objective was rooted in the coding and examination of the data collected 
from both the crime reports and the interviews. In contrast the fourth 
research question, sought first to find and then compare guidelines against 
the strategies identified as being used by investigators in answer to the 
second research question. From the perspective of a literature review 
however, these two research objectives were closely aligned. The search 
criteria used to review literature to find strategies that have been noted as 
being used by investigators simultaneously found strategies suggested for 
use by officers. When searching for strategies and guidelines that 
investigators both used and could follow when coming across social media, 
both academic and professional literature was considered.  
Although literature examining decision making by investigators when 
encountering social media in their cases has not been identified, academic 
research around the issue of cybercrime, police investigation and 
preservation of digital evidence from seized devices is wide-spread. In this 
literature there is a strong focus on proposed models of investigation and 
frameworks that investigators can follow (Reith, Carr, & Gunsch, 2002; 
Casey, 2004; O’Ciardhuain, 2004; Perumal, 2009; Biggs & Vidalis, 2009; 
Damshenas, Dehghantanha, Mahmoud, & Solahuddin, 2012). In other words 
laying out standard operating procedures that make some of the decisions 
on behalf of officers. They often include a strong technical aspect 
concentrating on devices that can be physically seized and then forensically 
examined (Casey, 2002; Carrier, 2003; Lyle, 2003; Baggili, Mislan & Rogers, 
2007). As such, a large segment of this literature appears to be aimed at 
forensic investigators rather than general law enforcement practitioners. 
Whilst the forensic examination of electronic devices in line with those 
guidelines was not conducted by officers themselves, one identified strategy 
and tactic that investigators were using to evidence social media when 
coming across it, was to seize electronic devices such as computers, tablets 
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and mobile phones and submit them to HTCUs to extract the information 
from them. 
The closest and most up to date guidelines aimed at investigators rather 
than forensic scientists was found to be that provided by the ACPO (2012) 
guidelines. At the time of writing (September 2017) these are the guidelines 
that are still in place (Bryant, 2016), directed to be followed by the National 
College of Policing and employed by digital investigators in the UK (Biggs & 
Vidalis, 2009). 
There are four general principles that are at the centre of the guidelines 
stemming from the 5 principles introduced by the High-Tech Crime 
Conference in 1999 (Ryan & Shpantzer, 2002). The first is that investigators 
should not change the original data in any way that is held on an electronic 
device. It goes on to say as identified above that computer software may 
change data without the user being aware that this has happened. The 
second principle is that if original data is accessed it should be done by 
persons who are competent to do so and be able to give evidence in court. It 
further identifies that some data will not be stored locally but externally. If this 
data is to be recovered then it stipulates that the person doing so is 
competent to do so and give evidence in court, and that consideration is 
given to legislation in the jurisdiction from which the data is being obtained. It 
does not specify who would be competent to obtain this information or by 
what means this could be done. The third principle states that there should 
be an audit trail kept so that an independent party could achieve an identical 
result if the same steps were pursued by them as the investigator undertook. 
The final principle is that the investigator in the case is responsible for 
ensuring that the above principles are adhered to. 
Investigators were however also conducting the analysis of devices 
themselves and introducing digital evidence in ways that did not incorporate 
the imaging of the original data. This included taking screen shots of and 
photographing social media accounts. In so doing they were not adhering to 
the suggested digital forensic models. The use of forensic models of digital 
recovery cited above in criminal cases stems from the US Supreme Court 
judgement of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
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(1993) (Ryan & Shpantzer, 2002; Berger, 2005; Meyers & Rogers, 2005). 
This ruling introduced tests of scientific validity and reliability (Ryan & 
Shpantzer, 2002; Berger, 2005; Meyers & Rogers, 2005) that requires expert 
principles and methodology to be followed when dealing with evidence that 
is to be accepted by the court. Subsequently The International High-Tech 
Crime Conference in 1999 adopted 5 principles (Ryan & Shpantzer, 2002) 
which the ACPO (2012) guidelines mirror, for dealing with digital evidence. 
This research has failed however to find case law in England and Wales in 
relation to digital evidence and more specifically social media (Biggs & 
Vidalis, 2009) that related to the exclusion of digital evidence. In the absence 
of a court ruling in the UK, the implications of investigators not adhering to 
these guidelines and forensic models of recovery of digital evidence are 
explored further below.   
 
8.1. ACPO guidelines and examination of electronic devices 
The four principles as set out above are most easily applied to digital 
evidence that is contained on a device that can be examined. The guidance 
is reflective of the literature on forensic recovery of evidence from devices 
(Reith, Carr, & Gunsch, 2002; Casey, 2004; O’Ciardhuain, 2004; Perumal, 
2009). That these guidelines were being adhered to was clearly visible in 
both the crime reports and from the interviews. Investigators were seizing 
items and then either submitting them to the HTCUs or using specifically 
sanctioned equipment at police stations for imaging the devices that they 
were seizing. There were two barriers that were identified in both the crime 
reports and the interviews to submitting devices to HTCUs. The first was the 
amount of time that it took to examine a device. The second was that the 
HTCU within TVP would not accept multiple devices but rather employed a 
triage process for submissions. As mentioned above this resulted in some 
items that investigators had a suspicion contained material relevant to the 
investigation not being accepted for examination. As a consequence, one of 
the investigators examined a device themselves to ascertain whether there 
was evidence present on it. Once they identified that there was the HTCU 
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then accepted the device for examination. By this point however data on the 
device is likely to have been altered by the investigator accessing it, violating 
both the first and second principles of the guidelines. Given the pressure on 
HTCUs (Kshetri, 2009; Yar, 2013; Bregant & Bregant, 2014), their reluctance 
to accept all devices for examination is understandable and the triage of 
devices has become an accepted process. However, the investigator without 
having violated the first two principles would have never recovered the 
evidence. The question then arises if the purpose of the examing the device 
by the investigator is to find evidence for the purpose of court, is there any 
point in doing so if this evidence will be subsequently excluded by the court 
due to the principles in the guidelines being violated.  
There are two principal mechanisms for excluding evidence in court. The first 
is through s.78 of PACE 1984 and the second is the ability for a judge to stay 
proceedings on the grounds of abuse of process under common law 
(Fitzpatrick & Taylor, 2001). Under common law evidence can be weighed 
up with on the one hand its probative value considered and on the other 
whether it causes prejudice against the aggrieved without being sufficiently 
connected to the case itself (Murphy, 2007). Although this principle is 
encompassed by common law in the UK it is also well recognised in other 
jurisdictions (Murphy, 2007). S.78 of PACE 1984 refers to the exclusion of 
evidence if it interferes with the defendants ability to have a fair trial (Murphy, 
2007). Thus evidence which has been obtained illegally or unfairly can be 
excluded (Murphy, 2007).  
With regard to the exclusion of evidence there are identified principles under 
which evidence can be excluded from a trial (Fitzpatrick & Taylor, 2001). 
These include ‘bad faith’ on the part of investigators, ‘impropriety’ which 
relates to breach of codes of practice and how bad faith and impropriety will 
subsequently affect the outcome of the case (Fitzpatrick & Taylor, 2001). A 
factor which falls under these headings is that of reliability and how evidence 
has been obtained (Fitzpatrick & Taylor, 2001). If there is reliable evidence 
available then this should be the principal evidence used (Fitzpatrick & 
Taylor, 2001). If evidence has been obtained that breaches the rights of 
suspect then similarly it may be excluded (Fitzpatrick & Taylor, 2001). 
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However simply because  evidence has been gathered in an improper way 
does not mean that this will happen. In the United States if evidence has 
been gathered in a way that has violated the rigths of the accused then it will 
not be accepted in the court. This is not the case in England and Wales, 
rather the fairness of the trial is considered (Murphy, 2007). This is crucially 
important as even if the way in which evidence has been obtained breaches 
ACPO’s (2012) own guidelines it may still be accepted. If identifying with the 
goal of the investigator to obtain evidence that is presentable in court, having 
some evidence, whether obtained improperly or not is better than having no 
evidence at all, as this evidence may still be accepted. The research has 
failed to find case law in England and Wales in relation to digital evidence 
and more specifically social media (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009) that related to 
exclusion of digital evidence.  
 
8.2. ACPO guidelines, social media and identified objectives 
Whilst the guidelines (ACPO 2012) are fairly extensive with regard to 
obtaining evidence from devices that have been seized, in relation to social 
networking they are limited. There are two identified objectives in the 
guidelines with regard to ‘internet chat’ which would as a term appear to 
encompass social media. The first is to ascertain who the suspect is and the 
second is to capture the content of the communications. These objectives 
clearly fit with the investigators goals identified from the interviews of 
obtaining evidence for the purpose of court; identifying the suspect; and 
partly that of safeguarding other victims by identifying the suspect. The 
objective of safeguarding does however include further elements as 
discussed above, for example identifying other possible victims in order to 
protect them. Furthermore, the third objective of maintaining victim 
engagement is not touched upon at all in the guidelines. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that aims other than evidence are not present in guidelines 
specifically constructed to deal with evidence. However the aims of 
‘maintaining victim engagement’ and ‘safeguarding’ are not encompassed by 
other guidelines relating to digital material. Furthermore if guidelines relating 
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to evidence are to be overridden due to other objectives, it may be helpful to 
investigators if the circumstances in which this may happen were detailed. 
 
8.3. ACPO guidelines, social media and suggested strategies 
The guidelines suggest a total of four strategies / tactics for obtaining 
evidence when dealing with social media. First, they identify that networking 
sites often contain a function that allows chat logs to be saved. This was a 
tactic to physically collect social media evidence found to be used by 
investigators from the data obtained during the interviews. The guidelines 
are somewhat vague however in how this information is to be extracted. It 
suggests that these saved logs be placed onto a removable media device. 
Who completes this extraction onto the removable storage devices is not 
stipulated. However, the copying of such information from an electronic 
device as discussed above will not be a mirror image of the information on 
the device but rather a copy. If the user of the device or the investigator were 
to do it then it would likely infringe upon the first, second and third principles 
of the guidelines. It is not clear why having saved the chat logs onto the 
device, they should not be then evidenced by downloading the information 
using equipment at police stations or through submission to the HTCU. This 
is the course of action suggested with regard to electronic devices containing 
data earlier in the guidelines. 
Secondly, the guidelines go on to state that if no removable media is 
available that the logs should be printed out. The printing out of chat logs 
and social media pages from a given profile was a tactic that was evidenced 
as being used by investigators in the data. This tactic was used by 
investigators when using accessing social media profiles from computers 
that were connected to printers. However as revealed during the course of 
the interviews many of the electronic devices where such ‘chat’ took place 
include mobile phones and tablets where removable storage is not possible 
nor is there a straightforwared ability to connect the device to a printer. 
The third recommendation in the guidelines is that if information is being 
accessed that is in transit then the authorities bureau should be contacted. 
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Accessing information on social media servers will undoubtedly mean that 
information will be in transit from the server to the user’s device or whatever 
device the investigator is working and attempting to access the information 
from (Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty, & Hegarty, 2010; Mason & George, 2011; 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty, & Lamb, 2011; Chung, Park, Lee, & Kang, 2012). 
However no further guidance is provided as to what the contact with the 
authorities bureau should achieve or the aims of doing so. Contact with the 
authorities bureau was a tactic seen during to the interviews to be adopted 
by investigators either for the purpose of obtaining advice or for the purpose 
of obtaining the content of a social media profile from the provider directly. 
Finally, in line with the above the only direct reference made to social media 
in the guidelines states that the best information will be provided by the 
service provider. It recognises however that the service provider may not be 
based in the UK and may not provide the information on request in any case. 
As such ACPO (2012) guidelines recommend that the investigator “should 
always secure a copy of what is seen as this may be the only opportunity to 
secure this evidence before it changes” (ACPO, 2012, p.34). This comment 
is not expanded upon and appears to be a catchall strategy that is at odds 
with the rest of the guidelines and particularly with regard to the four 
principles detailed above.  
Established methods of digital forensic collection of evidence concern 
themselves in the main with the seizure of devices (Casey, 2002; Carrier, 
2003; Lyle, 2003; Baggili, Mislan, & Rogers, 2007; Biggs & Vidalis, 2009; 
Damshenas, Dehghantanha, Mahmoud, & Solahuddin, 2012) and not ‘cloud 
computing’ as discussed above.  For this reason, it has been suggested that 
the ACPO (2012) guidelines specifically do not easily encompass new forms 
of digital evidence such as cloud computing (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009; 
Damshenas, Dehghantanha, Mahmoud, & Solahuddin, 2012; Zargari & 
Benford, 2012).  
Whilst all the investigators made reference to being aware of guidelines 
around digital evidence, none of them referred directly to the ACPO (2012) 
guidelines although there were aspects of these guidelines that were 
mentioned such as not using work computers to conduct research on profiles 
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in order not to leave a footprint. The finding that investigators were not aware 
of where specific guidelines originated from or their detail, has significance 
for the dissemination of any future professional practice, but was outside of 
the scope of this research. However, a repeated view of investigators was 
that if the situation justified it particularly in relation to safeguarding, then 
these guidelines could be over ridden.  
 
9. Conclusion 
The reasons for the researcher conducting a literature review prior to the 
collection and coding of the data whilst employing a grounded theory 
methodology was explained. This is the method that is espoused by Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) and during this review models of decision making were 
considered. It was however found during the research that the approach 
taken by investigators when social media was encountered could not be 
overlaid onto descriptive or normative models of decision making or those 
that encompassed heuristics that had been reviewed. Due to this further 
literature was assessed during and after the coding process and it was found 
that ‘problem solving’ models (Bransford & Stein, 1984; Sternberg, 1985; 
Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003) are better equipped to describe how 
investigators approach social media. This was significant as it validated the 
independence of theory emerging from the data rather than the researcher 
being overly influenced by the content of the literature reviewed prior to the 
start of the research.  
The first four steps of ‘problem solving’ as defined by by Pretz, Naples, & 
Sternberg (2003) were recognised as being acted out by investigators and 
this evidenced in Chapter 5. The first of these steps is a recognition that 
social media presents a problem, which was identified by all the 
interviewees. The second step is to identify the facets of the problem that 
social media presents. Facets that frame social media as a problem for law 
enforcement agencies have been recognised in existing literature and were 
explored. These facets were identified by investigators and noted in the data 
from the interviewees. The third step - the identification of the goals of the 
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problem solver was seen in terms of four hierarchical aims that investigators 
pursue. All four aims have been previously identified in literature examining 
police and more specifically detective work. However, they have been either 
assumed to form part of detective work by researchers in the case of 
evidence collection and suspect identification or in relation to all four goals 
they have been noted as being prescribed onto the police through legislative 
changes and governmental pressure. The identification of these aims by 
investigators themselves and in a hierarchical order is an original way of 
identifying how investigators approach the issue of social media and will be 
discussed in chapter 5. The remaining steps of the ‘problem solving’ model 
correlate to the processes noted as occurring within normative, descriptive 
and heuristic decision-making models (Shogren, et al., 2008; Frauenknecht 
& Black, 2010).  
Strategies used by and available to officers examining social media during 
their investigations were searched for. The majority of these pertained to 
processes related to examining physically recovered electronic devices and 
were aimed at digital forensic investigators rather than general officers. The 
closest and most up to date guidelines aimed at investigators rather than 
forensic scientists were found to be those provided by the ACPO (2012) 
guidelines. It was shown that although social media is considered within 
them, there are significant inconsistencies with the strategies / tactics offered 
for dealing with social media and the principles on which the guidelines are 
built on. Furthermore, the guidelines do not fully encompass two of the aims 
that investigators have, namely maintaining the engagement of the victim 
and the safeguarding of individuals.  
The following chapter discusses methodology employed in this research, 
including grounded theory that was touched upon in this chapter when 
considering the timing of a literature review.  
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Chapter 3: A grounded theory methodology and the approach taken to the 
collection of data from crime reports and interviews with investigators 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter concerns itself with the methodology employed during the 
research and the approach taken to collecting data from two separate 
sources, crime reports and interviews conducted with investigators. To begin 
with, the grounded theory methodology and the approach to coding the data 
that was adopted is discussed. The issue of being an insider researcher 
when employing a grounded theory approach is then considered. Following 
this each of the two data sources are examined individually, beginning with 
crime reports. An explanation of police crime recording systems is given. 
The reasons for using crime reports in this research are outlined as is their 
predicted strength and the constraints that they have in providing data to 
answer the research questions posed. The sample size of the crime reports 
is discussed as are the problems that were encountered in collecting the 
data. Next the decision as to why crime reports from the three investigative 
areas of child abuse, domestic violence and general office criminal 
investigation were chosen as opposed to more specialised departments that 
may have a higher likelihood of dealing with cybercrime is explained.  
The second source of data for the research were interviews conducted with 
investigators. To start with, the reasons are given for choosing interviews, 
specifically semi-structured interviews as a method of collecting data to 
answer the research questions posed and in particular the third research 
question. Next, the content of the interview schedule consisting of five 
separate sections is outlined. Sample size is then considered with attention 
given to the obstacles that are present in gaining access to investigators for 
research interviews. Following this, the limitations of semi-structured 
interviews and of using qualitative data to examine cognitive processes are 
reflected upon.  
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2. Grounded Theory Methodology 
As was discussed in the introductory chapter, there was no established 
theory identified on investigator decision making around social media. For 
this reason, grounded theory was adopted to analyse the primary data 
collected. This methodology is well-suited to building theory in a relatively 
unexplored field (Glaser, 1978; Schreiber, 2001; Goulding, 2002). Glaser 
and Strauss identify two separate types of theory generation – substantive 
and formal. Substantive theory is formed specifically in relation to the data 
from which it originates and does not attempt to generalise outside of this. 
Formal theory seeks to explain relationships between concepts found in the 
data (Goulding, 2002). This research sought to build more than Substantive 
Theory by taking data from different police areas and investigative 
departments.  
A system of coding was used to examine the crime reports and the interview 
transcripts. The way in which data is coded, seperates two distinct 
approaches in grounded theory (Kendall, 1999), that proposed by Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) and that presented by Glaser (1992). During this 
research, the system of coding that was put forward by Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) in Basics of Qualitative Research was used. This is a three step 
system of coding, which in contrast to the model offered by Glaser (1992) 
uses an additional intermediate step in the data analysis named ‘axial 
coding’.  The first level of coding, groups data together into categories. To 
begin with, these are likely to be numerous and based on description. 
However, as the coding process goes on categories are collapsed into each 
other to form fewer overarching ones. These overarching or higher 
categories become more conceptual in nature. The relationships between 
these conceptual categories can then be sought, which provides the theory. 
Axial coding develops these conceptual categories by formally identifying the 
conditions that allow each category to be formed. These conditions include 
the context, strategies and outcomes in which that category can exist.  
This intermediate step it is argued allows the researcher to add structure to 
the way that the data is examined and allows the researcher to be 
systematic in their approach. The detractors of this method argue that axial 
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coding places a restrictive framework on the data that prevents theory that 
otherwise might emerge, from doing so (Kendall, 1999). The reason for this 
is that the conditions identified by Strauss and Corbin (1990) as pertinent for 
understanding how categories are formed may not encompass all the 
theoretical links that are present in the data between categories. Not 
withstanding this argument, the more systematic approach was adopted. 
The reason for this was that as an insider researcher, as was demonstrated 
in the pilot studies undertaken prior to this research, there were 
preconceptions present around anticipated results in the data. The 
systematic approach to analysing the data was used in order to curtail the 
influence of the ideas that may have been introduced into the research due 
to this insider perspective, which is further discussed below.  
 
3. Police Crime Recording Systems 
Each police force uses crime recording systems, which record criminal 
incidents in line with Home Office national crime reporting standards (Home 
Office, 2018a). Each crime recording system if used diligently records the 
type of criminal incident that has been brought to the attention of the police. 
An offence is recorded either if: 
1. There is an identified victim 
2. The police to their knowledge believe that an offence has taken place.  
3. On the balance of probabilities there is no credible evidence to the  
contrary that a crime has taken place  
or 
4. If the points to prove that an offence has taken place against the state 
are evidenced.  
 
However, if it is used effectively it should also provide a comprehensive 
overview of an investigation and the investigative actions that have been 
considered by officers conducting the investigation. The National College of 
Policing, provides draft national standards for professional investigators 
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(National College of Policing, 2014), which includes those officers qualified 
as detectives. Within the core performance criteria expected of a detective is 
included: “Fully document all decisions, actions, options and rationale in 
accordance with current policy and legislation.” (National College of Policing, 
2014, p.2). There are various places where these decisions, actions and 
rationale can be recorded, however it is often the case that the crime 
recording system is designed so that this information can be recorded within 
it, and is used to do so by officers (National College of Policing, 2014). As 
such, within each crime report there exists the strong possibility that the 
circumstances of the investigation as well as any actions undertaken or 
considered are recorded, including investigative actions around social 
media. Crime reports have clearly not been created for the end purpose of 
academic research. As such using the definition that primary data is 
“collected at first hand for the specific purpose of addressing the 
criminological issues in questions” (Jupp, 1989, p.46) and that secondary 
data is “observations collected by other people or other agencies with other 
purposes in mind” (Jupp, 1989, p.46) this form of data collection falls into the 
latter category.  However, crime reports in the context of this research are 
akin to self-reporting surveys. Officers and investigators, whose decision 
making is at the centre of this research have the opportunity to detail the 
information sought in the first three objectives outlined in the introduction 
within crime reports. They record the type of crime that has been reported 
and / or investigated and the elements of the crime itself, which in turn has 
the ability to identify whether social media is involved and in what way. 
Furthermore, as detailed above, crime reports are also designed to allow 
officers to record decisions, actions, options and rationale. In addition, there 
exists a framework put forward by the National College of Policing for 
officers to use when making decisions (National College of Policing, 2014a) 
termed the ‘national decision model’ (NDM). The model was initially 
developed by the National Police Improvement Agency on behalf of ACPO 
(NPIA, 2012). The model is purported to be suiteable for all decision making 
in a police setting including operational and non operational situations. As 
such there may have been an expectation that this model would feature in 
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investigators’ decision making and been either visible in the crime reports 
examined or discussed during the interviews.  
This was precisely the data that was sought in order to achieve the first three 
research objectives.  
As a result, crime reports as a method of data collection in this research 
proposal, enjoyed the benefits noted in both primary and secondary data 
(Kothari, 2004). This included the following advantages that secondary data 
collection offers: minimal preparation time as no data collection mechanism 
had to be constructed (for example a questionnaire or interview plan); no 
organisation was needed with regard to the distribution of a data collecting 
mechanism; and as permissions were given to have access to the data by 
both Avon and Somerset Constabulary (ASC) and Thames Valley Police 
(TVP), the issue of low response rates associated with collecting primary 
data via questionnaires was avoided. These facets meant that a large 
amount of data was collected with a lower cost placed on the researcher. 
Importantly however, the crime reports had the potential to provide the 
benefit that primary data offers, in that data collected was in line with the 
objectives of the research. 
 
3.1 The choice of department 
Three police forces in England and Wales were initially approached and 
asked to provide anonymised crime reports that pertained to cases that 
civilian investigators and detectives had investigated. The choice of 
departments from which to obtain a sample of crime reports was a significant 
issue. There exist numerous roles and departments within the police that 
detectives traditionally occupy. These include: Major Crime enquiry teams; 
CID, CAIU; DAIU, Specialist Rape and Serious Sexual Offence Units; 
Serious and Organised Crime Units, Burglary and Robbery Teams, Area 
Intelligence Teams, Economic Crime Units, Cyber Crime Units and many 
others. Although the study was exploratory, the wider the range of case 
types and sample of investigators that was examined, the greater the 
extrapolation that could be drawn from the data. 
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For this study, three areas of investigative policing were chosen from which 
sample crime reports were taken.  These areas of investigation were: CAIU; 
DAIU and CID.  When deciding which areas of investigation to focus the 
research on, literature concerning social media that was examined prior to 
the submission of the research proposal was considered. Although literature 
does exist specifically concerning strategies employed around social media 
and police investigations it relates to either the use of social media as an 
intelligence tool (Trottier & Lyon, 2011; Trottier, 2012; Schneider, 2016) or as 
a communication aid for the police (Trottier, 2012; Denef, Bayerl, & Kaptein, 
2013; Schneider, 2016). In contrast, this research focuses on strategies 
used relating to social media content that is created by the actors within the 
investigation and that is subsequently treated as relevant material or 
evidence. More generally, literature that examines cybercrime describes 
types of offences that may feature social media as generated by the actors 
in the investigation, for example crimes concerning child grooming (Wall, 
2001; Jewkes & Andrews, 2005; Holt & Bossler, 2012; Gilespie, 2015). In 
these cases, the social media content would likely form part of the relevant 
material and / or evidence. This literature recognises that local police areas 
have created specialist units that deal specifically with offences like child 
grooming and more generally cybercrime, such as Paedophile Online 
Investigation Teams or dedicated cybercrime units (Jewkes & Andrews, 
2005; Manzhai, 2012; Wall & Williams, 2013; Nowacki & Willts, 2016). 
Furthermore, it is highlighted that some areas of investigation are more likely 
to come across cybercrime than the three areas of investigation chosen, for 
example the area of Fraud Investigation (Burns, Whitworth, & Thompson, 
2004). Thus, a consideration existed whether to draw on crime reports from 
investigative areas that the literature highlighted as more likely to encounter 
cybercrime. These as discussed above would likely have a significant 
incidence of social media in their cases generated by the actors in the 
investigation. 
Whilst acknowledging this, the focus has remained on the three chosen 
departments for two reasons. First, this research seeks to understand how 
social media affects the bulk of front line detectives and not a smaller 
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specialised section of the police. Police officers not only from specialist 
departments including general response officers are expected to deal with 
cybercrime (Holt, Belvins, & Burkert, 2010; Taylor, Fritsch, Liederbach, 2014; 
Bossler & Holt, 2012). The distinction between larger established 
departments and smaller more specialist units is important. Smaller units 
have access to greater resources, training and equipment (Jewkes & 
Andrews, 2005; Marcum et al., 2010; Wall & Williams, 2013). As a 
consequence, there may be significant differences between their approach, 
strategies and decision making in relation to social media to that employed 
by detectives in other departments. Furthermore, there is a lack of literature 
examining how the majority of police officers approach and deal with 
cybercrime (Holt & Bossler, 2012). 
The three chosen areas of investigative policing are staffed by detectives or 
experienced civilian investigators that either support or are the officers in 
charge of their own investigations and take up the bulk of serious and 
complex crime investigation at a Base Command Unit (BCU) level (Maguire, 
2003; Chatterton, 2008). Whilst in different forces at different times specialist 
units of investigators are set up to deal with particular aspects of crime  
(Maguire, 2003), at the start of 2014 (the time frame from which the samples 
were obtained) these three areas of investigation were distinct within the two 
forces that the crime reports were taken from.  
There does not exist at the point of writing a comprehensive list of the 
number of detectives that operate within England and Wales or the numbers 
in which they occupy specific departments (Police Federation of England 
and Wales, 2015).  However, Home Office data (2015) on police officer 
functions gives an indication of possible numbers totalling 27,626 police 
officers working within general office Criminal Investigation Departments 
(CID), specialist units made up from CID, Child, Sexual, and Domestic 
Abuse investigation departments and missing persons. Additionally, 2036 
civilian staff members are shown as working in those departments. A further 
9190 police officers are shown to be working across the areas of 
intelligence, vice, vehicle crime, special branch, fraud, drugs and burglary. 
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Although each of these departments would traditionally involve detective 
roles, there are no current figures of the ratio of police to detective 
constables in those departments, only numbers of officers and civilians 
working within them. Furthermore, the figures do not capture the number of 
officers and detectives that are working on regional teams or within the 
National Crime Agency. However, what is shown is that the three 
investigative areas chosen in this study occupy a significant portion 
(approximately 3/4’s) of the total pool of officers and investigators in 
departments that detectives occupy. 
Secondly, the focus of this research is on social media and not cybercrime in 
general. The distinction between the two is significant. Whilst cybercrime 
offences may involve social media (Wall, 2001; Jewkes & Andrews, 2005; 
Holt & Bossler, 2012; Gilespie, 2015), social media incidence in an offence 
may not necessarily fall under the umbrella of cybercrime (Ward, 2007; 
Stuart, 2014). Although widely written about, there is no universal definition 
of what cybercrime constitutes and it seen as covering a wide range of 
activities (Wall, 2001; Gordon & Ford, 2006; Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Clough, 
2011; Newman & Clarke, 2003; Gilespie, 2015). However the main 
approaches of how to define cybercrime require that at least part of the 
offence is formed or facilitated by a cyber element – not in terms of evidence 
but about how the crime is committed (Wall, 2001; Broadhurst, 2006; Gordon 
& Ford, 2006; Ajala, 2007; Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Clough, 2011; Gilespie, 
2015).  
However, social media does not need to feature in the commission or 
facilitation of the offence for it to form evidence or relevant material in an 
investigation (Hodge, 2006; Petrashek, 2010; Gagnier, 2011). For example, 
communication via social media between offender and victim that pertains to 
a domestic rape that has already occurred and is being investigated 
becomes very relevant to the offence. It was unknown prior to the analysis of 
the data what proportion of cases that contained a social media element 
would fall outside of the definitions of cybercrime. As such, literature which 
identified departments that dealt with the highest incidence of cybercrime 
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were not used to inform which areas of investigation would be sampled for 
incidence of social media.  
 
3.2 Crime reports and sample size 
The sampling size in grounded theory is determined by the data collected. 
Data collection stops when new data that is being collected no longer 
modifies or adjusts the theory that is built by the researcher (Schreiber, 
2001; Day, 2002). Ideally therefore, crime reports would have been 
requested in small batches until a saturation point had been reached with 
regard to the data and theory construction. However, it is the case that the 
request for anonymised crime reports incurs a cost on the police forces 
providing them due to the need for someone to first identify them and then 
secondly provide them in a useable format to the researcher. Furthermore, 
an organisation such as a police force will be better placed to decide 
whether to accept a request for this information if the request is not open 
ended (for example a researcher asking for permission to have access to an 
unknown number of crime reports) but finite in number. For this reason, a 
fixed number of crime reports were requested. Had it become clear after the 
analysis of the requested crime reports that saturation of data had not 
occurred, then the position would have been re assessed with a view to 
further crime reports being requested. This would have been done with 
consideration being given to this having an impact on the police forces 
providing them and whilst knowing that further data collection methods would 
be employed. In this case, no more additional crime reports were asked for 
as saturation was deemed to have occurred.  
It was initially envisaged that each of the three forces would provide 150 
crime reports, 50 from each of the three areas of investigation outlined 
above, which would allow a total of 450 reports to be examined. All three 
forces initially agreed to provide this data. However, one later declined to 
participate citing limitations on the resources that would be needed to 
provide the data. This meant that first of all, the amount of data obtained 
would have been reduced by a third. Secondly the breadth of data was 
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limited to two forces rather than three, which in turn limited the findings of the 
research, if compared to a study in which there were three participating 
forces. To compensate for this loss, an additional 150 crime reports were 
obtained from each of the two forces that did agree to participate bringing 
the total examined to 600.  
In line with the accepted ethical guidelines for the research (British Society of 
Criminology, 2006; ESRC, 2012), the crime reports were requested with the 
investigating officer’s details, their supervisor, the names of the actors within 
the investigation and geographical locations having been anonymised. It 
became clear however within a short space of time to both police forces 
providing the data that the resources that were required for this, were not 
available. There is no automated way to anonymise crime reports, and for 
anonymisation to take place each report had to be examined by someone 
and personal details manually anonymised. This was too costly a process for 
the forces to undertake in terms of working hours incurred. Consequently, a 
substantial amendment to the ethics documentation was submitted and 
accepted that allowed the researcher themselves to anonymise the crime 
reports. The anonymization was carried out by the researcher on police IT 
systems and once completed, the data was removed from police premises. 
This allowed data to be collected that would otherwise have not been made 
available.  
Crime reports were provided in the chronological order that they were 
created in from the start of 2014. This constituted a consecutive sampling 
technique (Schuster & Powers, 2005; Bowers, House, & Owens, 2011; 
Acharya, Prakash, & Nigam, 2013; Sharma, 2017).  Outside of seasonal and 
temporal bias it provided a random allocation of investigators within each of 
the three chosen departments, not differentiating between age, sex, length of 
service, experience, geographical location or type of investigation. The data 
collection began in earnest midway through 2015. There was a balance to 
be struck between obtaining the most recent crime reports and allowing 
investigations to be completed to see what strategies had been pursued. 
The investigation of cybercrime within which as discussed above social 
media is noted to feature is relatively fast moving (Gillespie, 2015; Moore, 
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2016). Therefore, the older the data collected, the greater the chance that 
investigative strategies noted in that data will have changed in comparison to 
the present moment. Conversely, complex cases take time to investigate. On 
average across England and Wales in 2015 it took 20 weeks from when an 
offence took place to when a person was charged in relation to it, with the 
longest average period of 25 weeks in the force areas from which the crime 
reports were taken (Ministry of Justice, 2016). Obtaining a sample of 
investigations that were instigated too recently would mean that they would 
be devoid of data. A period of 18 months was judged prior to the point from 
which data collection began to be sufficient for the majority of investigations 
to have been concluded. As such crime reports were requested to be 
collated chronologically from January the 1st 2014. This allowed time for 
investigations to have been completed whilst giving reasonably current 
officer investigative practice. 
 
3.3 Constraints in the data offered by crime reports 
Two criteria have been put forward as important when determining the 
quality of research data gathered through self-reporting. They are reliability 
and validity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Kirk & Miller, 1986; Winter, 2000; 
Golafshani, 2003; Gadd, Karstedt, & Messner, 2011). Reliability is described 
as consistency in the data that is being reported (Kirk & Miller, 1986; Winter, 
2000; Golafshani, 2003; Gadd, Karstedt, & Messner, 2011). Put a different 
way, it is whether the same reporting tools examining the same data on 
more than one occasion provide the same or similar response (Thornberry & 
Krohn, 2000).  
Validity refers to the concept of whether the information that is recorded is 
truthful (Kirk & Miller, 1986; Winter, 2000; Golafshani, 2003; Gadd, Karstedt, 
& Messner, 2011). A more apt way of describing it is whether the responses 
that are recorded match the interpretation of what has occurred or subjective 
reality of the researcher. Reliability and validity can vary without correlation 
to each other. The concept of reliability and validity with regard to qualitative 
data is important as it describes how dependable, consistent and 
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transferable the research is (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Patton, 2002; 
Golafshani, 2003) and ultimately makes the research defensible (Johnson, 
1997).  
There are two well-practiced methods for testing the reliability of data 
(Thornberry & Krohn, 2000). Both were used in this study to check the 
reliability of the data. The first method is the re-testing of the data collection 
method used. The second is the cross-checking of the results of the analysis 
of the data using other indicators. The sample size in this study consisted of 
600 crime reports, from two different police forces and three different 
departments within those two separate police forces. This effectively allowed 
for the re-testing of the data in different geographical and professional areas.  
With regard to cross checking the results from the data analysis of the crime 
reports, this was conducted through two different methods. The first was by 
examining the information that had been recorded in the supervisory reviews 
of the investigators’ managers. This provided a second source of information 
from a different individual on the same circumstances of an investigation. 
The second was through comparison of the data obtained from the crime 
reports to a different data set that being semi structured interviews with 
officers.   
With regard to validity, a number of facets have been put forward as 
assisting in its measurement (Thornberry & Krohn, 2000), with three being 
commonly cited. The first of these is criterion validity. This describes the 
measurement of results against an external bench mark (Thornberry & 
Krohn, 2000; Crow & Semmens, 2008). During the review of the literature no 
previous studies with similar objectives or methodology were found. In line 
with the fourth objective however, a set of guidelines were identified (ACPO, 
2012) that give a point of reference regarding decision making around social 
media. The fifth objective requires comparison of the data collected against 
this benchmark. This provided some validity for the data collected. The 
second facet is that of content validity. This describes whether the method of 
data collection is suited to measuring what the study sets out to achieve 
(Thornberry & Krohn, 2000; Crow & Semmens, 2008). As has been detailed 
above, the data that was sought contained in the crime reports had the 
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potential to answer the first three research objectives. The third facet is that 
of construct validity. This describes whether the data being collected is 
related in theoretically expected ways to other concepts or constructs that 
can be measured (Thornberry & Krohn, 2000; Crow & Semmens, 2008). 
Three objectives in this study are set out that are closely linked with each 
other, those being the first three. If data became apparent in relation to one 
of the objectives and had this type of validity, then it would likely become 
evident in one of the other two objectives.  
There are however limitations with collecting data through crime reports. 
Case files, which encompass not only the crime report that contains the 
investigation log but all other relevant material (for example statements, 
officers written notes, computer and phone downloads) do not contain a full 
record of what has taken place in an investigation and often contain errors 
(Alison, Snook, & Stein, 2001; Canter & Alison, 2003; Horvath & Brown, 
2006). Furthermore, the third research question seeks to ascertain the 
decision-making process and case files as a whole have been noted as not 
revealing the personal, professional and case specific knowledge on which 
detectives base their decisions (Feist, Ashe, Lawrence, McPhee, & Wilson, 
2007). This was highlighted in a pilot study undertaken prior to this proposal. 
An examination of 100 crime reports showed then that the depth with which 
officers recorded their decisions was not always detailed enough to allow for 
meaningful analysis of the data to take place. Secondly with anonymised 
crime reports, there is no possibility to further explore information and 
decisions taken by investigators noted in the crime reports. This would be 
desirable even if the crime reports contained a rich amount of information, as 
it would allow for clarification of issues and questions that arise as a result of 
what is contained in the crime reports. 
As such, from the outset it was anticipated that the data collected through 
the analysis of crime reports was likely to only fulfil the first two objectives of 
the research. A further method of data collection was deemed necessary to 
achieve the third objective, which is addressed below and involved 
conducting interviews with officers and investigators. 
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3.4 Classifying crime reports that have social media involvement 
In all, a total of 600 crime reports were reviewed and anonymised. Each 
crime report from both policing forces comprised of four distinct parts: 
• Crime categorisation. This defines the category of offence that best 
describes the circumstances of the incident.  
• The initial description of the circumstances of the incident. This 
description may not have been completed by the detective or 
investigator overseeing the case, but rather by the creator of the 
report. This could be the first attending officer to a report of a crime or 
police call centre operator to whom the crime is reported to.  
• The log of the investigation maintained by the officer or investigator in 
the case. 
• Supervisory reviews of the officer in the case.  
Each report was examined for any reference of social media within it. When 
mention of social media was found that was in line with the parameters set 
out in the introduction, the type of crime that it referred to was noted in 
conjunction with the area of investigation that it fell under – CAIU, DAIU or 
CID. 
Although ostensibly appearing a fairly simple process of classification, it 
presented a difficulty in terms of identifying the correct category of crime. 
The reason for this is that a set of circumstances that falls into or is 
encompassed by one type of crime category will often also naturally fall into 
other crime categories. The following circumstances are an example of a 
situation which could be classified under different crime definitions: an 
offender sending harassing and malicious communications via ‘Facebook 
messenger’. This set of circumstances could be classified under the offence 
of harassment as defined by s.1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
or the offence of malicious communications as defined by s.1 of the 
Malicious Communications Act 1988 (Geach & Haralambous, 2009). 
Furthermore, had a substantive offence taken place prior to the sending of 
these messages and the recipient was the victim of the substantive offence, 
with the person sending the messages being the offender of the substantive 
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offence, then it might also fall under the crime definition of ‘witness 
intimidation’ as defined by s.51 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994. In addition to this, as an investigation progresses, it may become clear 
that the incident would be more accurately classified under an alternate 
offence category with any charges brought against a suspect having the 
potential of being different again - for complex cases a decision which is 
undertaken by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). 
That a sequence of actions constituting an incident can overlap different 
offences is well recognised (Devlin, 1970; Shea, 1974; Ashworth, 2010; 
Owusu-Bempah, 2015) meaning that a defendant could be charged with 
different offences for the same actus reus and mens rea (Devlin, 1970; 
Shea, 1974; Ashworth, 2010; Owusu-Bempah, 2015). This also means that 
two defendants who have committed a similar ‘actus reus’ (Herring, 2014; 
Connor, 2009; Allen, 2011; Herring, 2014) under a similar ‘mens rea’ 
(Connor, 2009; Allen, 2011; Herring, 2014) can be charged with alternate 
offences (Devlin, 1970; Shea, 1974). The issue is not unique to the legal 
system in England and Wales but is also recognised in the United States 
(Brown, 2008; Chemerinsky, 2009) where significantly the decision as to 
what charge to lay in a spectrum of applicable offences has been argued to 
be aribtary (Chemerinsky, 2009).  
Within England and Wales except for a range of less serious offences the 
decision of which charge to lay against a defendant rests with the CPS 
(Ashworth, 2010; Owusu-Bempah, 2015) notwithstanding an influence being 
present from the police as the cases are brought to the CPS by them. There 
is however no clear and absolute guidance as to what offence should be 
charged in circumstances where multiple offences apply to the same incident 
(Ashworth, 2010), with the end decision resting with the CPS and later at trial 
with the judge themselves (Ashworth, 2010; Owusu-Bempah, 2015).  
For police forces, the procedure or rules under what offence a set of 
circumstances is classified under is set by criteria outlined in the Home 
Office Counting Rules for Recorded Crime (HOCR) (Home Office, 2016). 
Three rules are particularly significant to this research. The first is the ‘one 
crime per victim rule’. This dictates that if the circumstances of the incident 
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fall under multiple crime definitions, then only one crime is recorded, this 
being the most serious one. The most serious crime is one either judged to 
be the most serious by the individual recording the crime or incurring the 
greatestest penalty on sentencing. The second is the ‘principal crime rule’. 
This dictates that if there is a series of crimes contained within an incident, 
then one crime will be recorded, this being the most serious crime. The third 
is the ‘finished incident rule’. This dictates that if a series of different crimes 
are reported to the police by one victim at the same time where the victim 
and offender(s) are the same, then one offence will be recorded, this being 
the most serious one.The analysis of the data showed that these three rules 
could mask the way in which social media impacted upon the investigation, 
which is evidenced in the following chapter.  
These rules can be broadly, although not uniformly, related to the behaviour 
of prosecutors when deciding what charge to bring against a suspect. As 
described above when applying the ‘one crime per victim’ rule one aspect of 
the decision with what offence should be recorded against a set of 
circumstances, is the gravity of sentence that such an offence would carry 
on conviction. This is also borne in mind by prosecutors when they are 
assessing what offence to charge a defendant with (Ashworth, 2010).  
It is accepted that the official statistics of crime that the HOCR provide do not 
reflect the actual levels of crime that are present in society (MacDonald, 
2002). The cause of this includes police not recording crimes that are 
reported to them (Maxfield, Lewis, & Szoc, 1980) and crimes that are 
committed but are not reported to the police (Hough & Mayhew, 1983; Levitt, 
1998). Both of these causes become evident when Home Office statistics 
are compared against other crime surveys such as the British Crime Survey 
(Brand & Price, 2000; MacDonald, 2002). Reasons for police not applying or 
recording crimes uniformly even when they are reported is not only due to 
the different ways in which an incident can be defined as exemplified above, 
but also due: to the discretion of officers (MacDonald, 2002), differing levels 
of proof required before an incident is deemed to have happened (Simmons, 
Legg, & Hosking, 2003), political motivation (MacDonald, 2002), and an 
unwillingness by individual officers to take on investigations when crimes are 
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reported (Maxfield, Lewis, & Szoc, 1980) in order to control their workload. 
When analysing the data, the issues of officer discretion and differing levels 
of proof required before an incident is recorded as a crime were evident.. 
Nevertheless, the HOCR criteria were used initially when detailing the type 
of offences where social media incidence is present, the reasons for this 
being fourfold.  
First, the focus of the research is on the strategies adopted in investigations 
and the decision making process behind them. The crime that is not reported 
to the police, but recognised as taking place in surveys such as the British 
Crime Survey is not investigated, and so does not fall within the parameters 
of this research. Secondly, the rules and criteria set out in the HOCR are 
universally used by the Police in England and Wales (Home Office, 2016) 
and are well understood. Even if there is a lack of uniformity between how 
different police areas record crime, there is no other method of crime 
recording that police forces use that could be analysed. Using the same 
rules for crime classifications in this research as police use allows for it to be 
analysed by practitioners in the field of criminal justice with greater ease than 
were the research to rely on a set of new crime recording rules or a case by 
case decision by the researcher on each set of circumstances examined. 
Consideration was given to the way in which charges are brought against 
defendants as a way of classifying incidents, but again, as discussed above, 
this process is subjective and does not follow specific guidance that can be 
uniformly applied. Thirdly, one of the reasons for standardising the crime 
recording decisions is that the decision of what crime a set of circumstances 
constitutes is often a subjective one.  As discussed above even with the 
HOCR in place, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabularies (HMIC) 
acknowledges that there will be a degree of subjectivity present (HMIC, 
2012). As such, whether the researcher looked at each crime report on a 
case by case basis to determine the crime classification or devised their own 
crime classification rules,it would be a process or decision that could easily 
be challenged and thus undermine the validity of the research. Finally, the 
researcher is an ‘insider’, which brings with it an additional risk of 
preconceptions influencing the research (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007; Drake 
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& Heath, 2011) in what is already noted as being an area of subjectivity. By 
removing the classification process from the researcher and using a process 
that has been put in place by a third party, it prevented the influence of the 
insider from affecting the research in this area. 
Once reports had been identified that contained incidence of social media, 
then how social media was approached by the officer or investigator in the 
case and their supervisor was recorded and subsequently coded. 
 
4. The choice of interviews as a method of collecting data 
It was anticipated that data present in crime reports would not be able to 
effectively answer the third research question. The limitations of crime 
reports in providing data identified within literature was discussed above. 
Those limitations were confirmed and became evident when the crime 
reports were analysed and although strategies that have been used by 
investigators are noted in crime reports, the rationale behind the decision to 
use a specific strategy was not explicit. When the data from the crime 
reports was coded a correlation was noted between the variation and 
frequency of strategies and tactics used and whether social media formed 
critical evidence, evidence or relevant material in an investigation. The 
reason behind this however could only be implied and cannot be confirmed 
solely on the information contained within the crime reports. To be able to 
find the rationale for this and other strategies noted, a second set of data 
was collected in the form of semi-structured interviews. It was envisaged 
that, in an interview, the rationale for using a certain strategy could be 
ascertained.  
A semi-structured format was used to conduct the interviews. When using 
the term ‘semi-structured’ interview, it was understood to have several 
characteristics (Gillham, 2005; Crow & Semmens, 2008; May, 2011). First, 
the same topic areas were explored with each interviewee (Gillham, 2005; 
Crow & Semmens, 2008; May, 2011). If an area of interest was not covered 
by the interviewee then they were prompted with a question (Gillham, 2005; 
Crow & Semmens, 2008) in order for that topic area to be delved into. This 
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structure was sought in the interviews first to ensure that the topics which 
addressed the research questions posed were discussed and secondly 
because it allowed for testing of the reliability (Thornberry & Krohn, 2000) of 
the data against that obtained from the crime reports. 
An interview schedule was constructed to assist the researcher in keeping a 
semi-structured format. This interview structure was shaped by a preliminary 
study undertaken prior to this research, a process that is noted as being 
typical of semi structured interviews (Gillham, 2005; Crow & Semmens, 
2008). The interview schedule was divided into six separate parts. The first 
section asked interviewees to: describe their investigator experience; define 
social media; describe in what proportion of investigations social media 
featured and finally the types of investigation that it appeared in. This 
enabled the cross-referencing of the data obtained from the crime reports for 
the purposes of testing its reliability (Thornberry & Krohn, 2000).  
The second section asked interviewees to provide an example of: a case 
involving social media that had not resulted in a prosecution; the 
investigative strategy that was pursued, other strategies that were 
considered but not used; the reasons for considering those strategies and 
considerations of ACPO guidelines. The third section concerned questions 
about investigative approaches that were used by the interviewee that had 
resulted in successful prosecutions and the reasons for considering those 
strategies. Specific cases were not asked for. These two sections sought 
most obviously to answer the second and third research questions posed, to 
ascertain the strategies used by investigators and the decision-making 
process behind those strategies.  
The fourth section asked interviewees about factors that had had an impact 
on the way they dealt with social media and pivotal moments in their careers 
that affected their approach. The literature review undertaken prior to the 
data collection phase indicated that previous experiences would likely 
significantly influence decision-making (Adhami & Brown, 1996; Smith & 
Flanagan, 2000; Youngs & Canter, 2006; Stelfox, 2009; Rossmo, 2009; 
Zalman & Carrano, 2014; Smith & Tilley, 2015). The questions in this section 
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looked to identify the past experiences that investigators themselves were 
aware of as impacting on their decisions.  
The fifth section asked interviewees to consider social media and how the 
police deal with it; what they envisage as best and worst-case scenarios for 
the future for police investigations and social media; and constraints that 
they currently face.  
Finally, an open scenario was put to the interviewees that included an 
element of social media with several strategies and tactics available to pick 
from in response to the scenario. The choice of strategy made by the 
interviewee was noted and explored. This section is discussed in more detail 
below. 
Structure in the interview was seen to assist the research for the two 
reasons given above (Thornberry & Krohn, 2000; Gillham, 2005; Crow & 
Semmens, 2008). Furthermore non-structured interviewing carries with it the 
risk that the interaction between interviewer and interviewee will affect the 
data that is being collected. This may take place for a number of reasons 
including: the interviewees’ response changing in order to please the 
interviewer and provide a socially desirable response; the charectaristics of 
the interviewer affecting the relationship with the interviewee and in turn the 
responses provided; and non-standardisation of questions affecting the 
responses (Fontana & Prokos, 2007). As each interview can have its own 
unique interaction between interviewer and interviewee, so the parameters 
of the questions will differ between each interview and the questions put to 
the interviewee will not be of a standardised nature. This may make any 
subsequent analysis of the data more difficult as the data obtained will be 
non-uniform in its nature.  
Nevertheless, the choice of using semi-structured in opposition to fully 
structured interviews were threefold: First, semi structured interviews are 
noted as being able to give depth to data that is being collected (Crow & 
Semmens, 2008). The interviews were conducted in order to strengthen and 
build upon the first data collection method and followed on naturally from it. 
As discussed above the first method of data collection, examining crime 
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reports was likely to only fulfil the first two objectives of the research. To 
identify the decision-making process that explains why investigators have 
pursued a certain strategy and obtain an in depth understanding of their 
reasoning, it required that it be explored with them, which the rigidity of a 
fully structured interview may not have accomplished. A characteristic of 
semi-structured interviews is that the interviewer is free to probe any 
answers given further, or explore topics that have been brought up by the 
interviewee (Gillham, 2005; Crow & Semmens, 2008; May, 2011). 
Secondly, semi structured interviews allow some flexibility as to the direction 
and information that is being sought (May, 2011). Answers given by 
interviewees can be both clarified and elaborated upon. The flexibility to alter 
the direction of the interview as a study progresses and theory begins to 
emerge is critically important to the grounded theory methodology that was 
used in this research (Schreiber, 2001). This flexibility is not present in fully 
structured interviews.  
Finally, in an interview process the interviewee can dynamically challenge 
viewpoints that are held by the researcher in a way that a survey or data 
from a crime report is not able to do. The interviewees may be able to make 
sense of data in a way that is not obvious or apparent to the researcher 
(Mason, 2002). The information held within crime reports was coded and 
analysed, however there exists a risk that the hypotheses made, such as the 
reason for the correlation between the importance of the material gathered 
pertaining to social media and the variety and incidence of actions used is 
misinterpreted or connections between other pieces of data are not made by 
the researcher. Semi structured interviews allow a dialogue between 
researcher and interviewee where these connections can be explored or 
views held by the researcher challenged. This additional benefit that semi 
structured interviews hold is vitally important if theory is to be constructed. 
Indeed, grounded theory practitioners, advise obtaining data through 
different methods because of this: “by seeking different perspectives on a 
topic, the researcher is challenged to develop explanations for the variation 
in the data and to unify them at a more abstract level into a theory” 
(Schreiber, 2001, p.26).  
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There are two characteristcs of semi-structured interviews that assist in this. 
First, the pre-planned questions that are asked are largely of an open type 
(Gillham, 2005; Crow & Semmens, 2008). Secondly, the questions that are 
asked need not be phrased in the same way, nor asked in the same order 
(Crow & Semmens, 2008).  
It is for this reason also that interviews were sought with an additional 
department other to those from whom the crime reports were taken from. 
This department was the ‘authorities’ bureau’ which does not generate crime 
reports nor investigate crime. They do however act as a point of reference 
and act as a resource for officers when advice is sought around 
communications data as was identified through the crime reports. There was 
an anticipation that persons from this department would be able to cast a 
different perspective on data collected from the crime reports and officers 
interviewed from the CAIU, DAIU and CID. 
The question could be posed as to why the research used the first data 
collection method if it does not realise all the objectives of the research, 
instead of relying solely on interviews. First, as stated above the more data 
sources examined, the more robustly the researcher can build theory. 
Secondly, interviews place a significant demand in terms of time and 
resources on both the researcher and the interviewee (Gillham, 2005; Crow 
& Semmens, 2008). Through the examination of crime reports the research 
had the opportunity to identify trends, themes and issues that could be 
further explore through interviews, at a relatively low cost in comparison to 
obtaining all the data by conducting interviews. 
 
4.1 Sample size of interviewees 
As mentioned above in relation to crime reports, sample size in grounded 
theory is determined by the data collected. (Schreiber, 2001; Day, 2002). 
Initially 15 interviewees were sought with a view of expanding this as 
necessary. 15 interviewees were anticipated to be a manageable number of 
interviews to conduct and analyse based on the time required to conduct the 
interview, transcribing and subsequent analysis. In total, however only 14 
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interviews were conducted, with 13 interviewees originating from TVP and 
one from ASC. More interviewees were sought in both police areas without 
success. It is well documented that access to the criminal justice domain is 
difficult to obtain (Jupp, 1989) and particularly to police officers (Horn, 1996; 
Barrett, 2005).  
The gatekeepers that provided the access to both organisations were willing 
to do so and enthusiastic in their support. However, even though senior 
managers in both police areas had agreed access, the provision for this in 
line with the ethical guidance was that participation had to be voluntary. In 
the course of normal duty, detectives will often work overtime (Innes, 2003) 
in order to be able to complete their work. In addition to this, there is a 
reported national shortage of detectives (HMIC, 2015). This means that even 
though investigators may be willing to participate in research, the pressures 
of work prevent them from doing so. The invitations for participation in the 
study were distributed via e-mail and encompassed the whole of both the 
police areas. In all, 16 participants responded, with two being unable to 
conduct interviews due to ongoing work commitments. The number of 
respondents was heavily skewed towards TVP. A possible reason for this 
was highlighted by one of the ASC gatekeepers as to the current workload 
that investigators were experiencing in that police area. A second possible 
reason for officers from TVP being more willing to participate in interviews is 
due to the researcher working within the same organisation.  
 
4.2 Method of conducting interviews 
The interviews barring one were conducted whilst being recorded by a digital 
recorder (in agreement with the ethical guidelines). Although recording 
interviews in an audio format is not seen as a necessity by grounded theory 
theorists (Morse, 2001; Stern & Covan, 2001), there are two key benefits. 
The first is that information which may not be noted during the interview, 
either because it is missed or does not seem as important at the time is 
preserved for the researcher to re-examine (Schreiber, 2001). Secondly, by 
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not needing to make detailed notes, it affords the interviewer extra mental 
capacity with which to focus on the interviewee (Schreiber, 2001). 
During the course of the interviews advantage was taken of its semi-
structured nature in the three ways outlined above. First, strategies and 
tactics that were outlined by interviewees as being used in relation to social 
media were elaborated on and crucially the decision-making process behind 
them was probed. This was key as often the initial disclosure around the 
decision-making process by the interviewees was quite limited. Secondly, as 
themes emerged from the interviews they were considered in subsequent 
interviews that were conducted, particularly around the issue of safeguarding 
victims. Finally, variation in verbal cues was used to confirm the researcher’s 
understanding of the data. By repeating what the interviewees had said in 
answer to a question, the response of the interviewee then confirmed or 
altered the researchers understanding of the meaning of the interviewees’ 
view- point. 
The remaining four sections of the interview schedule were constructed to 
elicit both strategies and the decision-making process behind them from 
interviewees. Whilst investigators could be asked about specific cases that 
had not resulted in successful prosecution, the same was not true of cases 
that had resulted in a successful prosecution. The reason for this was that if 
cases were discussed that had secured a conviction at court, but it became 
clear during the interview that evidence has not been gathered correctly, 
then there exists an ongoing duty of disclosure in relation to this evidence. 
Should this disclosure of evidence not being collected appropriately then 
undermine a prosecution or conviction, then the ethical impact could be 
significant. However, if only cases were discussed that were unsuccessful or 
did not result in a prosecution, then the possibility exists that the data 
collected would be biased. This bias would exist if there is a correlation 
between these two variables of non-successful prosecution and strategies 
used.  In other words, if the prosecutions at court were not successful 
because of the decisions made and strategies pursued by investigators with 
regard to social media. A second issue that arose, which may have distorted 
the data is that the cases mentioned during the interviews would be historic 
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and as such not reflect current working practices and decision-making 
strategies employed by officers.  
To address these two potential biases in the data collected, two strategies 
were employed. First, investigators were asked about strategies that they 
used that have resulted in successful prosecutions. This discussion however 
was generic and the interviewees were not asked for case specific 
examples. Secondly, a hypothetical scenario was presented to the 
investigators in the final section of the interview. This presented the 
interviewees with the ability to choose strategies and tactics that they would 
employ at the time that the interviews were conducted and not solely provide 
examples of historic choices.  The hypothetical scenario put to interviewees 
in the final part of the interview involved an investigation featuring social 
media and investigators were asked for their proposed choice of strategies in 
dealing with this case. The purpose of presenting this scenario was to elicit a 
response from the interviewees which could be evaluated through process 
tracing methods to ascertain a decision-making process. Process tracing 
uses the information on the search itself rather than on the input variable and 
the final output (Harte & Koele, 1997). There are two major process-tracing 
techniques, verbal protocols and information boards (Gideon, 1996; Harte & 
Koele, 1997) and both were used to attempt to determine the rationale 
behind the strategies and tactics that the interviewees choose in the 
scenario.  
The hypothetical scenario was based upon a number of cases that had been 
noted in the crime reports and was provided to the interviewee through a 
short verbal narrative. The scenario placed the interviewee as an 
investigator in a case where a child had been sexually groomed through 
Facebook with the suspect being in custody. The interviewees were then 
presented with choices of strategies and tactics that they could use in 
relation to social media and the scenario presented to them. These choices 
were shown to the interviewees on cards laid out before them. As with the 
scenario itself, the strategies chosen for responding to this scenario were 
identified as used by investigators in the data collected from the crime 
reports. Behind the strategies and tactics listed on each card there was 
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another card with further information about the implications of choosing that 
option. In some cases, this information was fairly detailed in others quite 
generic. The choices for investigators were framed in two distinct areas. The 
first was a list of strategies that officers could pursue, specifically of how to 
access the suspect’s social media. The second detailed options for recording 
the content of the social media of the suspect or tactics that they could 
employ. Interviewees were asked to examine the strategies and tactics 
present in each of the two distinct areas and to select those that they would 
be inclined to use.  
As detailed above there are two main techniques of using process tracing - 
verbal protocols and information boards (Woods, 1993; Gideon, 1996; Harte 
& Koele, 1997). The information board in this case consisted of the cards 
detailing possible strategies and tactics laid out in front of the interviewees 
for them to choose from. Interviewee interaction with the board formed part 
of the data collected and the behaviour of the interviewees in relation to it 
was used to ascertain the decision-making process. Where any of the 
choices elicited a reaction that the interviewer could see, this reaction was 
recorded. The reactions included picking up cards, verbal comments, 
obvious changes in facial expression; interviewees spending time looking at 
a particular option; or returning to an option that they had previously seen. 
To make interviewee interaction with the information board more visible to 
the researcher, interviewees were additionally informed that there was 
information under each choice offered that may inform their decision. This 
was done to better identify the choices that the interviewees were interested 
in by tempting them to find out the content of the further information listed 
behind each option. In order to find out this information, the interviewees 
would have to physically pick up the card with the strategy or tactic listed on 
it to reveal it, thereby making their interest known to the researcher. This 
technique to elicit a response has been labelled ‘withheld information’ 
(Woods, 1993).  
In order to employ verbal protocols, the interviewees were also asked to 
think aloud and verbalise their thought process as they picked options from 
the two columns. Furthermore, for each of the behavioural reactions noted 
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above interviewees were questioned as to their thought process. This 
verbalisation of thoughts falls under the term ‘verbal reports’ in process 
tracing techniques (Woods, 1993). Verbal protocols have been criticized for 
not having the rigour of controlled experiments where a specific hypothesis 
is being tested (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 1994). However, this 
research relies on grounded theory methodology (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) 
where no clear starting hypothesis has been identified, and as such the 
inclusion of verbal protocols is seen as beneficial. It has been suggested that 
the use of information boards in conjunction with verbal protocols provides 
more information than using either in separation (Westenberg & Koele, 1994; 
Svenson, 1996).  
With regard to coding and analysing the data, in the previous small-scale 
research undertaken to date themes emerged naturally. It was anticipated 
that, as this research builds upon those studies themes would emerge, 
which occurred. 
 
4.3. Using a qualitative methodology and process tracing as means of 
collecting data 
Using qualitative methods to understand cognition is not commonplace 
(Kingstone, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2008). Cognitive Ethology (Kingstone, 
Smilek, & Eastwood, 2008) was coined as a term to describe the study of the 
real world with a view to identifying key features of the cognitive process 
used by individuals. Subsequently, once a theory is identified through real-
world observations, then its features can be tested in laboratory conditions. 
This is in opposition to traditional research, which relies on strict conditions 
in what is usually termed a ‘laboratory’. Findings from the laboratory are then 
extrapolated to the real world.  
It is argued however that laboratory findings have fragility and that the 
results will not necessarily be reproduced outside of the specific research 
environment in which the research was conducted (Berry & Klein, 1993; 
Kingstone, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2008). The reason for this is that the 
stability of decision making and processes is tied to the situation in which 
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individuals find themselves in (Duncan & Owen, 2000). Furthermore it may 
be that strict laboratory conditions cannot ever mirror real world situations 
precisely due to the lack of variables in a laboratory setting (Woods, 1993; 
Kingstone, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2008). Conversely, it is argued that real 
world observations contain too much varience for any particular process that 
is noted to be directly attributed to a specific factor (Woods, 1993; Kingstone, 
Smilek, & Eastwood, 2008).  
In using a hypothetical scenario with identical choices available to each 
participant and then observing their choices using verbal protocols and 
information boards a ‘laboratory’ setting was created. It is however noted 
that the use of semi structured interviews reduced the rigidity of this 
laboratory scenario. Specifically, the interviewees were questioned about 
their physical responses to the options available to them.  Due to the 
differences in physical response between interviewees, in order to be 
appropriate different questions were put to different interviewees in different 
ways and not phrased identically. As such, a risk arises that the interviewees 
see the question differently and the parameters of the scenario are altered. 
In order to mitigate weaknesses identifed above of using a controlled setting, 
the hypothetical scenario was combined with the interviewees previous 
views and decision making process behind strategies used and considered 
with regard to social media in their investigations. This constituted parts 2, 
3,4 and 5 of the interview as set out above. These views encompass 
previous experiences of the interviewees with regard to social media, their 
subjective views on them and introspection on why strategies were chosen 
by them. This data can be described as subjective reports defined as ‘first 
person measures of personal experiences and beliefs’ (Kingstone, Smilek, & 
Eastwood, 2008, p329). Subjective reports are however argued to be 
unreliable for a number of reasons. First it is thought that introspection of an 
experience may change the subjective views of the individual about the 
experience (Lutz & Thompson, 2003). Secondly significant cognitive 
processes occur beneath concsious awareness which concious introspection 
does not capture. Finally, subjective reports on behaviour and decision 
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making may be inconsistent with actual behaviour seen in the real world 
(Hurlbert & Heavey, 2001). 
Both of the above methods in isolation contain shortcomings in their 
approaches. However, the use of different approaches to collecting data on 
human cognition including laboratory settings combined with observation 
and subjective reports have been suggested as a more robust framework 
than using any one method in isolation (Kingstone, Smilek, & Eastwood, 
2008). For this reason both methods of subjective reporting and process 
tracing were employed within the context of the interview. 
 
5. Insider research 
Being an insider researcher brings with it the danger of the researcher’s 
subjective opinion influencing the research process and analysis of data 
(Brannick & Coghlan, 2007; Drake & Heath, 2011). This is particulary 
significant when using grounded theory, as the researcher is central to the 
theory building process (Goulding, 2002; Mruck & Mey, 2007). It was noted 
in the introductory chapter that preconceptions that were held by the 
researcher became evident during small scale projects prior to this research 
being undertaken. As a result self reflection was employed throughout the 
data analysis and coding process to minimise this impact. Brown (1996) 
evaluated the benefits and weaknesses of being an insider researcher when 
carrying out research with the police. A list of 4 separate categories of 
researcher was identified: 
Insider – insider: Police officers or other police staff conducting research 
within the police 
Outsider – insider: Former employees of the police conducing research 
within the police 
Insider – outsider: Researchers who have no background in the police but 
work within the police or criminal justice system conducting research. 
Outsider – outsider: researchers who have no background in the police and 
who work outside of the police service conducting research of it. 
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Under this classification the researcher falls into the category of an ‘insider – 
insider’. The possible effects of being an insider researcher when conducting 
interviews becomes even more pertinent than when examining and coding 
crime reports. Even without the issue of the researcher being an ‘insider’, as 
discussed above, non structured interviews allow for the interviewee to 
interact with the researcher and as a consequence alter their responses 
(Fontana & Prokos, 2007). Added to the interaction between researcher and 
interviewee influencing the data is that the researcher is an insider. The 
researcher themselves will likely have views on the research being 
conducted as a result of being an insider and these views may in turn impact 
on the interview. The researcher may for example unconciously give positive 
verbal or non verbal cues to the interviewee on views that are consistent with 
the researcher’s own, in turn affecting what the interviewee says. Thus in 
this type of data collection, not only is the process of categorising data and 
its analysis capable of being influenced by the researcher, but the actual 
information that is collected may also be influenced. With regard to the 
benefits identified of being in this category the following two apply. First, 
there is an element of credibility that the researcher carries when conducting 
research as a police officer with other police officers and investigators 
(Reiner & Newburn, 2007). This credibility is also linked to a measure of trust 
in that the researcher is less likely to be critical of the interviewees and of the 
police as a whole. Investigators and officers who are being interviewed may 
as a consequence be more willing to be candid about their experiences and 
views as they believe that these views are shared by the researcher.  
Secondly, police work is complex with knowledge of criminal legisltation, 
procedures, practices and professional knowledge likely forming a necessary 
part of any research that is conducted, which an insider researcher may 
already posses (Reiner & Newburn, 2007). This was very evident in this 
research. During the analysis of the crime reports, the researcher’s 
knowledge of: legislation inlcuding RIPA 2000, PACE 1984, SOA 2003; the 
structure and purpose of different units within the police such as HTCUs, 
Authorities Bureau, CAIU, DAIU and CID and the type and scope of 
equipment used, such as stand alone computers and machines to download 
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and obtain data from electronic devices, all assisted in analysing the data. 
This knowledge is of course available to outsiders but at a cost of time and 
further research to ascertain what they involve. 
Conversely, there are disadvantages to being an insider researcher. These 
involve being less willing to be critical in any research findings of the police 
and interviewees for reasons of wanting to make a favourable impact in the 
work place and professional allegience. Secondly, an outsider is likely to 
carry a fresher and more objective perspective than an insider. When 
conducting the interviews the researcher was acutely aware of their position 
as an ‘insider – insider’ and attempted to minimise any views carried 
impacting on the interviews through verbal or non verbal cues. An attempt 
was made to base avenues of exploration and topics of questioning not 
present in the interview schedule to be structured on the data collected from 
the crime reports and preceding interviews rather than on the views of the 
researcher. Regular introspection was employed in order to minimise the 
impact of any bias developing due to allegience to both TVP and work 
colleagues.  
 
6. Conclusion 
An important aspect of presenting qualitative data analysis is to show the 
method in which the data was collected and subsequently analysed clearly 
and transparently (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This chapter has articulated the 
rationale for using crime reports to provide data to answer the first three 
research questions posed and why crime reports have been selected from the 
three departments of CAIU, DAIU and CID across two separate police areas . 
It also makes clear the limitations that have previously been recognised in 
academic literature in the data that crime reports can provide. This in turn 
provides the rationale for using interviews to collect data to answer the third 
research question effectively and for the purposes of testing reliability.  
The way in which to categorise the types of crime in which social media was 
noted was discussed. This involved highlighting the difficulty of applying one 
crime category type to any particular set of circumstances due to the possibility 
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that any one particular set of circumstances reported to the police may fit the 
points to prove for different offences. It was explained that the police crime 
recording system was chosen due to its uniformity of classification rules and 
use across all of the police forces in England and Wales. However, the 
weaknesses of such a categorisation were also outlined, which highlighted 
that these categories may hide the nature of the social media involvement. 
Difficulties encountered in obtaining the crime reports were described. This 
included not only one police force withdrawing from participating in the 
research but also both police areas which did provide crime reports being 
unable to provide the necessary resources to anonymise the data. It was 
explained that this issue was overcome by obtaining agreement from the 
University Ethics Committee for the researcher to anonymise the reports 
themselves.  
The choice and benefits of using semi-structured interviews in the context of 
using a grounded theory methodology were then discussed. This included 
probing investigators’ reasons for choosing strategies around social media, 
allowing issues to be clarified as they emerge in the research and finally to 
challenge views that might be held by the researcher. The limitations of 
semi-structured interviews were also acknowledged, which centre on the 
impact that the researcher has in altering the data that is collected from the 
interviewee. The method of conducting the interviews and the interview 
schedule was outlined. The first part of the interview schedule posed 
questions that cross-reference data collected from crime reports and test its 
reliability. The second part of the interview sought to obtain a subjective self-
reflective account on the part of the interviewees as to why strategies were 
chosen by them in previous cases that they have dealt with. The final part of 
the interview puts a hypothetical scenario to the interviewees and uses 
process tracing methods to identify the decision-making process behind 
strategies chosen. Each method in isolation, the first being the self-reflective 
account and the second using process tracing has shortcomings in 
determining the cognitive process behind decisions. It is argued however 
that taken together they offer a more robust framework for obtaining data. 
Sample size was discussed as were the obstacles to obtaining access to 
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investigators for the purpose of research interviews. Finally, consideration 
was given to the impact of insider research and the need for the researcher 
to be conscious of their status as an insider throughout the course of the 
research. 
The following chapter examines and analyses the data obtained from the 
crime reports and does so whilst comparing them against the ACPO (2012) 
guidelines reviewed in Chapter 2.  
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Chapter 4: An analysis of the crime reports found containing social media 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, data found in the crime reports is presented and then 
analysed. To begin with, the way in which crime reports containing social 
media were coded is outlined. This includes an explanation of using the 
categories of relevant material, evidence and critical evidence to do so. The 
offences found to contain social media are then presented by offence 
classification against the two police and three investigative areas from which 
the reports were collected. Through a more detailed analysis of the 
circumstances of the reports containing social media it is evidenced that the 
actual role of social media in an incident or offence was often masked by the 
offence classification. Next strategies and tactics that were identified in the 
crime reports that investigators used to deal with social media are presented 
forming a total of 19 separate categories. The crime reports containing social 
media in each police area are then grouped into those in which social media 
forms relevant material, evidence or critical evidence. The strategies / tactics 
used by investigators for each of those groups are then identified.  
.  
2. Establishing the impact of social media on an investigation 
Crime reports taken from each force were examined separately in order to 
compare whether there were any differences between the two.  Each 
department was also examined separately again with a view to ascertaining 
whether there were differences between investigative areas. The process for 
examining the reports was as follows: 
1. The different crime types that featured in all the crime reports 
examined were recorded for each department and police area. 
2. Out of those, crime types that contained mention of social media were 
noted. 
3. Where social media did feature in an investigation, that investigation 
was categorised in terms of the impact that the social media had on it. 
This was done in the following three categories: 1) Relevant material; 
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2) Evidence in the investigation; 3) Evidence critical to the outcome of 
the investigation.  
The decision as to the level of impact that social media had in an 
investigation and where it would sit in regard to the first two of these three 
groups was made by the researcher on the basis of the definitions found 
within the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA 1996). 
However, even with set definitions available, whether a piece of social media 
content forms relevant material, or evidence is a subjective one and open to 
challenge, as the act places the decision as to how material is defined in the 
hands of individuals. In relation to relevant material, it states that material is 
relevant if: 
 “it appears to an investigator, or the officer in charge of the investigation or 
the disclosure officer to have some bearing or on the surrounding 
circumstances unless it is incapable of having any impact on the case” 
(Crown Prosecution Service, 2005, p.36). 
Furthermore, the instruction for investigators is that a wide view should be 
taken and that material be considered irrelevant only after careful 
consideration (Crown Prosecution Service, 2005; Hannibal & Mountford, 
2015). The retention of relevant material in an investigation is crucial to fair 
outcomes (Roberts & Zuckerman, 2010; Knoops, 2013) in the criminal 
justice system and has been put in place for two reasons. The first is in an 
effort to prevent miscarriages of justice that have previously been seen to 
occur (Choo, 2009; Knoops, 2013) and the second is to increase the 
efficiency of the criminal justice process (Choo, 2009; Moissidis, 2008). So, 
whilst social media that falls into this category would not form part of a 
prosecution case, there is a duty in law for it to be retained by investigators 
and treated in a certain way (CPIA, 1996; Choo, 2009; Roberts & 
Zuckerman, 2010; Knoops, 2013; Hannibal & Mountford, 2015). 
Furthermore, it may not always be clear at the point in which material is 
collected, whether it will form part of evidence at a later stage or not (Crown 
Prosecution Service, 2005). As such it forms an important part of the 
investigative process.  
82 
 
Evidence is defined within the ‘core investigative doctrine’ as material that is: 
“[…]sufficiently relevant to the facts in issue is admissible, subject to the 
exclusionary rules. The test for relevance is: ‘evidence which makes the 
matter which requires proof more or less probable’ (Lord Simon of Glaisdale 
in DPP v Kilbourne (1973) AC 729, at p 756. The ‘facts in issue’ are those 
facts which the prosecution must prove in order to establish the guilt of a 
defendant” (ACPO, 2005a, p.26).  
Evidence Critical to the outcome of an investigation is not a category that is 
defined within professional literature. It was deemed as important for 
inclusion in this research for two reasons. First, although social media may 
form evidence within an investigation, if it is not critical to its outcome, then 
the possibility remains that other evidence can be collected in lieu of it and 
investigators may choose to do so as part of their investigative strategy. 
Where it is critical, this option is not available. Secondly, where social media 
forms evidence that is critical, it may be treated differently by investigators 
than in cases where it supports other evidence. Investigators for example 
may focus more on the quality of the collected evidence, because without it a 
prosecution is not viable. The definition that was used in the research was as 
follows:  Evidence as per the definition used above, without which a 
successful resolution of a case could not be reached. The test as to whether 
a resolution is successful or not is whether the CPS deem that a charge can 
be brought against a suspect based on the evidence, or whether an 
investigator or supervisor can make a decision that no crime has taken 
place.  
 
3. The data collected 
With regard to crime categories, the data is presented below in a similar 
format to that in which it was collected. To begin with each police area 
(starting with ASC and then TVP) and each of the three areas of 
investigation (Domestic Abuse, Child Investigation and Criminal 
Investigation) were examined separately for crime categories and frequency 
of social media appearance. The same areas of investigation in ASC and 
83 
 
TVP were then compared against one another for crime categories and 
frequency of social media appearance. Next each police area taken as a 
whole was compared against the other for crime categories and frequency of 
social media appearance. 
Subsequently, strategies / tactics were identified that were used in relation to 
social media. The strategies / tactics used to deal with social media were 
identified in each crime report. They were coded into 19 separate categories 
employed by investigators. In their open codes they were then noted within 
the context of the impact that social media had on those investigations, so 
whether it provided critical evidence, evidence or relevant material. These 
three categories gave a frame work or a level of coding in itself. 
Relationships between the open codes were sought first within and then 
outside of those categories.  
 
4. Avon and Somerset Crime reports 
4.1 Domestic Abuse Investigations 
There were 22 different offence types recorded in 100 crime reports: 
Arson endangering 
life 
 
Common assault 
 
Assault ABH: 
 
Assault GBH section 
 
Attempt to pervert the 
course of justice  
Blackmail 
 
Breach of restraining 
order  
 
Cruelty to / Child neglect  
 
Criminal damage 
 
False imprisonment  
 
Harassment 
 
Kidnap  
 
Public Order Section 
4  
 
Putting people in fear of 
violence  
Sexual assault  
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Sexual assault on a 
child under 13 
Sexual activity with a 
child 
Sexual assault by 
penetration  
 
Stalking Rape Theft in a dwelling 
Threats to kill   
Table 1 - Avon and Somerset Constabulary Domestic Abuse Investigation offence types 
Of those 22 offence categories social media featured in seven, which are 
highlighted in red above. In total, 20 investigations involved a social media 
element. In five of those, the evidence that social media had to offer was 
critical to the case outcome. In seven it formed evidence in the investigation 
and in the remaining eight it formed relevant material. 
Although there are seven offence categories with the crime type varying 
quite significantly between them, there was a predominant way in how social 
media featured. In 14 of the 20 crime reports, the nature of the social media 
involvement was in messages being sent between the suspect and the 
aggrieved or witnesses that caused them some harassment, however there 
were only four offences of harassment recorded. As such, this is an example 
of the ‘Principal Crime Rule’ masking the harassment offences which is the 
predominant involvement of social media in these cases.  
 
4.2 Child Abuse Investigations 
There were 14 different offence types recorded in 100 crime reports.  
Cause incite a 
child under 13 to 
engage in a sexual 
activity 
Cause a person to 
engage in sexual activity 
without their consent 
Causing or inciting child 
prostitution or 
pornography 
Cause a child 
under 13 years to 
watch / look at 
sexual activity 
Cruelty neglect to children Engage in a sexual act in 
the presence of a child 
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Meeting a female 
child following 
sexual grooming 
Possession of an 
indecent or pseudo photo 
of a child 
Rape of child under 13 
 
Safeguarding a 
child 
Sexual activity involving a 
child  
Sexual assault on a child 
under 13 
Sexual assault by 
penetration on a 
child under 13 
Take / make indecent 
photograph pseudo 
photograph of a child  
 
Table 2 - - Avon and Somerset Constabulary Child Abuse Investigation offence types 
Of those 14 offence categories social media featured in seven which are 
highlighted in red above. In total, 22 investigations involved a social media 
element. In nine of those the evidence that social media had to offer was 
critical to the case outcome. In six it formed evidence in the investigation and 
in the remaining seven it formed relevant material. 
In five of those investigations the nature of social media involvement was in 
messages being sent between suspect and the aggrieved or witnesses that 
caused them some sort of harassment. In this set of data there are no 
offences recorded under the heading of or related to harassment, and so 
again the HOCR were seen to mask the involvement of social media in the 
offence.  In another 12 of those investigations the social media involvement 
constituted either the grooming of a victim or interaction between suspect 
and aggrieved, which in turn was a precursor to a more serious sexual 
offence. 
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4.3 Criminal Investigations  
There were 11 different offence types recorded in 100 crime reports: 
Arson endangering 
life 
Assault GBH section 18  Causing a person to 
engage in a sexual 
activity without their 
consent 
Cause or incite a 
child to engage 
sexual activity  
Kidnap 
 
False imprisonment 
 
Rape Rape of child under 13 Sexual activity involving a 
child  
Sexual assault  Sexual assault by 
penetration  
Sexual assault by 
penetration on a child 
under 13 
Threats to kill   
Table 3 - Avon and Somerset Constabulary Criminal Investigation offence types 
Of those 11 offence categories, social media featured in five, which are 
highlighted in red above. In total 15 investigations involved a social media 
element. In three of those the evidence that social media had to offer was 
critical to the case outcome. In eight it formed evidence in the investigation 
and in the remaining four it formed relevant material.  
In three of those investigations the nature of social media involvement was in 
messages being sent between suspect and the aggrieved or witnesses that 
caused them some sort of harassment. One of these offences falls under the 
heading of ‘Threats to Kill’. However, the threat to kill was made through 
other means and not via social media, the content of which in this case was 
less seriously harassing. Although constituting only three investigations and 
so smaller in both total and proportion in comparison to the data from 
Domestic and Child Abuse Investigation departments, again the HOCR were 
seen to mask the actual involvement of social media.  In another seven of 
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those investigations the social media involvement constituted either the 
grooming of a victim or interaction between suspect and aggrieved, which in 
turn was a precursor to a more serious sexual offence. 
 
5. Thames Valley Police Crime Reports 
5.1 Domestic Abuse Investigations 
There were 23 different offence types recorded in 100 crime reports: 
Abuse of trust Adult protection  Any other indictable 
offence 
Assault GBH Assault with injury Breach of restraining 
order 
Child protection 
non-crime incident  
Common assault 
 
Criminal damage 
 
Domestic incident 
non-crime incident  
Domestic violence 
disclosure scheme 
Drug supply 
False 
imprisonment 
Harassment MAPPA risk assessment 
of the aggrieved 
Perverting the 
course of justice 
Rape Robbery of business 
property 
Sexual assault  Sexual assault on a child 
under 13 
Threats to kill  
 
Unexplained death Violent disorder  
Table 4 - Thames Valley Police Domestic Abuse Investigation offence types  
Of those 23 offence categories social media featured in eight, which are 
highlighted in red above. In total 17 investigations involved a social media 
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element. In ten of those the evidence that social media had to offer was 
critical to the case outcome. In two it formed evidence in the investigation 
and in the remaining five it formed relevant material.  
In ten of those investigations the nature of social media involvement was in 
messages being sent between suspect and the aggrieved or witnesses that 
caused them some sort of harassment. However, nine of these offences 
were recorded under the heading of harassment and so the HOCR masked 
the involvement of social media in only one offence.  
 
5.2 Child Abuse Investigations 
There were 13 different offence types recorded in 100 crime reports: 
Assault with injury Assault without injury Child abduction 
Child protection 
non-crime 
incident 
Cruelty to children and 
young persons 
Domestic non-crime 
incident 
Domestic non-
crime incident 
Harassment all offences Sexual assault  
Sexual assault on 
a child under 13 
Sexual activity with a child Rape  
 
Rape of a child 
under 13 
  
Table 5 - Thames Valley Police Child Abuse Investigation offence types 
Of those 13 offence categories social media featured in five, which are 
highlighted in red above. In total 13 investigations involved a social media 
element. In two of those the evidence that social media had to offer was 
critical to the case outcome. In ten it formed evidence in the investigation 
and in the remaining one it formed relevant material.  
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In four of those investigations the nature of social media involvement was in 
messages being sent between suspect and the aggrieved or witnesses that 
caused them some sort of harassment. Two of those offences were recorded 
under the offence heading of harassment, with the HOCR masking the 
involvement of social media in two offences. In another two of those 
investigations the social media involvement constituted either the grooming 
of a victim or interaction between suspect and aggrieved, which in turn was a 
precursor to a more serious sexual offence. 
 
5.3 Criminal Investigations 
There were 22 different offence types recorded in 100 crime reports: 
Action Fraud Adult protection non-
crime incident 
Arson with intent to 
endanger life 
Assault with 
injury 
Assault GBH section 18 Attempted murder 
Burglary other 
than in a dwelling 
Child protection non-
crime incident  
Domestic incident 
Drug possession Drug possession 
excluding cannabis 
Drug supply 
Obscene 
publications 
Perverting the course of 
justice 
Possession of firearms 
Possession of 
other weapons 
Rape  Rape of a child under 13 
Robbery Sexual activity involving a 
child 
Sexual assault 
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Unexplained 
death 
  
Table 6 - Thames Valley Police Criminal Investigation offence types 
Of those 22 offence categories social media featured in seven, which are 
highlighted in red above. In total 20 investigations involved a social media 
element. In five of those the evidence that social media had to offer was 
critical to the case outcome. In eight it formed evidence in the investigation 
and in the remaining seven it formed relevant material. 
In one of those investigations the nature of social media involvement was in 
messages being sent between suspect and the aggrieved or witnesses that 
caused them some sort of harassment. With this offence not being one of 
harassment the HOCR masked the nature of the social media involvement in 
this one case.  In another nine of those investigations the social media 
involvement constituted either the grooming of a victim or interaction 
between suspect and aggrieved, which in turn was a precursor to a more 
serious sexual offence. 
 
6. Comparison of crime types featuring social media between TVP and ASC 
The cross over on specific crime types between TVP and Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary appeared initially to be fairly limited. Within general 
Criminal Investigations the overlap was limited to three offence types: rape; 
sexual assault and assault occasioning GBH. Within Child Abuse 
Investigation there was an overlap of only two offences: Sexual Assault on a 
child under 13 and Sexual activity with a child. And finally, within Domestic 
Abuse investigations there was an overlap again of only two offences: 
harassment and rape.  
In total, the offence types that were common to both TVP and ASC when 
comparing across all departments numbered eight: 
Rape Sexual assault Sexual activity involving 
a child 
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Sexual assault on 
a child under 13 
Assault with injury / 
Assault ABH 
Assault GBH section 18 
Harassment all 
offences 
 
Obscene publications 
 
 
Table 7 - Common offence types to both Avon and Somerset Constabulary and Thames Valley Police featuring 
social media 
This was a total of eight different crime categories out of a total of 15 
category types that mentioned social media in TVP and out of a total of 18 
crime categories mentioning social media in ASC. Three of those crimes 
categories: Harassment, Rape, and Sexual activity with a child featured in 
more than two crime reports, and between them formed the vast majority of 
the crime reports, 31 crimes out of a total of 49 within TVP and out a total of 
57 for ASC. By taking a broader classification approach to create three 
categories to encompass: sexual offences, physical non-sexual assaults and 
harassment, these three categories encompassed 35 out of 48 offence types 
in the TVP crime reports and 51 out of 57 offence types in Avon and 
Somerset that featured social media. This observation could be useful in 
alerting officers to crime types where social media is more likely to feature 
and in the construction of standard operating procedures created to assist 
officers in dealing with such crimes. Such standard operating procedures are 
common in assisting investigators in their cases (Rowley, 2010; Yexley & 
Horvath, 2012; Veigas & Lum, 2013). The ACPO (2012) guidelines only refer 
to indecent images of children when discussing offences other than those 
where the cyberelement fully constitutes the crime as being offences where 
digital evidence might feature. These findings show however that digital 
evidence, specifically social media is prominently present in a number of 
other offences categories.  
 
92 
 
7. Crime classifications masking offences 
Officer discretion and proof required prior to an offence being recorded were 
evident as playing a role in the child and adult protection incidents not being 
recorded as full offences in both ASC and TVP. This was highlighted as a 
cause of crimes not being recorded uniformly by police forces in chapter two 
(Simmons, Legg, & Hosking, 2003). An example of officer discretion 
affecting crime recording was a ‘child protection incident’ recorded in a TVP 
crime report. In this report, the mother of a child believed that the father was 
sexually abusing the child based on what the three-year-old child had said. 
Other than two comments made by the child, which did not clearly indicate 
sexual abuse there was no other evidence that constituted the basis of the 
belief that this offence took place. No further evidence could be collected 
from the child as the mother was reluctant for the child to have contact with 
the police. This incident was recorded as a ‘child protection incident’ rather 
than an offence that would detail a sexual assault on a child. In this case the 
level of proof required to evidence an offence taking place was not present 
and discretion was exercised by the officer in the case in not recording an 
offence as having taken place.  
In a crime recorded by ASC investigated by the criminal investigations 
department under the heading of ‘causing or inciting a child under 13 to 
engage in sexual activity’ the ‘one crime per victim’ and ‘finished incident’ 
rules were both seen to be applied. The circumstances recorded indicate 
that the offender requested on more than one occasion that a child under 13 
send them pictures of themselves that were indecent and asked the victim to 
engage in a sexual activity over webcam via social media. The offender also 
did sexual acts on webcam which the aggrieved saw. The offender and the 
aggrieved both exchanged indecent images of themselves on several 
occasions.  
This case was reported to the police once this interaction had finished. The 
offender made admissions to the circumstances outlined above. Only one 
incident or crime report was created. Clearly a series of crimes were 
committed as indecent images were sent on a number of occasions and the 
offender made requests of the aggrieved to perform sexual acts on more 
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than one occasion. However, as these offences were reported to the police 
at the same time, the ‘finished incident rule’ applied. Furthermore, these 
circumstances could constitute a number of offences, including ‘causing a 
child to watch a sex act’ as set out in s.12 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
(SOA 2003), ‘causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in a sexual 
activity’ as set out in s.8, 2003 and possession and distribution of indecent 
images of children as set out in s.1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978. 
However as per the ‘one crime per victim’ rule only one offence is recorded.  
These two findings are important as although the number of recorded 
investigations that contain social media can be seen to total 49 of the 300 
examined within TVP and 57 of the 300 examined within ASC, these figures 
mask the greater total number offences that feature social media due to the 
crime recording rules. As such the proportions of crimes that feature social 
media (16% of those examined from TVP and 19% of those examined from 
ASC) may also not be an accurate representation. The combination of 
differing levels of proof, officer discretion and HOCR counting rules affecting 
the way in which incidents were recorded, required that the crime reports 
were examined in the detail of what occurred within each incident rather than 
relying on the overall recorded category of offence to assess how social 
media featured in and impacted upon different crime types. This more 
detailed analysis is presented in the following section. 
 
8. Factors affecting investigator decision making  
There was a wide and diverse range of strategies and tactics that 
investigators used and or considered when approaching social media in their 
investigations. The range of actions that were noted as being used in crime 
reports were coded into open categories. These categories are displayed in 
tables below separately for ASC and TVP crime reports and for the three 
ways set out above in which social media can be classified within an 
investigation (forming critical evidence, evidence or relevant material). Under 
each category is listed in how many investigations the strategy or tactic was 
noted as being used in. The categories are numbered from one to 19, with 
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consistency across the tables as to the category type that each number 
refers to for ease of comparison. Within these 19 categories are evident a 
number factors that were identified during the literature review as affecting 
decision making within the police including knowledge and structural 
organisation.  A more detailed overview of these factors is given below and 
subsequently highlighted in the 19 categories of strategies and tactics 
identified as being used by officers. 
Knowledge available to an investigator enables or constrains their ability to 
make a decision. It has previously been suggested that the police lack the 
knowledge and skills to effectively deal with digital evidence (Jewkes & 
Andrews, 2007; Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Nicol, Innes, Gee, & Feist, 2004) or a 
new scenario that they have previously not dealt with (Stelfox & Pease, 
2013). Knowledge as a term can be subdivided in further categories: 
knowledge of local policy; a working knowledge of the legal framework in 
relation to the collection of evidence; professional knowledge which includes 
the management of case work and principles of investigation; and a detailed 
knowledge of the legal framework (Stelfox, 2009). Each of these categories, 
although overlapping and ultimately necessary to some degree to be able to 
conduct an investigation, carry a slightly different emphasis.  
Local policies which will be in line with legislation, but may be skewed 
towards the effective use of resources and their proportionate deployment 
within the constraints of the police force or department. A murder 
investigation would for example warrant a greater resoure allocation than a 
theft from a vehicle due to the the greater gravity of the offence. Local 
procedures including the provision of gatekeepers for forensic submissions 
(including digital submissions) will determine what an investigator is able to 
do and the outcomes available for them in any particular case (Stelfox, 
2009). 
A working knowledge of the legal framework is critical to officers collecting 
evidence. Decisions in relation to the collection of evidence can be required 
immediately, without the ability for officers to consult with reference material 
(Stelfox, 2009). So for example an investigator has to be aware when he is 
within the limits of the law to seize a physical piece of evidence, such as a 
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computer, otherwise he will run the risk of the computer being excluded as 
evidence in any ensuing court case. With regard to digital evidence, a 
working knowledge of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA, 
2000) is crucial as it regulates how digital data can be obtained if it 
constitutes communciations data or involves the interception of 
communications. 
The management of case work can be deemed as professional knowledge 
(Schon, 1983; Usher & Bryant, 1987; Eraut, 1994) and carries with it the 
need to balance the expenditure of the investigator as a resource against 
potentially a number of competing investigations and lines of enquiry. 
Principles of investigation also constitute professional knowledge when 
understood as standard operating procedures and have the ability as 
described above, to signpost the investigator and direct him as to the 
decisions that can be taken. Such standard operating procedures have been 
created with social media directly in mind (ACPO, 2012) as discussed in 
chapter two. However in an investigator’s absence of knowledge about this 
specific guidance there are various investigative techiniques (Stelfox 2007) 
which also constitute professional knowledge and allow social media to be 
evidenced in a number of different ways. These forms of ‘evidencing’ are 
part of the professional knowledge of an investigator. For example, the 
content of a social media message can be recorded in the form of a witness 
statement, a photograph, a digital download or a screen capture to name a 
few methods. 
Finally a detailed legal knowledge may constrain or signpost the investigator 
as to  the decisions that have been previously taken and are in turn expected 
and what is required of them. Stated cases with regard to evidence collection 
require the police to take specific action when they encounter specific 
circumstances, thus simplifying the decision making process. One of the 
best known examples of such a stated case is that of R v Turnball (1977) 1 
QB 224 which stipulates the factors that require consideration when a 
witness makes an identification.                                                                    
Organisational structure and supervision will have a substantial impact on 
the individual investigators  (Nicol, Innes, Gee, & Feist, 2004; Youngs & 
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Canter, 2006; Stelfox, 2009). Supervisors will assign cases to an invistigator, 
thereby affecting the amount of time that they have to pursue enquiries. 
They will also assign investigative actions, thereby removing some of the 
decision making choices from the investigator and offer professional advice 
and direction, which may frame the choices and subsequent decisions that 
an investigator will have and make. How open an organisation is to change 
will impact on how quickly investigators will adapt to dealing with new forms 
of evidence such as social media. For example, it has been noted in the past 
that the police is generally resistant to dealing with cybercrime for a variety 
of reasons (Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Awan & Blakemore, 2016). These include: 
a culture among police of not viewining cybercrime as actual crime; a lack of 
previous exposure to cybercrime for senior officers; and it being low on down 
on public priorities (Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Awan & Blakemore, 2016). Whilst 
as discussed in the methodology chapter, not all social media incidence in a 
case will entail a ‘cybercrime’, a proportion for example where social media 
has been used to groom a child so that sexual offences can be committed, 
undoubtly will (Wall, 2001; Broadhurst, 2006; Gordon & Ford, 2006; Ajala, 
2007; Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Clough, 2011; Gilespie, 2015).  
Finally, police forces have very different structures between themselves of 
where the expertise in cybercrime sits, that being dedicated High Tech 
Crime Units, Peadophile online investigation teams, intelligence 
departments, Crime Scene Investigation units or a mixture of the above 
(Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Hunton, 2009; Awan & Blakemore, 2016). The ease of 
access for investigators to these areas of cybercrime expertise will likely 
impact on how they will approach social media as evidenced below.  
 
9. Strategies employed in investigations 
9.1 Avon and Somerset Constabulary 
All the below strategies and tactics were noted in cases where social media 
offered evidence that was critical to the investigation. There were 17 
investigations in total: 
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1) 
Interviewing the 
suspect 
(5 investigations) 
2)    
De briefing the suspect 
(4 investigations) 
3) 
Summarising the social 
media involvement 
(17 investigations) 
4) 
Using the RIPA* to 
obtain social media 
information 
(4 investigations) 
5) 
Seizure and download 
of information stored 
on devices 
(6 investigations) 
6) 
Obtaining passwords 
and usernames of 
social media accounts 
(5 investigations) 
7) 
Researching how to 
obtain information from 
social media providers 
(3 investigations) 
8) 
Assessing the social 
media involvement 
(1 investigation) 
9) 
Obtaining statements 
(6 investigations) 
10) 
De briefing 
11)  
witnesses 
(8 investigations) 
12) 
De briefing the victim 
(11 investigations) 
13) 
Considering 
safeguarding 
(2 investigations) 
14) 
Considering the use of 
undercover officers 
(1 investigation) 
15) 
Obtaining supervisory 
advice 
(7 investigations) 
16) 
Using specialist 
resources for research 
purposes 
(1 investigation) 
17) 
Evidence being 
provided by aggrieved 
or suspect 
(4 investigations) 
18) 
Attempt to identify / 
information sought 
about suspect / 
witness or victim 
through social media 
19) 
CPS advice sought 
(0 investigations) 
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other than subscriber 
checks 
(7 investigations) 
20) 
Accessing social media 
account 
(0 investigations) 
  
Table 8 - Strategies / tactics noted in Avon and Somerset Constabulary investigations where social media 
evidence was critical 
*RIPA refers to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA, 
2000) 
 
At a basic level, the ability of investigators to interview suspects (category 
one) demonstrates knowledge of the law in how to do so as set out in The 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984) and local knowledge of 
policies and procedures of how to undertake such interviews whether that be 
inside or outside of custody. The use of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (category four) further demonstrates knowledge of more 
complex legal frameworks and the application for material covered by this 
act as well as knowledge of local policy of how to do so. More evidence lies 
in the seizure of devices (category five) and completion of statements 
(category nine) the processes for doing so which are also covered by 
criminal law including different sections of PACE 1984. This demonstrates a 
knowledge of the relevant legal framework when dealing with social media 
which is identified above (Stelfox, 2009) as a component of knowledge that 
affects investigator decision making.  
Working knowledge of digital evidence is demonstrated by investigators in 
categories 5 and 7. The researching of how to obtain information from social 
media providers shows a growth in this knowledge for those individual 
investigators conducting this research. Furthermore, the information was 
also obtained from other departments within ASC and TVP demonstrating 
that this knowledge was already present and available to be accessed. 
Although police expertise in digital evidence has been recognised (Sommer, 
2004; ) this contrasts with the typical suggestion noted in the literature that 
officers do not have the capabilities to deal with digital evidence (Nicol, 
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Innes, Gee, & Feist, 2004; Jewkes & Andrews, 2007; Metcalfe, 2007; 
Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Hunton, 2009).  
Category 14 - obtaining supervisory advice demonstrates the ability for 
investigators to obtain guidance from their line managers about their 
investigations. This reflects on the organisational structure of ASC and TVP 
in either facilitating this, allowing it or actively making it happen - a factor 
identified above as influencing decision making (Nicol, Innes, Gee, & Feist, 
2004; Youngs & Canter, 2006; Stelfox, 2009). Investigators’ working 
knowledge with regard to digital evidence and effects or organisation 
structure on decision making are explored in more detail below.  
There were 21 investigations in total where social media constituted 
evidence. The following strategies / tactics were noted in those 
investigations: 
1) 
Interviewing the 
suspect 
(6 investigations) 
2) 
De briefing the 
suspect 
(0 investigations) 
3) 
Summarising the social 
media involvement 
(20 investigations) 
4) 
Using the RIPA to 
obtain social media 
information 
(1 investigation) 
5) 
Seizure and download 
of information stored 
on devices 
(6 investigations) 
6) 
Obtaining passwords 
and usernames of 
social media accounts 
(1 investigation) 
7) 
Researching on how to 
obtain information from 
social media providers 
(0 investigations) 
8) 
Assessing the social 
media involvement 
(4 investigations) 
9) 
Obtaining statements 
(7 investigations) 
10) 
De briefing witnesses 
(4 investigations) 
11) 
De briefing the victim 
(13 investigations) 
12) 
Considering 
safeguarding 
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(1 investigation) 
13) 
Considering the use of 
undercover officers 
(0 investigations) 
14) 
Obtaining supervisory 
advice 
(5 investigations) 
15)  
Using specialist 
resources     
for research purposes 
(1 investigation) 
16) 
Evidence being 
provided by aggrieved 
or suspect 
(4 investigations) 
17) 
Attempt to identify / 
information sought 
about suspect / 
witness or victim 
through social media 
other than subscriber 
checks 
(4 investigations) 
18) 
CPS advice sought 
(0 investigations) 
19) 
Accessing social media 
account 
(0 investigations) 
  
Table 9 – Strategies / tactics noted in Avon and Somerset Constabulary investigations where social media 
provided evidence 
In total, there were 18 investigations where social media constituted relevant 
material and the variety of investigative actions used fell further: 
 
1) 
Interviewing the 
suspect 
(4 investigations) 
2) 
De briefing the 
suspect 
(1 investigation) 
3) 
Summarising the social 
media involvement 
(15 investigations) 
4) 
Using the RIPA to 
5) 
Seizure and download 
6) 
Obtaining passwords 
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obtain social media 
information 
(1 investigation) 
of information stored 
on devices 
(2 investigations) 
and usernames of 
social media accounts 
(0 investigations) 
7) 
Researching on how to 
obtain information from 
social media providers 
(0 investigations) 
8) 
Assessing the social 
media involvement 
(2 investigations) 
9) 
Obtaining statements 
(2 investigations) 
 
10) 
De briefing witnesses 
(2 investigations) 
11) 
De briefing the victim 
(7 investigations) 
12) 
Considering 
safeguarding 
(0 investigations) 
13) 
Considering the use of 
undercover officers 
(0 investigations) 
14) 
Obtaining supervisory 
advice 
(2 investigations) 
15)  
Using specialist 
resources for research 
purposes 
(1 investigation)  
16)               
Evidence being 
provided by aggrieved 
or suspect 
(2 investigations) 
17) 
Attempt to identify / 
information sought 
about suspect / 
witness or victim 
through social media 
other than subscriber 
checks 
(4 investigations) 
18) 
CPS advice sought 
(0 investigations) 
19) 
Accessing social media 
account 
(0 investigations) 
  
Table 10 – Strategies / tactics noted in Avon and Somerset Constabulary investigations where social media 
constituted relevant material 
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As the importance of the social media present in the investigation decreased 
from forming critical evidence to evidence and finally relevant material so too 
there was a fall in both the type but also the incidence of strategies and 
tactics used.  With regard to types of strategy where social media formed 
evidence that was critical, 17 different strategies and tactics were used. 
Where it constituted evidence 14 different types of strategy and tactic were 
seen and where it was relevant material 13 separate strategies and tactics 
were noted.  
With regard to the frequency with which strategies and tactics were used, 
where social media constituted critical evidence in total strategies and tactics 
relating to social media appeared 92 times (a mean of 5.4 in each 
investigation). Where social media constituted evidence, strategies and 
tactics appeared on 77 occasions (a mean of 3.7 used in each investigation) 
and where it was relevant on 45 occasions (a mean of 2.5 used in each 
investigation). 
 
 As such there is a correlation with what investigators were either doing or 
recording what they were doing and the importance of the social media 
material. This correlation becomes even more pronounced when it is noted 
that there were only 17 investigations where social media formed evidence 
that was critical to the investigation as compared to 21 where it formed 
evidence and 18 where it formed relevant material. The more important the 
social media was to the case, the greater the frequency and variety of 
actions performed. There is no rationale recorded for this correlation within 
the crime reports themselves. However, one explanation is that this is due to 
investigators’ application of case management, a factor noted as affecting 
investigator decision making above (Schon, 1983; Usher & Bryant, 1987; 
Eraut, 1994). There is a finite amount of time that investigators have to 
dedicate to their investigations and a finite amount of resources that each 
police area has to expend. As such, lines of enquiry that are judged to be 
less important may not be pursued. The correlation on its own could also be 
explained in another way, in that the more enquiries that were conducted in 
relation to social media the more important evidence it uncovered. However, 
in almost all the investigations there was an initial summary of the social 
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media involvement. The content of these summaries and the importance that 
they attached to social media changed little as further strategies and tactics 
were pursued and material collected in relation to the social media. This 
suggests that the initial appraisal of how relevant the social media was, was 
made correctly and it was on this basis that different strategies / tactics and 
their frequency were pursued.  
 
9.2 Thames Valley Police 
This pattern repeated itself through with the strategies and tactics that were 
employed in the TVP crime reports. In relation to cases where social media 
formed critical evidence in the investigation there were 16 cases in total. The 
range of actions were coded into the following open categories: 
1) 
Interviewing the 
suspect 
(9 investigations) 
2) 
De briefing the suspect 
(2 investigations) 
3) 
Summarising the social 
media involvement 
(12 investigations) 
4) 
Using the RIPA to 
obtain social media 
information 
(3 investigations) 
5) 
Seizure and download 
of information stored 
on devices 
(10 investigations) 
6) 
Obtaining passwords 
and usernames of 
social media accounts 
(1 investigation) 
7) 
Researching on how to 
obtain information from 
social media providers 
(3 investigations) 
8) 
Assessing the social 
media involvement 
(4 investigations) 
9) 
Obtaining statements 
(5 investigations) 
 
10) 
De briefing witnesses 
(3 investigations) 
11) 
De briefing the victim 
(9 investigations) 
12) 
Considering 
safeguarding 
(2 investigations) 
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13) 
Considering the use of 
undercover officers 
(0 investigations) 
14) 
Obtaining supervisory 
advice 
(3 investigations) 
15)  
Using specialist 
resources for research 
purposes 
(0 investigations) 
16) 
Evidence being 
provided by aggrieved 
or suspect 
(2 investigations) 
17) 
Attempt to identify / 
information sought 
about suspect / 
witness or victim 
through social media 
other than subscriber 
checks 
(1 investigation) 
18) 
CPS advice sought 
(0 investigations) 
19) 
Accessing social media 
account 
(1 investigation) 
  
Table 11 – Strategies / tactics noted in Thames Valley Police investigations where social media evidence was 
critical 
In relation to cases where social media formed evidence in the investigation 
there were 17 investigations in total. The range of actions were coded into 
the following open categories: 
1) 
Interviewing the 
suspect 
(6 investigations) 
2) 
De briefing the suspect 
(0 investigations) 
3) 
Summarising the social 
media involvement 
(13 investigations) 
4) 
Using the RIPA to 
obtain social media 
information 
5) 
Seizure and download 
of information stored 
on devices 
6) 
Obtaining passwords 
and usernames of 
social media accounts 
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(1 investigation) (10 investigations) (5 investigations) 
7) 
Researching on how to 
obtain information from 
social media providers 
(1 investigation) 
8) 
Assessing the social 
media involvement 
(4 investigations) 
9) 
Obtaining statements 
(5 investigations) 
 
10) 
De briefing witnesses 
(3 investigations) 
11) 
De briefing the victim 
(7 investigations) 
12) 
Considering 
safeguarding 
(0 investigations) 
13) 
Considering the use of 
undercover officers 
(0 investigations) 
14) 
Obtaining supervisory 
advice 
(6 investigations) 
15)         
Using specialist 
resources for research 
purposes 
(0 investigations) 
16) 
Evidence being 
provided by aggrieved 
or suspect 
(5 investigations) 
17) 
Attempt to identify 
suspect / witness or 
victim through social 
media other than 
subscriber checks 
(4 investigations) 
18) 
CPS advice sought 
(2 investigations) 
19) 
Accessing suspect or 
victim social media 
account 
(3 investigations) 
  
Table 12 - Strategies / tactics noted in Thames Valley Police investigations where social media provided 
evidence 
In relation to cases where social media formed relevant material in the 
investigation there were a total of 14:  
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1) 
Interviewing the 
suspect 
(1 investigation) 
2) 
De briefing the suspect 
(0 investigations) 
3) 
Summarising the social 
media involvement 
(10 investigations) 
4) 
Using the RIPA* to 
obtain social media 
information 
(0 investigations) 
5) 
Seizure and download 
of information stored 
on devices 
(2 investigations) 
6) 
Obtaining passwords 
and usernames of 
social media accounts 
(1 investigation) 
 
7) 
Researching on how to 
obtain information from 
social media providers 
(1 investigation) 
8) 
Assessing the social 
media involvement 
(3 investigations) 
9) 
Obtaining statements 
(3 investigations) 
10) 
De briefing witnesses 
(2 investigations) 
11) 
De briefing the victim 
(6 investigations) 
12) 
Considering 
safeguarding 
(0 investigations) 
13) 
Considering the use of 
undercover officers 
(0 investigations) 
14) 
Obtaining supervisory 
advice 
(3 investigations) 
15)  
Using specialist 
resources for research 
purposes 
(0 investigations) 
16) 
Evidence being 
provided by aggrieved 
or suspect 
(0 investigations) 
17) 
Attempt to identify 
suspect / witness or 
victim through social 
media other than 
subscriber checks 
18) 
CPS advice obtained 
(0 investigations) 
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(0 investigations) 
19) 
Accessing social media 
account 
(0 investigations) 
  
Table 13 – Strategies / tactics noted in Thames Valley Police investigations where social media constituted 
relevant material 
Aside from the categories 13 and 15, the strategies and tactics used by 
investigators in TVP repeated those that were seen in ASC, which 
demonstrated a consistency of options being adopted across the two police 
areas. This supports the idea that there are accepted customs and practices 
that have developed to collect digital evidence that can effectively be 
presented to a jury in a court setting (Bryant, 2016). Furthermore, the total 
frequency in which categories 13 and 15 were used by investigators in ASC 
was only on 3 occasions. As with ASC as the importance of the social media 
present in the investigation decreased, so too there was a fall in the type of 
strategies / tactics used.  
With regard to types of strategy and tactics where social media formed 
evidence that was critical, 16 different options were used. Where it 
constituted evidence, 15 different types options were seen and where it was 
relevant material 10 separate options were noted. With regard to the 
frequency with which strategies and tactics were used, where social media 
constituted critical evidence in total strategies and tactics relating to social 
media appeared 70 times (a mean of 4.4 used in each investigation). Where 
social media constituted evidence, strategies and tactics appeared on 75 
occasions (a mean of 4.4 used in each investigation) and where it was 
relevant on 32 occasions (a mean of 2.3 used in each investigation). The 
correlation with what investigators were either doing or recording what they 
were doing and the importance of the social media material was not as 
strong as it was with the reports from ASC, but still present. Again, in the 
majority of the investigations there was an initial summary around the social 
media involvement, and the importance attributed to social media changed 
little as the investigation progressed and further strategies / tactics were 
pursued.  
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Of the four strategies / tactics outlined by the ACPO (2012) guidelines to 
deal with social media two of them are noted as being used in the crime 
reports and subsumed in the categories above. The first of these is to 
contact the authorities’ bureau if the data that is being sought is deemed to 
be in transit. These actions fell under the codes of ‘seeking specialist 
resources for advice’ and ‘using RIPA (2000) to obtain information’ on social 
media accounts. The second was the catchall strategy of securing a copy of 
what can be seen. This can be seen in the coded categories of ‘Obtaining 
passwords and usernames of social media accounts’’ and then ‘accessing 
social media account’. Whilst there is no mention of printing out the social 
media logs (the second suggestion put forward in the guidelines) within the 
strategies / tactics seen in the crime reports, there is mention of victims and 
witnesses making screen shots of logs and sending them electronically to 
investigators. This would be the necessary precursor to these screen shots 
then being printed out by investigators.  There is no reference in the crime 
reports to investigators making use of a specific facility to save chat logs (the 
first suggestion put forward in the guidelines). However, officers were seen 
to be submitting electronic devices for the extraction of information to HTCUs 
or using specialist equipment to do so in line with first part of the guidelines 
referring to seizure of electronic devices, and in so doing obtaining 
information pertaining to social media through this process.  
 
10 Social media and investigators access to knowledge and information 
As noted above, the action of researching how to obtain information from the 
provider of the social media appearing in the case was identified in eight 
investigations (out of a total of 106 that featured social media) across both 
ASC and TVP crime reports. Six out of the eight investigations where this 
occurred was where the evidence offered by social media was critical to the 
case outcome. With the exception of one case, the advice obtained 
appeared to be consistent.   
There are however four further pieces of evidence that show investigators 
seeking specialist knowledge that was outside of their own knowledge base, 
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but present within the two police organisations and in so doing progressing 
their investigations. First, the crime reports evidenced officers submitting 
devices for examination and download, either to an operator who through a 
connection to a device can download the contents of a phone or to their 
HTCUs. This was seen in 36 investigations spread across both ASC and 
TVP and is in line with guidance provided in the ACPO (2012) guidelines 
around seizure of electronic devices. Secondly, in obtaining supervisory 
advice either from their line managers.  It was seen that often as a result of 
this consultation further investigative actions were set by the supervisors. 
Thirdly, on three occasions, specialist resources within ASC were asked to 
conduct research on the investigators’ behalf to progress the investigation. 
Finally, CPS advice was obtained on three occasions.  
Aside from one case where the investigator was given lines of enquiry to 
pursue by their supervisor there was no evidence to suggest that lack of 
knowledge in how to deal with social media was negatively affecting 
investigators ability to progress their investigations, which has been 
suggested in some of the literature as to what happens when officers deal 
with digital evidence (Nicol, Innes, Gee, & Feist, 2004; Jewkes & Andrews, 
2007; Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Williams, 2008; Hunton, 2009; Awan & 
Blakemore, 2016). In almost all of the situations, the opposite appeared to 
be the case. When investigators were faced with a lack of knowledge they 
approached others to obtain that knowledge or to facilitate their case moving 
forwards. Not only does this demonstrate an ability to obtain knowledge with 
regard to digital evidence, but it also demonstrates legal knowledge in 
relation to RIPA 2000 and submission for checks on social media accounts 
and PACE 1984 with regard to seizure of electronic items for subsequent 
examination. 
 
11. Social media and organisational structure and resources 
The ability for investigators to seek advice from a variety of persons  and 
departments reflects on local policy, resources and organisational structure 
(Groeneveld, 2005). The crime reports do not contain the organisational 
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structure and policy with regard to the management structure,  the way in 
which supervisory reviews are conducted, their frequency, the policy in 
relation to contacting High Tech Crime Units, submitting digital items for 
analysis or how investigators can make applications under RIPA 2000 for 
information relating to indivdual social media accounts.  
As discussed in chapter two, there is no possibility to explore further this 
information without using other types of data. However the crime reports did 
evidence that these actions were taking place.  Given that the crime reports 
show that supervisory reviews have taken place, the organsiation structure 
and policy either allows reviews to be conducted by supervisors and this is 
utilised by them, or it is an expected aspect to their role that is actively 
followed. Either way, the interaction between supervisor and investigator 
takes place and this interaction is recorded in the crime reports.  
The crime reports showed that there were three departments who had 
expertise of digital evidence and specifically social media. These 
departments were the HTCU, Intelligence Units and units dealing with 
applications for communications data. These have been identified previously 
as having expertise in the area of cybercrime within the police (Jewkes & 
Yar, 2008; Hunton, 2009; Awan & Blakemore, 2016). These three 
departments were contacted by investigators on a regular basis in both TVP 
and ASC. Given that the crime reports did not contain any reference about 
other departments that investigators turned to for information, it would 
suggest that these three departments are known for their expertise in social 
media and hence they were being asked for advice. Not only were these 
departments approached for guidance, but technical expertise was provided, 
either in the form of downloading devices or in the information provided by 
them about the social media applications. There was no evidence in any of 
the crime reports that there was uncertainty about where to submit devices 
for examination, there was simply a record of investigators doing so. 
It has been argued that there has been a resistance by the police in 
considering cybercrime offences as actual crime (Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Awan 
& Blakemore, 2016). There was however no evidence in terms of the 
language used of resistance to investigating any of the crimes that involved 
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social media. It is of course possible that the resistance to investigation may 
have manifested itself in crime reports not being created, which in turn would 
not be evident in the crime reports examined.  
 
12. Problem Solving, Heuristics, prescriptive and descriptive models of 
decision making 
Heuristics, prescriptive and descriptive models of decision making have 
been identified in the literature review as models of decision making that 
may impact or describe the decision-making process behind the investigative 
strategies and tactics chosen by investigators. However, due to the static 
nature of the information collected in the crime reports it is not possible to 
expand or explore further the reasons why the strategies identified above 
were selected. There are strategies and tactics present in the tables that 
show established ways of collecting evidence and how this process is 
influenced. These include obtaining statements (Gozna & Horvath, 2009), 
seeking or obtaining supervisory advice (Groeneveld, 2005) and interviewing 
suspects (Sanders & Young, 2012). There is a lack of evidence in the crime 
reports to ascertain whether investigators weighed up different ways of 
obtaining evidence and as a result of this process made a decision to use 
them or whether investigators used these techniques automatically as a 
consequence of previously employing them. Other strategies and tactics are 
present that may have been adapted for social media. This would include 
seeking specialist advice, seizing electronic devices and making 
communications data applications using RIPA 2000.  
There is some limited support to show that investigators were mirroring the 
steps identified as being followed by individuals when they encounter a new 
issue in problem solving models (Getzels, 1982; Simonton, 1999; Pretz, 
Naples, & Sternberg, 2003). First, officers were seeking advice on how to 
deal with social media. This offers support to the proposition that they were 
encountering and recognising social media as a new problem and in so 
doing seeking advice on how to deal with it. Secondly, strategies and tactics 
are present that show investigative enquiries that are unique to social media. 
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This includes the seeking information around suspects, witnesses and 
victims through social media and accessing social media directly. This again 
offers support to the idea that officers were seeing social media in a unique 
light and in so doing approaching it distinctively to other forms of evidence 
that they deal with.  
It may have been expected as detailed towards the beginning of chapter 3 
that the NDM would feature within the crime reports as a framework for 
decision making. However, whilst envisaged by ACPO (2012) and the 
National College of Policing as being prescriptive in nature, the NDM is very 
similar to and overlays onto models of professional learning cycles (Dewey, 
1933; Argyris & Schön, 1978; Kolb, 1984; Gibbs, 1988; Johns, 1995; 
Brookfield, 1998; Thompson, 2000; White, Fook, & Garnder, 2006). These 
models are descriptive in nature rather than prescriptive, having been 
constructed following observations of how professionals in different fields 
make decisions. Whilst there was evidence of professional learning cycles 
utilised within the research, there was no direct evidence of the NDM and it’s 
individual steps being employed by investigators. The NDM assumes 
however in it’s first step that there is a concious extrapolation of a problem 
by the decision maker. In contrast this research has found that social media 
was being approached as a problem in a ‘fuzzy scenario’ where the issue 
and it’s facets are not particulalry well defined (Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 
2003). In such a scenario the problem requires first of all recognition by the 
individual that a ‘problem’ exists and then the subsequent defining of the 
problem’s facets (Bransford & Stein, 1984; Sternberg, 1985; Pretz, Naples, & 
Sternberg, 2003). These steps are not present within the NDM. This is in 
contrast to a situation where the issue is distinct and decisions can be 
applied within clear parameters (Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003). 
Furthermore, the research found that a significant portion of the decisions 
made in relation to social media were driven by heuristcs which can allow an 
unconcious process. This may offer an explanaiton as to the NDM’s lack of 
mention, although there are other possible explanations for it not being 
utilised including that it may not be well suited to making decisions within 
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complex investigations and as such is not utilised by detectives. To ascertain 
this is an area for further research. 
In order to ascertain the reasons why strategies detailed above have been 
used, the decision-making process behind them, and to evidence that 
officers were indeed seeing social media as a distinct and new problem, 
interviews were conducted with investigators. This forms the second part of 
this research and is addressed in the following chapter.  
 
13. Conclusion 
When an overall view of the data was presented showing the types of crime 
that have had social media involvement and the way in which social media 
affected these investigations, the arguments supporting the weaknesses of 
using the original police classifications to identify which investigations social 
media was affecting were highlighted. The conclusion was drawn that the 
next step in the data analysis would be to examine the social media 
involvement in the incidents in more detail. It was shown that the majority of 
investigations featuring social media occurred in the following three offence 
types: sexual; physical non-sexual assaults; and harassment cases. This 
allows for signposting investigators to the potential of social media material 
being present in certain investgations, expanding the scope of those 
mentioned within the ACPO (2012) guidelines and the construction of 
standard operating procedures to assist officers in dealing with social media 
in such crimes. Such procedures are widespread in signposting investigators 
in areas other than social media in their cases (Rowley, 2010; Yexley & 
Horvath, 2012; Veigas & Lum, 2013).  
Strategies and tactics were then presented that were visible in the data and 
19 separate categories were found that aside from two repeated themselves 
across both police areas. These strategies / tactics reflected established 
factors that affect investigative decision making identified in academic 
literature. These include different forms of knowledge, organisational 
structure and resources. The strategies evidenced around social media 
however challenge the notion that police lack the knowledge and skills to 
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deal with digital evidence or the impetus to deal with offences where it is 
present (Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Awan & Blakemore, 2016). It was shown in 
the crime reports that three out of the four suggested tactics in the ACPO 
(2012) guidelines were being utilised. 
The limitations of crime reports have prevented an analysis as to why 
decisions are taken, whether officers behave in a way described by problem 
solving models when tackling social and a deeper exploration of the 
organisational structure and resources present (Jewkes & Yar, 2008; 
Hunton, 2009; Awan & Blakemore, 2016). The next chapter examines the 
data collected through interviews with investigators, which had the potential 
to overcome the constraints that crime reports present.  
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Chapter 5 – An analysis of the interviews: the aims of investigators and 
strategies used  
 
1. Introduction  
This chapter begins by identifying the strategies / tactics that were noted as 
being used by investigators during their interviews. A comparison is then 
made with these against those that were identified in the examination of 
crime reports.  Next, the first part of the analysis of the interviews is 
presented. In this analysis four aims are identified that investigators have 
when dealing with social media. The way in which the ordering of these 
goals was achieved from the data is described and data from the interviews 
presented to that effect. The decision-making models seen in the literature 
review are shown not to adequately explain how officers approach social 
media when they encounter it in their investigations. Problem solving as a 
concept is revealed to more accurately describe the situation faced by 
investigators when encountering social media. The four aims identified are 
portrayed as an evolved understanding of what drives the decisions of 
investigators. 
How investigators frame social media as a problem is then presented with 10 
separate facets distinguished by officers. This describes the first three 
stages of the problem-solving model as presented by Pretz, Naples, & 
Sternberg (2003) namely, identifying social media as a problem, defining it 
and ordering goals that the individual faced with the problem wants to 
achieve. 
The chapter then goes on to describe the fourth stage of the model, that 
being developing strategies to achieve the identified goals. It breaks this 
stage however further into those steps presented by the decision making 
model of Frauenknecht & Black (2010). It describes the choices made by 
investigators using the stages in this decision-making model with reference 
to the four identified goals of investigators of: collecting evidence in a way 
that it would be accepted by a court; identifying suspects; maintaining the 
engagement of the victim; and safeguarding individuals. The greatest 
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amount of information available around decision making rules obtained from 
the interviews was around the aim of obtaining evidence for court and as 
such the main body of the analysis focuses on this goal. There was much 
less information pertaining to the remaining three goals and the options that 
investigators identified in relation to achieving them. Finally the ACPO (2012) 
guidelines are compared against the actual behaviour of investigators.  
 
2. Strategies used when social media is encountered 
Data collection through the process of semi-structured interviews with 
investigators sought to answer the second and third questions posed in this 
research. The second question looked to identify investigative strategies 
deployed by investigators when they encounter social media. Data obtained 
from crime reports identified a number of strategies and tactics used and 
coded them into 19 separate categories. These were used during the 
hypothetical scenario presented to investigators at the end of the interview. 
However, prior to the hypothetical scenario strategies and tactics used in 
previous cases encountered by the investigators were discussed. In total 14 
investigators were interviewed and two cases discussed with each 
investigator during their interview. Although this meant that only a total of 28 
cases that involved social media were explored in comparison to the 106 
cases identified in the crime reports, the same categories of strategies and 
tactics employed or considered were noted in the interviews as in the crime 
reports barring one, which was consideration of using undercover officers. 
Furthermore, the use of undercover officers was only considered in only one 
of the 106 crime reports containing social media. Although no statistical 
analysis has been conducted, the mention of this strategy in only one report 
out of 106 may be considered to be out of the boundaries of normal 
considerations made by investigators. No further strategies or tactics were 
noted during the interviews additional to the ones seen deployed in the crime 
reports. Although it is difficult to make a direct comparison of the frequency 
options used between both sets of data, that the same options were 
identified defends the reliability of the results found in each (Thornberry & 
Krohn, 2000). The following table shows the same categories as identified in 
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the analysis of the crime reports. Below each category is listed the number 
of interviewees that mentioned or considered this strategy or tactic during 
their interviews when discussing previous cases that they have dealt with: 
 
1)  
Interviewing the 
suspect 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 14 
interviewees) 
2)  
De briefing the 
suspect 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 1 
interviewee) 
3) 
Summarising the social 
media involvement 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 14 
interviewees) 
4) 
Using the RIPA to 
obtain social media 
information 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 5 
interviewees) 
5) 
Seizure and download 
of information stored 
on devices 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 10 
interviewees) 
6) 
Obtaining passwords 
and usernames of 
social media accounts 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 6 
interviewees) 
7) 
Researching on how to 
obtain information from 
social media providers 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 3 
interviewee) 
8) 
Assessing the social 
media involvement 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 14 
interviewees) 
9) 
Obtaining statements 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 12 
interviewees) 
10) 
De briefing witnesses 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 7 
interviewees) 
11) 
De briefing the victim 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 6 
interviewees) 
12) 
Considering 
safeguarding 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
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considered by 12 
interviewees) 
13) 
Considering the use of 
undercover officers 
 
14) 
Obtaining supervisory 
advice 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 3 
interviewees) 
15)  
Using specialist 
resources for research 
purposes 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 10 
interviewees) 
16) 
Evidence being 
provided by aggrieved 
or suspect 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 8 
interviewees) 
17) 
Attempt to identify / 
information sought 
about suspect / 
witness or victim 
through social media 
other than subscriber 
checks 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 8 
interviewees) 
18) 
CPS advice sought 
(mentioned as being 
employed or 
considered by 7 
interviewees) 
19) 
Accessing social media 
account 
 (mentioned as being 
employed by or 
considered 11 
interviewees) 
  
Table 14 – Strategies / tactics noted as being used by investigators in the data obtained from interviews 
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3. The identification of four goals 
During the course of the interviews, it became clear, that the parameters of 
the decisions that investigators were encountering were not clearly defined. 
The strict boundaries of experiments from which heuristics have been 
identified and prescriptive / normative and descriptive / positive models have 
been derived from, were not present. Whilst elements of models identified in 
decision making literature were present in the data, they failed to adequately 
describe the initial situation that faced investigators when they encountered 
social media. There was no single set of parameters that investigators were 
describing during the interviews against which to overlay a model of decision 
making as defined in the literature review.  What was clear however was that 
investigators were identifying social media as a problem. The following 
statements were made by different investigators in the initial stage of the 
interviews when investigators were asked to define social media: 
  
Participant 8: “Massive pitfalls and I think we are lacking hugely on social 
media. Well behind” 
Participant 9: “I think there needs to be a lot of work around assisting police 
around social media”.  
Participant 11: “Hard work. I think it causes problems rather than solves 
problems”.  
Participant 13: “It’s the bane of my life at the minute with some of the jobs 
that I have”. 
 
As the interviews progressed it became clear that all the investigators had 
been at a point during their professional careers where social media had 
featured in an investigation and presented an unknown element to them. As 
the above statements show, social media was being identified as an issue, 
but it was not immediately obvious what that issue was or the parameters of 
the problem that it presented. Rather than revealing strict parameters in 
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which a decision was being made, the coding process revealed four 
separate goals that investigators strove towards. These were as follows: 
1. Safeguarding individuals 
2. Maintaining the engagement of the victim. 
3. Identifying the suspect for the purposes of the investigation.  
4. Collecting evidence in such a way that it would be accepted in court.  
The aims were clearly identified by investigators through statements that 
they made during the interviews. However, not all 14 interviewees mentioned 
each of the four aims. The safeguarding of individuals was mentioned by 12, 
reference to maintaining the engagement of the victim was mentioned by 11, 
identification of the suspect by 7 and collecting evidence that would be 
accepted in court by 7. The order in which these goals are listed is reflective 
of the importance assigned to them by investigators. The importance that 
investigators assigned to a goal was ascertained through comments made 
by them when considering one goal against another and where a clear 
choice had to be made of satisfying one over another. In other words, in a 
situation where only one goal out of two being considered could be 
achieved. Although not all investigators ranked each of the four aims, when 
they did make comments that placed aims relative to each other they were 
always ranked in the above order. The evidence for this was that in each of 
the interviews where previous cases were discussed, definitive statements 
were made in relation to tiering that were not over ruled elsewhere in the 
interviews. 
 
3.1 Collection of evidence for court 
The greatest number of comments, a total of 57, were made with regard to 
presenting the social media encountered in investigations as evidence for 
the purpose of it being presented in court. The following comments are 
typical of the ones made by participants regarding social media and relating 
it to court: 
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Participant 9: “Well court, giving it to CPS, they need it to be evidenced in 
the right way” 
Participant 10: “Make sure whatever product they get can stand up 
evidentially in court” 
Participant 12: “Eventually everything will be questioned in court” 
 
The main concern in presenting social media as evidence in court was that it 
would not be excluded as evidence because of a challenge by the defence 
or scrutiny by the court. The following comments provide some insight into 
this: 
 
Participant 6: “you rely on it in a decent case in court and falls down because 
you haven’t id’ed somebody correctly or collected the evidence correctly.” 
Participant 3: “doing things the right way by going through authorities, and 
getting things produced in a manner we know if it’s questioned in court we 
obtained this through the right channels.” 
Participant 5: “That would have to come from the defence and or the suspect 
should there be one….. All we need is that element of doubt don’t we. That’s 
all we need from the defence.” 
 
As these goals became apparent during the coding procedure, literature was 
sought that had examined detective work to establish whether these goals 
had previously been explicitly acknowledged as was seen in the literature 
review.  
 
3.2 Identification of the suspect for the purpose of the investigation 
Identification of the suspect as an aim was commented on a total of 13 
times. This was the lowest number of comments with respect of the four 
overarching goals identified. The following comments are examples of the 
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ones made by participants with regard to social media and relating it to 
identifying a suspect for the purpose of the investigation: 
 
Participant 10: “So we’ve had to identify who that person was, initially. It was 
an absolute priority, then have a look at the content of his Facebook 
contacts” 
Participant 1: “Essentially it was our only way of progressing this 
investigation. We had the complaint with the victim but in order to do 
anything about that whatsoever we had to try and identify who it was that 
was asking her for these images” 
Participant 5: “we want to identify them” 
 
There is an implicit ordering that places the identification of a suspect in an 
investigation over recording social media as evidence for court. This is 
because if there is no suspect who has been identified then there can be no 
case which can be heard in court (Connor, 2009). Furthermore, the following 
comments show that when looking to identify a suspect through social media 
that was present in a case, investigators were not concerned with presenting 
it as evidence unless there was a prospect of the case going to court, which 
shows that these two aims are separate and distinct: 
 
Participant 6: “Yeah. I probably use it more as an intel tool rather than, yeah 
an evidential ID through Facebook.” 
Participant 9: “Once I’d found him you know he’s then consensual. So it 
becomes irrelevant really to me I found the right person, he’s admitting his 
presence, he’s saying its consensual so the investigation takes another, now 
I’m trying to prove consent or whatever, that becomes irrelevant. Obviously if 
he has said no I’ve never been there then I would have to look at my 
evidence chain really.” 
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Participant 6 was talking about a robbery investigation where the 
identification of a suspect took place through social media that presented 
itself during the case. The investigator’s use of the social media to identify 
the suspect rather than use it as evidence is very clear as it is described as 
an ‘intel tool’ rather than ‘an evidential ID’. Participant 9 was discussing their 
investigation into a rape. The aggrieved in this case could not name the 
suspect, but the suspect was identified through the social media present in 
the case. The investigator explains that once the suspect had been identified 
and arrested, during the subsequent interview he placed himself at the 
incident when it occurred. As such, there was no need to evidence how he 
was identified as a suspect because he did so himself. The issue in the case 
was now consent. Had he not identified himself as being present, then it may 
have been necessary to evidence how social media had identified him as the 
suspect. In these two comments, the two investigators demonstrate that 
identifying the suspect through social media was a separate and distinct goal 
to evidencing the social media and furthermore it was an objective that was 
sought prior to considering whether to present social media as evidence. 
 
3.3 Maintaining victim engagement 
In total 26 comments were made on the subject of maintaining victim 
engagement with the following being typical of the strength of feeling 
expressed on the importance of the victim: 
 
Participant 2: “Yeah and it was all very victim focused if you like” 
Participant 1: “I mean we are here to try and provide a service to the victim” 
Participant 12: “because long term if there is stuff going to court I want a 
much better relationship with victim” 
 
The ordering of the victim as a goal above that of identifying the suspect and 
gathering evidence for court was also very clear. 
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Participant 3: “the most important thing here isn’t about me getting a quick 
conviction or a quick detection. It’s about the victim and sometimes we lose 
sight of that” 
Participant 12: “I probably wouldn’t. Just because I’m thinking long term if I 
want to keep her on board for a prosecution if I could build a good rapport 
with her, a good relationship with her. It would only be this my personal gain 
to see it then and there.” 
Participant 13: “Because I had to make a decision, do I arrest a vulnerable 
CSE girl for some petty shit, well it’s not petty it’s quite, and risk damaging a 
relationship with the police, or do I get her in voluntarily. So I got her in 
voluntarily.” 
 
Participant 3 in the statement above clearly places the victim above the 
quick conviction of the suspect and the actions that would lead to and enable 
a quick conviction to happen. Participant 12 was discussing whether to seize 
a victim’s phone against their will from them in order to be able see and 
record social media messages visible on the phone as evidence. Again, the 
investigator makes a decision not to seize the phone in preference to 
preserving or maintaining a better relationship with the victim. Participant 13 
describes a situation where the suspect in the case they are investigating is 
a victim in another case. In order to maintain the relationship with the victim, 
they alter the way in which they approach her as a suspect and make a 
decision not to arrest her but rather deal with her voluntarily. This last 
example places maintaining a relationship with the victim above that of 
dealing with them as a suspect and collecting evidence which an arrest 
would facilitate in this case by giving the investigator powers to seize their 
phone.  
 
Out of the 26 comments made regarding maintaining a relationship with 
victims, 14 described the process of obtaining evidence relating to social 
media consensually from the victim, specifically by having access to their 
phones or electronic devices that had social media content stored on them. 
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Although consideration was given to seizing these devices against the 
wishes of the victim, none of the investigators described making this choice, 
preferring instead to try and obtain the evidence another way or to persuade 
the victim to allow access to their device. This was done to maintain a 
relationship with the aggrieved. The seizure of such devices is done to 
obtain intelligence, evidence for the case or to identify the suspect. Three 
investigators explicitly describe making a choice not to seize devices from 
their victim if they will not provide access to their social media even if it 
impedes identifying the suspect in the case. 
 
 
3.4 Safeguarding 
In total, 39 statements were made regarding safeguarding. In some cases, 
the word ‘safeguarding’ was specifically mentioned whilst in other cases the 
risk to victim(s) and the safety of the victim was considered. Comments 
containing reference to risk and safety of victims were included as these 
elements are present in literature and government agency direction 
concerning safeguarding reviewed in Chapter 2. This highlighted that 
safeguarding of children, vulnerable adults, victims of rape and domestic 
violence had over the last 20 years become a statutory requirement for the 
police to fulfil (Adoption and Children Act 2002; Children Act 2004; Laming, 
2009). The following comments are typical of the ones made by participants 
regarding social media and relating it to safeguarding: 
 
Participant 3: “If the child is in a safe place. If the child has been assaulted 
and the child has phoned mum and mum doesn’t know where he is then 
yeah. That would be quite a priority to get just for safeguarding issues and 
welfare.” 
Participant 5: “First and foremost if you’re dealing with victims, how can we 
protect them from this happening again. What can they put in on their own 
self-awareness, self-protection around stopping this happening.” 
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Participant 7: “In terms of managing the risk to other people, because its 
social media, if you’ve got an idea, if you know who your suspect is, you can 
probably determine if you’ve got other potential victims that are at risk.” 
Participant 9: “these girls need safeguarding it could be their images. We 
had a real concern about this lad and all the relationships he was having.” 
 
With regard to ordering the Safeguarding above the other three objectives 
identified in total there were nine comments made. Two comments ordered 
safeguarding above maintaining victim engagement. The remaining seven 
comments ordered safeguarding above organisational guidelines with regard 
to the action undertaken having a negative or questionable impact on the 
case at court.  
Participant 4 considered the risk that the suspect posed to the aggrieved and 
stated that this would influence their decision making. If the risk was 
significant enough they would break with protocols and access the suspects 
Facebook directly over normal work computers. 
Participant 5: “If police officers encourage victims to stay on those Facebook 
twitter accounts it will obtain further information then that goes against the 
ethical approach to why are we putting victims not saying they have to we 
are encouraging them to stay there to see if it will generate more evidence. 
And that is an issue for me.” 
Participant 7: “Yeah, I think it’s always a little bit, a grey area in terms of 
whether you have got the power to seize it as evidence of the case, bearing 
in mind that it’s your victim and I suppose it’s the case really I suppose if 
we’re talking life and death, I would quite happily stand up in court and say 
that I’ve seized it.”  
Participant 9: “Yeah. And because we need to justify it. And justification is 
protecting children or vulnerable people then that ups the ante.”  
Participant 11: “Like those guidelines are there to make sure that we don’t do 
something wrongly. But if I was doing it for the right reasons and it was to 
protect somebody, especially with that Facebook thing, checking to make 
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sure with the intel that we had and everything else. You know I was doing it 
for the right treasons. As long as I can justify it.” 
 
Participant 4 discusses the hypothetical scenario presented in the final part 
of the interview. They explain that if the suspect posed a significant enough 
risk to the victim or other victims then they would break protocols and access 
the suspect’s facebook directly on work computers even though this would 
break organisation guidelines and may subsequently impact on the 
admissibility of evidence. Participant 5 was using a hypothetical example to 
emphasize the importance of the victim to them when dealing with social 
media. In the scenario that they outline, the victim is being harassed by a 
suspect via social media. Instead of officers advising the victim to block the 
suspect, they advise the victim to not block the suspect so that any further 
messages sent by the suspect can be collected as evidence for the case. 
The investigator explains that a scenario such as this would be an issue for 
them ethically as they would rather protect the victim than obtain evidence. 
 Participant 7 discusses the risk posed by the suspect in a hypothetical 
scenario. Their comment is in relation to seizing the victim’s electronic 
devices in order to identify the risk posed and that if it was a ‘life and death’ 
scenario then they would be happy to do so. Given that the victim in this 
scenario does not wish to surrender her electronic devices, the intended 
consequence would likely be to damage the relationship with the victim. The 
investigator may also forsee a potential issue in court in taking this course of 
action as they reference standing up in court and explaining their action. As 
such they can be seen to order safeguarding above maintaining a 
relationship with the victim and potentially the collection of evidence for the 
purposes of court. This example shows safeguarding as a goal to be distinct 
from the goal of maintaining and engaging the victim in that what is seen as 
being in the best interests of the victim may alienate the victim from the 
police and other public agencies. Other examples where these two aims 
conflict could include the arrest of an offender in a domestic violence 
situation to whom the victim is emotionally attached and protective of or the 
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decision to remove a child from their parents from whom they do not wish to 
be separated from. 
Participant 9 refers to a case where she was challenged by a solicitor acting 
on behalf of the suspect as to their attempts to obtain access to the 
suspect’s computer and that this course of action was outside the scope of 
the investigation. The investigator justifies her enquiries not in terms of 
collecting evidence for the case or that they have a legal basis to pursue 
those enquiries but rather on the basis of safeguarding. The safeguarding in 
this case centres around identifying the other victims of the suspect who are 
at risk from him.  
Participant 11 speaks about breaking guidelines and rules which prevent 
officers from doing the wrong thing in relation to social media and its 
collection if it is in order to protect an individual. Although not specifically 
mentioning collection of evidence for court the guidelines that the 
investigator is refering to are the ACPO guidelines whose concern is the 
gathering of electronic evidence including social media. 
 
4. The ranking of investigator goals 
The four aims discussed above presented themselves clearly in the data 
during the coding process. The most commonly mentioned aim regarding 
social media was to collect it to use as evidence in court. This was the 
lowest in terms of priority however. There were no cases where the 
interviewees placed the collection of social media to use as evidence in court 
above the other three aims identified. The second identified aim in terms of 
importance for investigators was that of suspect identification. This had the 
lowest incidence of mention out of the four aims. This can be explained by 
the suspect being known in the majority of the cases discussed to the victim 
or identified through other means prior to the social media evidence being 
known to the investigator. Identification of the suspect and collection of 
evidence for court are closely intertwined. Without a suspect, there can be 
no prosecution and so no court case for evidence to be collected for. 
Criminal law requires first an act that constitutes the offence (actus reus) and 
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secondly a guilty mind (mens rea) which precipitated the act (Connor, 2009) 
before a criminal offence can be considered to have taken place. The ‘guilty 
mind’ necessitates a suspect. As such in order for a case to be heard in 
court a suspect is required. The collection of evidence can lead to the 
identification of a suspect. However, the identification of a suspect does not 
necessitate a court case or collection of the material that identified the 
suspect as evidence for court. This was shown in the examples where 
officers identified suspects using social media, but did not subsequently use 
that material for the purposes of evidence for court once the suspect had 
been identified. There exists the possibility that investigators would rather 
not identify the suspect if this were to compromise evidence collected for 
court, however this type of preference was not expressed during the 
interviews.  
The third identified aim was to maintain victim engagement. Investigators 
were clear that the relationship with the victim was more important than the 
collection of evidence and in three cases more important that identifying the 
suspect. The primary aim identified was that of safeguarding. This aim is 
intertwined with the other three in that prevention of harm to the victim and 
others may entail maintaining a relationship with the victim, identifying the 
suspect and collecting evidence for court in order to convict an offender. 
Investigators expressed a willingness to damage the relationship with the 
victim and circumvent rules around the collection of evidence in order to 
identify other victims and the suspect in a case for the purpose of 
safeguarding.  In this way a distinction is made between the aims of 
identifying the suspect for the purpose of the investigation and identifying the 
suspect for the purpose of safeguarding.  The preferences as they are 
ordered from one to four are done so in an ordinal way with no measure of 
strength of preference of one choice of aim over another. I failed to find an 
explicit ordering of these 4 objectives during the literature review.  
ACPO (2012) guidelines only address one of the investigator aims that being 
the collection of evidence for court. The other three aims identified above are 
not recognised in the guidelines nor is any guidance given as to where 
strategies could be found to address them.  
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 5. Identifying the facets of social media as a unique problem 
Investigators were seen across all 14 interviewees to recognise that a 
problem existed when coming across social media in their investigations as 
in the first step of Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg’s (2003) model. Investigators 
also defined the problem that they were facing with ten separate facets being 
identified from the data. These were coded into the following categories: 1) 
failure of social media providers to engage with the police; 2) the lack of 
legislation granting police powers in relation to it; 3) the changing nature of 
social media; 4) an increased workload associated with social media; 5) 
restrictive guidelines; 6) lack of specialist support; 7) difficulty in accessing 
social media accounts; 8) a lack of training; 9) inadequate technical 
resources; 10) loss of evidence. These 10 coded categories reflect how 
investigators framed the problem of social media in the cases that they dealt 
with. All of the difficulties identified by investigators during the interviews 
have previously been acknowledged (Barnes, 2006; Kardasz, 2012; Trottier, 
2012; Etzioni, 2016) and were referred to in the litearture review. 
The table below shows the aspects of social media that caused them issue 
and which participants identified each issue: 
 
1. Failure of 
social media 
providers to 
engage with 
the police 
Participants: 1, 2, 
3, 5, 9, 10, 11 
 
2. The lack of legislation 
granting police powers 
in relation to it 
Participants: 1, 5, 9, 10, 
11 
3. The changing nature of 
social media 
 Participants: 3, 6, 10, 11, 
12, 13 
4. An increased 
work load 
associated 
5. Restrictive guidelines 
Participants: 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 13,  
6. Lack of specialist 
support 
Participants: 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 
9, 11, 12 
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with social 
media 
Participants: 1, 3, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
12, 13, 14 
7. Difficulty of 
accessing 
social media 
accounts 
Participants: 1, 5, 
9, 13, 14,  
8. A lack of training 
Participants: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 
9. Inadequate technical 
resources 
Participants: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 
10. Loss of 
evidence 
Participants: 1, 3, 
4, 5, 9, 13,  
  
Table 15 - Facets of social media that cause issue for investigators 
 
Categories, one, two, three, four, seven and ten are ones that are unique to 
social media and these facets have been noted previously and discussed in 
the literature review. During the interviews three of the five investigators who 
mentioned a lack of legislation as an aspect of social media that caused 
them issue expanded further on the cause of this. Their focus was on social 
media as communications data and how current legislation on 
communciation, namely RIPA 2000 did not easily encompass it. The issue of 
the right to privacy was raised, whether there is an expectation of privacy 
when communications are sent via social media and how communications 
are retrieved when investigators access suspects’ and victims’ social media 
accounts. 
The first, second and seventh categories as listed above combine to form 
the 10th category in the table which pertains to loss of evidence. If social 
media providers fail to engage with the police then evidence cannot be 
collected from them. If there is a lack of legislation to force them to engage 
then again evidence cannot be obtained. The same is also true if 
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investigators cannot access pertinent social media accounts to collect 
evidence directly. Further to this, investigators were concerned about data 
being ereased from social media accounts by suspects, victims and 
witnesses, if not secured quickly enough. 
The remaining categories (five, six, eight and nine) as posing an issue to 
them are not unique to social media. Investigators desired more knowledge 
around social media through training (category eight) and specialist 
resources in terms of personnel (category six). A lack of training has been 
identified as an issue by investigators in computer based crime (Goodman, 
1996; Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Williams, 2008; Hunton, 2009; Awan & 
Blakemore, 2016),  but also a wide range of other fields in policing including 
mental health (Lamb, Weinberger, & DeCuir Jr, 2002), family crisis 
intervention (Bard & Berkowitz, 1967), pursuit driving (Hill, 2002) and dealing 
with youth offenders (Pilavin & Briar, 1964). Similarly the need for specialist 
resources to support different areas of police work is noted in computer 
related crime (Hunton, 2009), cybercrime (Jewkes, 2013), fraud 
investigations (Button, Frimpong, Smith, & Johnston, 2007), mental health 
triage (The Police Foundation, 2016) and serious sexual assault 
investigations (Hester & Lilley, 2015). Restrictive guidelines have been 
widely acknowledged as having a significant impact on police work not only 
in relation to computer based evidence (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009) but more 
generally affecting officers ability to exercise discretion in all aspects of their 
work (Chakrabarti, 2008) and their ability to perfrom ‘frontline’ duties (Sindall 
& Sturgis, 2013). Finally it has been noted that technical resources at the 
disposal of the police to deal with computer based and internet crime are 
inadequate (Sommer, 2004; Hunton, 2009; Jewkes, 2013; Bryant & 
Stephens, 2014).  
Previous studies (Chase & Simon, 1973; Simon & Simon, 1978; Glaser, 
1999) have suggested that the greater the expertise in a particular field the 
clearer the individual is able to identify the pertinent factors in an 
encountered problem. The correlation between the number of factors 
identified in the issue and so the framing of the problem was compared 
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against investigator time working in a detective role. This is seen in the table 
below.  
 
Participant number Years working as a 
detective 
Categories identified by 
participants as causing issue in 
relation to social media 
Participant 10 28 years  1, 2 ,3, 4, 5, 8, 9 
Participant 5 18 years  2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 
Participant 9   12 years  2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
Participant 1 10 years  2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
Participant 14 7 years  4, 7, 9 
Participant 3 5 years 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 
Participant 2 4 years 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 
Participant 11 3 years 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 
Participant 8 3 years 4, 5, 8, 9,  
Participant 6 3 years 1, 4, 6, 8, 9 
Participant 7 2 years 4, 6, 8 
Participant 4 1 year 6, 8, 9, 10 
Participant 13 1 year 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 
Participant 12 1 year 1, 4, 6, 8, 9 
Table 16 - Facets of social media that cause issue for investigators as identified by each interviewee 
 
There was as can be seen no clear correlation. This was also the case when 
the total amount of time investigators had served in the police was compared 
against factors identified that framed the problem. Significantly, the studies 
(Chase & Simon, 1973; Simon & Simon, 1978; Lesgold, et al., 1988; Glaser, 
1999) which identified that domain specific knowledge assisted in the 
identification of the factors that comprised a problem were conducted in 
‘laboratory’ conditions. In those studies the participants did not have the 
opportunity to seek advice or knowledge from other sources when tackling 
the problems presented to them. During the coding process it became 
apparent however that investigators would activily seek knowledge to 
supplement their own when they encountered social media and were unable 
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to identify strategies to achieve their stated aims. Investigators sought 
knowledge from colleagues, supervisors, specialist departments and 
expressed a desire for additional training in relation to social media. The 
below table shows strategies to obtain information against the number of 
participants that selected each strategy: 
  
1. Consulting with 
supervisor for advice 
         (3 investigators) 
2. Expressing a desire 
for additional 
training 
         (13 investigators) 
3. Sharing of 
professional 
knowledge 
         (13 investigators) 
4. Approaching 
specialist resources 
for advice 
         (10 investigators) 
 
  
Table 17 - Strategies used by investigators to obtain further information about social media 
 
The ‘real world’ which allows the transfer of knowledge during these 
interactions appears to have negated the difference between the knowledge 
that individuals hold with reference to the subsequent framing of a problem 
that is noted during ‘laboratory’ conditions. This significantly shows a 
willingness on the part of investigators to search for knowledge when they 
come across a problem that they do have the domain specific knowledge to 
frame. This was noted in chapter three during the examination of the crime 
reports where investigators were seen to approach specialist departments, 
their supervisors and the CPS as well as conducting their own research 
when they were coming across social media platforms that were new to 
them.  
The ACPO (2012) guidelines do not explicitly define social media as forming 
a new and unique problem, although by mentioning it and providing four 
strategies / tactics to deal with it there is an inferred acknowledgement of it 
forming a separate issue. This absence is noticeable given that the 
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identification of a problem and defining its facets are articulated as the first 
two steps within problem solving (Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003) models. 
Having recognised social media as a new ‘problem’ with distinctive facets 
and identified officer aims and goals the next stage of problem solving 
models is to identify decision making rules used by individuals. This is 
addressed in the next section.  
 
6. Decision making rules 
The first three steps that investigators were seen to undertake when 
approaching social media as put forward in the model of problem solving by 
Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg (2003) are described above. This includes first 
recognising that social media is a problem. Secondly, defining or framing the 
problem in terms of 10 separate facets and thirdly identifying four 
hieracrhical goals that investigators were pursuing. Investigators were also 
seen to conform to the last two stages of the problem solving model, these 
two stages being developing a strategy to reach those goals and evaluating 
the actions taken. These two steps as discussed in the literature review are 
further expanded upon in the decision making model proposed by 
Frauenknecht & Black (2010) into 5 separate stages. The first stage is for 
the decision maker to identify possible options. The second is to identify the 
consequences of those possible options being acted upon with the third 
being to identify how desireable each of those consequences is. The fourth 
is to assign a likelihood of those consequences occuring. The final stage is 
to utilise a rule by which to choose an option out of those identified. Rules 
that decide on which option is chosen are encompassed by the decision-
making literature that concerns Heuristics (Elio, 2002; Gigerenzer, 2008),  
 
Normative / prescriptive models (Crozier & Raynard, 1997; Koksalan, 
Wallenius, & Zionts, 2011) and Positive or descriptive models (Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1981; Crozier & Raynard, 1997; Koksalan, Wallenius, & Zionts, 
2011) described in the literature review. 
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To begin with, the options considered by investigators in relation to collecting 
evidence for court are examined. These options are further separated into 
three separate issues: the overall strategy to achieve the collection of 
evidence, the tools or tactic to enact a chosen strategy and the physical way 
to secure evidence. For each of those options the consequences that 
investigators envisaged happening are ascertained. The desirability of the 
options was weighed by investigators. In identifying the consequences and 
desirability of options, decision rules used by investigators to make a choice 
were identified. These are examined in the subsections below.  
 
7. Obtaining evidence for the purpose of court 
7.1 Investigators’ strategies for collecting evidence 
The following options were considered by investigators when looking to 
obtain evidence for court: 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 Option 6 
Gaining 
access to a 
social media 
profile by 
obtaining a 
username and 
password with 
the user’s 
consent 
Requesting 
the victim, 
suspect or 
witness to 
provide 
evidence 
from their 
profiles not 
in the 
presence of 
the 
investigator 
Requesting 
the victim, 
suspect or 
witness to 
provide 
evidence 
from their 
profiles in the 
presence of 
the 
investigator 
Requesting 
content 
directly from 
the social 
media 
provider 
Seizing 
electronic 
devices 
Seeking 
advice on how 
to obtain 
evidence 
Using a work 
computer 
Using a work 
computer 
Using a work 
computer 
Contacting 
the social 
media 
provider 
directly 
Using 
equipmen
t to 
download 
the 
device. 
Approaching 
specialist 
departments 
Using a 
standalone 
computer 
Using a 
standalone 
computer 
Using a 
standalone 
computer 
Contacting 
the social 
media 
provider 
through the 
authorities’ 
bureau 
Using 
HTCU to 
download 
the 
device. 
Approaching 
the CPS 
Using a 
personal 
device 
Using a 
personal 
device 
Using a 
personal 
device 
  Obtaining 
supervisory 
advice 
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 Table 18 - options used by investigators when looking to obtain evidence for court 
Investigators identified three separate issues to consider when choosing 
options to deal with social media. The first (in black in the table above) was 
the overall strategy considered for accessing social media content. The 
second is seen in the subsequent rows which are green in colour. These 
identify the tools with which to fulfil each strategy for gaining access to social 
media content. The third is seen in the remaining rows in red. These pertain 
to the physical way in which the evidence would be secured. For each of 
these three options different decision rules were found as being used by 
investigators. 
The ACPO (2012) guidelines identified three specific tactics for dealing with 
social media that were discussed in the literature review. The fourth strategy 
 Using the 
victim / 
suspect / 
witness 
device 
Using the 
victim / 
suspect / 
witness device 
  Obtaining 
advice from 
colleagues 
Using 
statements to 
describe 
social media 
content 
Using 
statements 
to describe 
social media 
content 
Using 
statements to 
describe 
social media 
content 
Obtaining a 
report from 
the social 
media 
provider 
Obtaining a 
report from 
HTCU 
 
Screen 
shooting 
images of 
social media 
content 
Screen 
shooting 
images of 
social media 
content 
Screen 
shooting 
images of 
social media 
content 
 Obtaining a 
report from 
equipment 
used to 
download 
the device 
 
Taking 
photographs 
of social 
media content 
Taking 
photographs 
of social 
media 
content 
Taking 
photographs 
of social 
media content 
   
Printing off 
images of 
social media 
content 
Printing off 
images of 
social media 
content 
Printing off 
images of 
social media 
content 
   
Using 
software to 
record 
investigator 
actions when 
viewing the 
profile 
Using 
software to 
record 
investigator 
actions when 
viewing the 
profile 
Using 
software to 
record 
investigator 
actions when 
viewing the 
profile 
   
Downloading 
the entire 
profile to an e 
mail account 
Downloading 
the entire 
profile to an 
e mail 
account 
Downloading 
the entire 
profile to an e 
mail account 
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was a catchall to ‘always secure a copy of what is seen’ without specifying 
how to do so.  
The three specific tactics that it offers however are seen to be covered by 
those identified by officers to deal with evidence in the table above: 
Downloading the entire social media profile to an e mail account, the printing 
out of social media content and approaching the authorities’ bureau for 
advice. As can be seen from the table above there were several other 
specific strategies and tactics identified by officers that are not identified, 
mentioned or discounted by the guidelines (ACPO, 2012).   
 
7.2 Investigators view of the consequences of choosing overall strategies in 
obtaining evidence for court 
Investigators identified the following consequences of choosing an overall 
strategy with regard to accessing social media content:  
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 Option 6 
Gaining 
access to a 
social media 
profile by 
obtaining a 
username and 
password with 
the user’s 
consent 
Requesting 
the victim, 
suspect or 
witness to 
provide 
evidence from 
their profiles 
not in the 
presence of 
the 
investigator 
Requesting the 
victim, suspect 
or witness to 
provide 
evidence from 
their profiles in 
the presence of 
the investigator 
Requesting 
content 
directly from 
the social 
media 
provider 
Seizing 
electronic 
devices 
Seeking 
advice on 
how to 
obtain 
evidence 
The ability to 
see all the 
content and 
not that just 
selected by 
the user 
 
Minimised 
collateral 
intrusion on 
other persons 
Minimised 
collateral 
intrusion on 
other persons 
An 
independent 
third party 
providing 
evidence that 
cannot be 
challenged in 
court 
An 
independe
nt report 
providing 
evidence 
that cannot 
be 
challenged 
in court. 
Ascertaining 
the correct 
way of 
obtaining 
social media 
evidence 
Ease of 
access to the 
account 
 
No ability to 
see the entire 
content of the 
social media 
profile.  
Ease of access 
to the account 
Time taken to 
have access 
to the content 
Some 
social 
media 
content 
being 
missed.  
Those 
persons 
approached 
not being 
able to 
provide 
adequate 
advice 
Collateral 
intrusion on 
other persons 
 The ability to 
see all the 
content and not 
The social 
media 
provider not 
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that just 
selected by the 
user 
affording the 
content 
Inadvertent 
changes 
made to 
someone’s 
account that 
they did not 
wish to 
happen 
     
The 
accusation 
could be 
levelled that 
evidence had 
been changed 
/ deleted by 
investigators 
     
Contravening 
RIPA 2000 
due to 
accessing live 
telecommunic
ations data 
     
Table 19 - Consequences identified by investigators for choosing overall strategies for accessing social media 
content 
The first line of the table above depicted in black writing details the overall 
strategy identified in the first table seen above. Under each of these six 
options are then shown investigators views of the possible consequences of 
undertaking each specific strategy. The rows in green show what 
investigators perceived to be positive outcomes and the conversely the rows 
in red show what officers perceived to be a negative outcome.     
As described in the model by Frauenknecht & Black (2010) investigators 
used rules to decide which options to choose. Although the term ‘rule’ is 
used this is not to suggest that investigators were using one single or simple 
guideline to inform their decisions. As will be discussed below the ‘rules’ 
involved multiple strands, were complex in nature and applied differently to 
the separate aspects of how to approach social media. 
The questions asked of investigators during the interviews did not probe the 
weighting of desireability as to the consequence of each of the options. What 
did not materialise also was a coherent or obvious weighing of the likelihood 
of outcomes in relation to each strategy. That is not to say that this 
consideration did not take place on the part of the investigators, rather that 
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the interview structure and questions did not address this explicitly. Decision 
making rules however did appear quite clearly and did so for each of the 
three separate issues identified in the first table above those being: choosing 
an overall strategy to access social media content; identifying the tools to do 
so; and finally how to secure the physical evidence. Investigators decision 
making rules with regard to physically securing evidence are examined first. 
This is then followed by the rules engaged to decide which tools were used, 
before finally examining the how the overall strategy is chosen.  
 
7.3. Decision rules used by investigators when choosing how to physically 
secure evidence for court 
When considering how to physically secure social media evidence detailed 
in red in the first table), investigators relied on their previous experiences. 
They directly transposed their experience from past events pertaining to the 
collection of non social media evidence and applied it to social media. The 
following  comments exemplify this:  
Participant 1: “I think it just boils down to established and traditional methods 
of presenting evidence. So, it literally it is as simple as writing a statement to 
say I logged on to this site at this date at this time and this is what I saw and 
here’s a photograph of it and hoping it will be good enough for the courts.” 
Participant 1: “if I had you know a filing cabinet with a large amount of data in 
it, how would I present a single document or single page of a document or a 
paragraph of that page and I’m simply using the same principles to present 
something that’s written on a screen or an image” 
Participant 3: “It’s like the old lady walking down the street and bringing in a 
blood-stained knife. Ultimately, she’ll be the one who is questioned about 
where it was found in the circumstances, the person in the SDO (front 
counter) who has just accepted it and given to forensics to look at. Yeah. It’s 
the same for anything, it is evidence. Its information. Tangible or not.” 
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Participant 6: “So when I go to a crime scene and see a bloody knife on the 
floor, I take a photo of it and exhibit that photo. I see evidence on social 
media I take a photo of it and exhibit that photo.” 
A total of nine investigators made a direct identification with other forms of 
evidence collection as influencing how they collected evidence around social 
media. This pertained to taking statements, photographing, obtain screen 
shots of and printing off social media content. The ability of an individual to 
associate a new situation with a past one is well documented (Orasanu, 
Martin, & Davison, 2001; Moriarty, 2015; Cookson, 2017). A prefect match is 
not required with a previous situation for the individual to make use of the 
rules that they used in the previous incident (Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 
2001; Moriarty, 2015; Cookson, 2017). This is true of the use of previous 
situations by investigators to inform their behaviour around social media 
because as has been shown above social media poses a new problem for 
investigators with facets that make it unique and different from previous 
problems encountered by them.  
Participant 9: “I’ve done it myself and it’s worked for me in the past.” 
Participant 6: “I’ve used it evidentially a few times. It’s never been challenged 
the way I’ve done it. So far.” 
Both investigators were providing reasons for why they were content with the 
tactics that they were using for collecting social media evidence. They did so 
by seeking confirmation from past experiences that showed that the tactic 
that they were using was adequate and correct. This demonstrates both 
confirmation bias and the availability heuristics. Confirmation bias as they 
sought information to confirm that their choice of how to physically secure 
social media evidence is correct and the availability heuristic, as they were 
picking out a choice of physically securing evidence that they used 
previously and so is easily available for them to implement. Looking at past 
experiences however, and specifically when they apply to collecting other 
types of material and evidence, does not guarantee success for that strategy 
or tactic in the future or in relation to social media.  
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Representativeness heuristic is closely aligned to confirmation bias. It 
describes how individuals attribute beliefs to a certain set of events biased 
on their experience from similar sets of events in the past. With regard to the 
police, it has been noted that investigators rely on their professional 
knowledge to make decisions, a great deal of which is acquired from their 
own personal experience (Adhami & Brown, 1996; Smith & Flanagan, 2000; 
Stelfox, 2009). Again, this allows for the quicker formation of a hypothesis 
and plan as to how to deal with a situation, including collection of evidence. It 
may however also lead to errors, as the current situation may differ 
significantly to the ones encountered previously by the officer and lead to an 
erroneous hypothesis or identification of a suspect (Stelfox, 2009; Moriarty, 
2015). 
This engagement of the representative heuristic can be seen through the 
following investigator comments:  
 
Participant 12: “Only because I’ve had it in court and it’s slightly different but 
this is my thinking towards it” 
Participant 6: “That was never scrutinised or criticised at court” 
 
Both investigators were making comments about investigations that they had 
taken to court and strategies and tactics that were used not with regard to 
social media material but other electronic evidence. They then applied those 
same strategies and tactics to social media based on their positive 
experience in court.  
The following comments allude to the availability heuristic (Ask & Granhag, 
2005; Rossmo, 2009; Stelfox, 2009; Rassin, Eerland, & Kuijpers, 2010; 
Moriarty, 2015) being engaged:  
Participant 4: Explained that it was natural to take a statement and exhibit 
Facebook posts in the way that the above example was given. That this was 
the way that evidence was exhibited and she had been taught. 
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Participant 7: “I think it probably stems from harassment legislation way way 
way back, cause 10, 12 years ago, when we didn’t have ACESO1 machines, 
we would have to evidence, we would have to write verbatim the messages, 
even if there were a hundred messages, we would have to write them 
verbatim. And put it in a duty statement” 
The majority of investigators identified that their strategy or tactic of dealing 
with social media originated from previous experiences when asked directly 
for an explanation as to the approach that they were pursuing. For the 
reasons detailed above it is argued that these decisions are based on 
heuristics. In contrast three of the officers expressed their inability to identify 
the reasoning behind their decisions: 
Participant 6: “I think I just that was the best way I could think of dealing with 
that at that time. Yeah I don’t think I’ve necessarily seen someone do it like 
that.” 
Participant 12: “If I’m being honest, I’m not too sure. I suppose, I don’t really 
know.” 
Participant 12: “I don’t know where that came from.” 
Participant 13: “But I can’t remember my thinking behind it.” 
 
This lack of immediate insight as to where a decision stems from has also 
been identified as an indicator of heuristics affecting the choices made by an 
individual and is discussed in more depth during the literature review.  
 
1 ACESO refers to equipment that is able to form a mirror image of data held on a mobile phone or SIM card. A 
limited number of officers have a licence and access to this equipment.  
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8. Investigators decision rules for choosing the tools with which to fulfill a 
chosen strategy.  
8.1 The use of a personal device, standalone or normal work computer to 
access social media profiles 
When making a choice between the tools with which to fulfil a given strategy 
from the choices of standalone, work, personal computers, victim and 
suspect computers, contacting social media providers directly in order to 
access social media accounts or using HTCU or equipment present in police 
stations to download electronic devices, heuristics were again seen to be 
employed. Specifically, this involved the availability heuristic (Ask & 
Granhag, 2005; Rossmo, 2009; Stelfox, 2009; Rassin, Eerland, & Kuijpers, 
2010). 
Investigators stated that personal devices, had previously been used by 
them to access social media, when it had first surfaced within investigations, 
however they no longer considered it a viable tool. The reason for this was 
the potential visibility of the investigators’ personal profiles by suspects or 
witnesses, if personal devices were used. When determining whether to use 
a standalone computer or a normal work computer, the determining factor 
appeared to be the ease of access or availability of equipment: 
Participant 1: “At the moment we are introducing standalone computers 
where we can long onto Facebook anonymously but you are talking one 
computer per county and you are expecting people who work at one police 
station to travel down to another police station which is the best part of 60 
miles so they can log onto a Facebook account.” 
Participant 6: “I’m not saying it doesn’t exist. But when you’re rushed and 
you’re juggling all these investigations.” 
Participant 8: “Which was probably wrong. I don’t know. I know we have a 
standalone in the ACESO room. I guess you’re sat at your desk it’s easier.” 
Participant 9: “The lack of available computers. So, we’ve got that one, but 
as CID we probably don’t have one in our office.” 
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Participant 13: “If you are looking up someone, that’s the AIT standalone 
machine that’s recording equipment that shows you what you did to find out 
what’s circumstances for a job, look through Facebook, I can see behind it I 
suppose in court as in to prove that you haven’t made it up if that makes 
sense. But that is there is a lot of reluctance from my colleagues to use that 
– oh for fucks sake, more time consuming, more faff, its more exhibits, 
whereas we are at our desk top, we’ve got the technology at our hands, let’s 
just research people, find it, screen shot it”  
 
Investigators believed that the use of a ‘stand-alone’ computer with a distinct 
IP address not related to their police network was a preferable way to access 
social media profiles. Two investigators identified the reason for this 
probably stemmed from shielding their police IP address from suspects 
when intelligence work was being conducted on suspects’ social media 
profiles. This reasoning may however be redundant when applying it to a 
suspect or victim social media profile that the suspect and victim were aware 
that police would be looking at. A further two investigators stated that the 
stand-alone computer had software installed that could record the 
investigator actions when looking at social media profiles. Aside from this the 
other investigators were unable to explain the reason for this preference 
other than to refer to guidelines or training courses.  
Nevertheless 12 out of the 14 investigators expressed an inclination to use 
their own work computers rather than accessing a standalone due to the 
availability of their work computer in comparison to the standalone. Reasons 
for the lack of availability varied from someone else using the ‘stand-alone’ 
computer, it being in a different office, being in an inaccessible room to being 
in a different police station. Thus, the hurdle of unavailability could be as low 
as a walk along a corridor from the investigators office to the room where the 
‘stand-alone’ was with the specific case files pertaining to the case. This was 
a conscious decision as officers were aware of guidelines or reasons for 
using a stand-alone computer but chose not to use this option due to what 
appeared to be the engagement of the availability heuristic.  
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 8.2 Use of equipment at the police station or the HTCU to download 
electronic data from devices 
Similarly, when investigators were considering whether to use equipment 
present at the police station to download the content of an electronic device 
or to submit the device to the HTCU, the ease of availability of the results 
and the time taken to obtain those results featured heavily. This was the 
case even though investigators believed that evidence provided by HTCU 
would be preferable to that gained from equipment available at the police 
station. The comments below are typical of those made: 
Participant 6: “We have a 5, 6 months turn around for phones so I wasn’t 
about to, we have to deal with stuff expeditiously don’t we, I wasn’t going to 
submit all that stuff and leave him hanging for 6 months.” 
Participant 9: “I mean ACESO is only a couple of years old. When it was just 
HTCU you were seizing and then sending phones off for you’d think a lot 
more before you think I’m going to download this person’s phone. But 
definitely me nowadays, knowing that I’ve got people and we’ve got CSI that 
do it and people in our office that can ACESO download a phone if it’s an 
option and someone’s willing to sign a consent then I can give it back to 
them the same day you know and I’ve captured that evidence so, it’s the 
systems available to us” 
Participant 10: “I mean I think it was always viewed the best practice would 
be for example to seize the device or you wanted to go into an account that 
HTCU would video it and put their preamble on their initially and then you 
would get a very professional sort of package. But then when certainly I 
know their work is now sort of backed up probably 9 or 10 months.” 
Participant 14: “if you are sending something off to the HTCU you are going 
to be waiting around 6 months for something to come back.” 
There appeared to be a choice between three weighted factors for 
investigators in relation to choosing whether to submit an item to the HTCU 
for examination. On the one side, there was the quality of evidence that 
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would be obtained by submitting a device to the HTCU. This was balanced 
against the speed with which this evidence would be returned and whether a 
device would be accepted for examination. The speed with which a device 
would be examined was identified by investigators as functionally important 
in gathering evidence for two reasons. First, the quicker a device is 
examined the more likely the investigation is to progress in a timely manner. 
Secondly, investigators were more likely to gain access to victims’ electronic 
devices such as phones if they could return those devices back to them 
promptly. This reflects the strong attachment of individuals to their electronic 
mobile communications devices and specifically mobile phones (Oksman & 
Rautiainen, 2003; Rosen, 2004; Campbell, 2007; Green & Haddon, 2009; 
Vandebosch & Van Cleemput, 2009).  
Furthermore there were process barriers to the submission of devices for 
examination to the HTCU. One officer highlighted that due to the restrictions 
on their resources the HTCU would only examine one item out of a number 
seized during an investigation. The investigator stated that it was difficult to 
make an informed choice around which item to submit. A second officer 
detailed that the HTCU unit would not examine an item unless there was a 
belief or suspicion that there was material present that would assist the case. 
This in the investigators’ view was a reasonable procedure as the HTCU has 
a need to triage items for examination otherwise it would be overwhelmed 
with submissions that would most likely not hold any relevant material or 
evidence (Sommer, 2004; Hunton, 2009; Jewkes, 2013; Bryant & Stephens, 
2014).  
However, they gave the example of a particular case where the mother of a 
victim had told the officer that she had examined the victim’s computer and 
found no relevant material on it. As such the HTCU would not have accepted 
the computer. Due to previous experience, the investigator believed that 
there still may be evidence on the computer that the mother had missed. 
This is a further example of the representative heuristic (Stelfox, 2009; 
Moriarty, 2015) being employed and of professional learning (Dewey, 1933; 
Argyris & Schön, 1978; Kolb, 1984; Gibbs, 1988; Johns, 1995; Brookfield, 
1998; Thompson, 2000; White, Fook, & Garnder, 2006) being acted upon. 
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Although they identified that guidelines instructed that investigators should 
not examine electronic devices themselves as it was likely to alter data 
(ACPO, 2012) the choice facing them was to examine it themselves or lose 
any potential evidence. Having examined the computer, the investigator 
found evidence relevant to the case and as such, subsequently submitted 
the computer to the HTCU who examined it and produced a report to detail 
the evidence found. That police HTCUs are overwhelmed with submissions 
and work has been commented upon previously (Kshetri, 2009; Yar, 2013; 
Bregant & Bregant, 2014). However although there is clearly an impact on 
the amount of devices that can be examined and the time which it takes to 
do so, the HTCUs as evidenced in chapter 4 were shown to be continuing to 
function and provide evidence in cases concerning social media.  
The use of equipment available at a police station was more widely 
considered. The reason for this was that a phone or tablet could be 
examined in a very short time frame. This allowed investigations to progress 
quickly and the electronic device be returned to the victim in question. 
Furthermore there was a perceived degree of independence about the report 
that was produced by the equipment, which made it an attractive option. 
There were however also impediments that prevented the use of such 
equipment. When there was a suspicion that indecent images were present 
on a device then guidelines instructed that they be submitted to HTCU rather 
than be examined locally. These internal TVP guidelines (Thames Valley 
Police, 2017) concerning indecent images found on electronic devices 
appeared to cause genuine frustration in officers. Secondly the examination 
by HTCU was believed to be more thorough than what was achievable with 
equipment at the station. 
 
8.3 Approaching the CPS, supervisors or colleagues for advice 
Although the CPS was contacted by investigators to apply for social media 
content from the United States, only three officers reflected upon 
approaching the CPS for the purposes of advice. The view of two of those 
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investigators was that the CPS was unable to offer useful advice as to how 
to deal with social media.  
Participant 6: “That never gets picked up on by CPS because they don’t 
really know if we are doing rightly or wrongly” 
Participant 7: “Yeah. I mean they wanted me to get. If I’m honest I don’t think 
CPS really understand the whole social media stuff.” 
In both cases the investigators were commenting on previous experiences 
with the CPS and modelling their choices because of it. As discussed above 
this is indicative of both the representativeness heuristic (Stelfox, 2009; 
Moriarty, 2015) and of professional learning cycles (Dewey, 1933; Argyris & 
Schön, 1978; Kolb, 1984; Gibbs, 1988; Johns, 1995; Brookfield, 1998; 
Thompson, 2000; White, Fook, & Garnder, 2006) and incorporating past 
professional experience into present practice. 
Professional learning cycles were also extended to knowledge held by 
investigators’ co-workers. When considering colleagues, 12 out of 14 
investigators spoke of using knowledge that their direct colleagues with 
whom they worked had suggested or that they had asked them of. This 
knowledge appeared to be accepted without much question. The following 
comments were typical of this: 
Participant 6: “Which I haven’t done but my colleagues use them a lot and 
apparently you can get a link to this persons Facebook account” 
Participant 12: “They’re all pretty experienced in there. So, I’ve got no 
qualms in going to them.” 
Three of the officers made reference to consulting with their supervisors and 
again accepted the knowledge that they provided. There was no clear 
discernible reason for this acceptance that was given. The knowledge of 
direct colleagues was treated as an extension of their own knowledge. The 
absolute confidence in relation to advice given was also extended to 
colleagues from some other departments however this was not as universal 
when compared with direct colleagues. Whilst knowledge sharing between 
team members appeared to be inherently accepted by investigators this is by 
no means typical of working team environment (Cabrer & Cabrera, 2002; 
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Zarraga & Bonache, 2003; Cabrera, Collins, & Salgado, 2006). The 
interaction between supervisors and investigators appeared to be very 
organic. This and investigators interaction with other team members is 
reflective of the organisational structure and culture (Cabrer & Cabrera, 
2002; Zarraga & Bonache, 2003; Cabrera, Collins, & Salgado, 2006). An 
example of this behaviour with regard to social media was investigators 
downloading the profiles of social media users to email addresses (in the 
case of Facebook). This behaviour was learnt from other colleagues. This 
particular technique of physically securing the evidence differs from the 
others used by investigators as it is a new technique not mentioned as being 
previously used or applied to other forms of evidence gathering. 
 
8.4 Contacting the social media provider directly or via the authorities’ bureau 
Contacting the social media provider directly was discussed by five 
investigators. The first provided an example of having tried to obtain 
information directly from a social media provider based in Canada but being 
informed that the request would have to be made through the authorities’ 
bureau. The second suggested approaching social media providers’ directly 
as a line of investigative enquiry, but had no experience of doing so 
themselves. As such these two investigators had made a conscious decision 
to approach the provider directly at some point in their career. The other 
three rejected it out of hand stating that social media providers would not 
provide the information directly to an officer. Two of those investigators were 
part of the authorities’ bureau, which grants authorities under RIPA (2000) 
and applies under these authorities for communications data. These two 
investigators took this knowledge from the roles that they were performing.  
In addition to the two investigators from the authorities’ bureau a further two 
investigators spoke of obtaining evidence from social media providers via the 
authorities’ bureau. The reason for applying to the authorities’ bureau was 
for two reasons. The first was again the quality and independence of the 
evidence that would be obtained from the service providers. The second was 
for obtaining advice as to how to actually obtain material from social media 
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providers. There were three caveats mentioned to obtaining content from 
user accounts in this way. The first was that regarding Facebook, they would 
only supply this evidence if the offence was judged under the criteria of 
being ‘serious crime’. This bar is set for crimes that would attract a custodial 
sentence of 3 years or more on first conviction, include violence, financial 
gain or conspiracy. The second was the amount of time that would pass 
between an application being made and the evidence being obtain, which 
could take up to 12 months. Finally, it was stated that some social media 
providers would simply not provide the evidence even if requested (Hodge, 
2006; Boyd & Ellison, 2007; Ward, 2011; Kardasz, 2012).  
  
9. Decision rules used by investigators when choosing an overall strategy to 
access the content of a social media account 
When deciding which option to choose to access social media content in an 
account a greater number of rules appeared to be engaged and more 
conscious consideration given to the decision than with the choices 
described above. First, the likelihood of a case going to court was 
considered. Secondly the gravity of a case was reflected upon. The following 
comments made by investigators illustrate this:  
Participant 6: “Well I would say we have different workloads, we have more 
serious jobs and less serious jobs, we have limited personal resources and 
time and effort to put into things, so we have to be proportionate about the 
seriousness of the offence, the willingness of the victim, the likelihood of trial 
or is it something that is going to be NFA’ed” 
Participant 6: “And if the offence is more serious and you’ve got a willing 
victim you’ve got to guess I be proportionate with your investigations and 
some take more commitment, more, more work than say do others. I think as 
a police officer you need to think where the job may end up eventually. If you 
are looking at crown court trial you probably look to do more investigation 
than if that wasn’t going to happen. Inevitably those investigations get more 
scrutiny.” 
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Participant 10: “So it was a case of look, how pivotal is this information. How 
serious is this offence we are dealing with.” 
 
The reason for this consideration was the quality of evidence that would be 
gathered. The more important the case and the greater likelihood that the 
case would be heard in court then investigators tended to view evidence that 
was more independent of them and more complete in nature as preferable. 
This preference was made as there was a belief that evidence that was 
independent of them was less likely to be challenged in court (although none 
of the investigators had actually experienced such a scenario). A victim or a 
witness providing evidence was seen as being independent of the 
investigator. Similarly seizing a device to be examined by either HTCU or 
equipment at the police station was seen as a way of obtaining impartial 
evidence. The most secure evidence was believed to be that provided by the 
social media provider themselves. The decision was driven by fear of 
evidence being excluded or the investigators themselves being criticised 
over their actions. 
Whilst victim and witnesses providing the social media content themselves 
was perceived to be independent of the police and required smaller 
resources when compared to submitting items to the HTCU or using police 
equipment to examine it, investigators were wary of it. The reason for this 
was a fear that the victim or witness may have altered or not included all the 
content present and in so doing exposing the prosecution of the case at 
court to risk. As such although the evidence was independent there was a 
question as to its completeness. 
Obtaining evidence from logging onto individuals’ accounts whether they 
belong to a victim or suspect created several issues for investigators. First, it 
was identified that this course of action would be against internal guidelines. 
Secondly there was an ethical issue about collateral intrusion. Thirdly 
consideration was given whether an application under RIPA 2000 was 
required. Fourthly how to evidence the content of the account presented 
issues.  Finally, the independence of the evidence could be challenged as 
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the accusation could be levelled that the content of the account was 
tampered with.  
In contrast to many of the decision rules observed and described above 
which involved heuristics when considering which tools to use and how to 
physically evidence the content of social media accounts, this choice was 
considered. Investigators were clearly weighing up the desirability of options 
The first two comments below are examples of investigators referring to the 
strength of evidence when supplied by the social media provider themselves 
and the second two comments refer to the strength of evidence when 
provided by the HTCU: 
Participant 3: “however with authority of authorities and the things that they 
do, they can produce a proper effectively legal document which again I could 
do by submitting a statement, however there is more weight to a report from 
Facebook saying for instance at this time at this place this message was 
made from this person to this person this is the IP address, that give us 
locations, it simply rubber seals the fact that it is true and it’s not just the 
investigator colluding with the witness.” 
Participant 5: “2 elements there, 1 is best evidence, it won’t have been 
tainted, it won’t have been in some way changed or there is a potential for 
the accusation of change” 
Participant 10; “I mean I think it was always viewed the best practice would 
be for example to seize the device or you wanted to go into an account that 
HTCU would video it and put their preamble on their initially and then you 
would get a very professional sort of package. But then when certainly I 
know their work is now sort of backed up probably 9 or 10 months.” 
Participant 14: “Well more professional for want of a better word, but yes 
because they are a unit that specifically is there to do that kind of thing. 
Whereas when you’re sat with a witness or victim who is going through a 
computer and showing you certain things then things might get missed off. 
So, evidence-wise I would suggest its best to go through.” 
This choice of more independent and complete evidence was however 
tempered by the cost of obtaining that evidence and the value of that 
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evidence as assigned to it by the investigators. With independence and 
completeness of the evidence there was also a perceived cost in obtaining it 
when measured against the time and effort on the part of the investigators. 
The costs included the time it would take for an electronic device to be 
examined by HTCU, the process for a submission to be made to examine a 
device or obtain material from a social media provider directly, and 
convincing a victim to give their electronic device to the police. The choice 
considered by investigators was an intertemporal one. The ease of obtaining 
evidence now set against how that evidence would be perceived in court at a 
later time. The following comments illustrate this: 
Participant 1: “So I think the courts are mindful to what we can realistically 
achieve with the technology and the resources available to us with social 
media.” 
Participant 1: “it is a question of trying to balance the evidential standard 
over what can be achieved in a timely manner” 
Three of the options or at least the initial steps were relatively low cost in 
terms of time and effort. The first was obtaining advice whether that be from 
colleagues, supervisors or specialist departments. The second was to seize 
an electronic device in preparation for examination. The third was victims 
and witnesses providing the social media content themselves to 
investigators. Whilst investigators obtaining advice from their colleagues was 
not noted in the crime reports, the seizure of devices was. The popularity of 
seizing items for examination appears at odds however to the observation 
that most content of user accounts was held either in a cloud or in external 
storage rather than on the electronic device of the user. Indeed, this was 
supported by investigators comments:  
Participant 12: “if you ACESO a phone there is only very limited information 
that you can get off there and because Facebook and Instagram aren’t 
saved to the hard drive itself it’s almost impossible to get it off an ACESO” 
However, the data pertaining to social media accounts that was recorded on 
these devices however limited still provided important information to 
investigators as the following comment shows: 
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Participant 9: “Because WhatsApp when you send an image via WhatsApp it 
automatically saves depending on your settings but generally can 
automatically save into your photo albums and she did still have that so I 
could tell via Facebook that was my man.” 
There was no ranking constructed between the gravity of the case and the 
likelihood of it appearing in court against which option was used to access 
social media content as the information needed to do so was not present in 
the interviews. Although different in nature this observation lends support to 
the relationship between the importance of the social media material 
obtained (relevant, evidence or critical evidence to the case) and the number 
of strategies / tactics employed regarding it noted from the crime reports. 
This is an example of intertemporal decision-making, which are noted in both 
descriptive/positive (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Crozier & Raynard, 1997; 
Koksalan, Wallenius, & Zionts, 2011) and normative/prescriptive (Crozier & 
Raynard, 1997; Koksalan, Wallenius, & Zionts, 2011) models of decision 
making. The intertemporal relationship in this case is balancing the value of 
the evidence, against the effort made by investigators in relation to it. 
Nevertheless, the majority of investigators identified that their strategy or 
tactic of dealing with social media originated from previous experiences 
when asked directly for an explanation as to the approach that they were 
pursuing. For the reasons detailed above it is argued that these decisions 
are based on heuristics. In contrast three of the officers who were 
interviewed expressed their inability to identify the reasoning behind their 
decisions. This lack of immediate insight as to where a decision stems from 
has also been identified as an indicator of heuristics affecting the choices 
made by an individual. By taking a course of action that has not been 
consciously thought out, the implication is that an unconscious thought 
process has been utilised. It is this unconscious decision-making process 
that heuristics can describe (De Martino, Kumuran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2004; 
Dane & Pratt, 2007; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Individuals’ use of 
heurisics whether concious or unconcious on which to base their decision is 
driven by contextual cues which identify it as a type of situation in which a 
156 
 
particular response is appropriate (Klein, 1999; Higham & Vokey, 2000; 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). 
 
10. Decision making regarding keeping the victim engaged, identifying 
suspects and safeguarding 
When considering the goal of maintaining a relationship with the victim and 
social media two options were considered. The first was the seizure of 
electronic devices and the second was obtaining usernames and passwords 
to victims’ accounts. When considering the seizure of electronic devices 
belonging to victims the main concern of investigators was victims not 
consenting to the seizure and keeping the device from the victim for an 
extended period of time. This action was envisaged to alienate the victims 
from the investigation and from the investigators. As such the use of 
equipment available at a police station was universally preferred to 
submission of a device to the HTCU. The reason for this was that a phone or 
tablet could be examined in a very short timeframe. This allowed for the 
electronic device to be returned quickly to the victim. One of the investigators 
stated that if the victim did not provide their device, then it would change 
their strategy with regard to the victim. It would necessitate them arresting 
the offender in contrast to dealing with them voluntarily in order that their 
mobile phone could be seized. Obtaining the username and password to 
victims’ accounts if given was not extrapolated on further.  
Information from the interviews regarding options and their consequences 
pertaining to the goal of suspect identification was the least prolific out of the 
four identified goals. In the comments made, how the suspect was identified 
and the evidence presented to court did not become a pertinent issue for 
investigators. Options that were considered included: seizing victim devices 
for examination and open source research regarding suspects on the 
internet. Within these two options the only one further extrapolated was that 
of seizing victims’ devices for examination. The issue of the victims not 
wishing to give their devices up was raised in the same vein as discussed 
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with the goal of obtaining evidence for court and maintaining a relationship 
with the victim.  
When considering decision making regarding safeguarding three options 
were considered which were also identified and used in the goal of obtaining 
evidence for court. These were requesting information from the social media 
provider, accessing the victim’s account having obtained their username and 
password and finally seizing the victim’s device. However, as the goal 
changed so did the consequences of the actions considered in contrast to 
the other three goals. The consequences of not obtaining the social media 
content were couched by investigators in terms of the level of danger and its 
immediacy towards victims. Thus, the strategy and the tools with which to 
achieve the aim were differentiated between by the amount of time it would 
take to identify suspects and victims. As such investigators stated that they 
were not concerned with guidelines present that instructed them not to use 
work computers to access social media profiles as time was of the essence. 
The only caveat with contacting social media providers directly was that 
social media providers would provide information immediately only if there 
was an immediate threat to life present.  
   
11. Conclusion 
In the interviews, investigators identified the same strategies and tactics with 
respect of how they dealt with social media as were found during the 
examination of the crime reports with the exception of one strategy, which 
featured in only one crime report out of a total of 106. This finding supported 
the reliability of the results found (Thornberry & Krohn, 2000) in both sets of 
data. During the course of the interviews four goals were identified that 
detectives strive towards when considering social media in their 
investigations. These four goals were found to be hierarchical in nature. All 
four aims have been previously identified in literature examining police and 
more specifically detective work. However, they have been either assumed 
to form part of detective work by researchers in the case of evidence 
collection and suspect identification or in relation to all four goals they have 
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been noted as being prescribed onto the police through legislative changes 
and governmental pressure. The identification of these aims by investigators 
themselves and in the hierarchical order described in this chapter is an 
original way of identifying how investigators approach the issue of social 
media.  
It was found that the approach that was taken when social media was 
encountered could not be overlaid onto descriptive or normative models of 
decision making or those that encompassed heuristics. Instead it was 
suggested that ‘problem solving’ models (Bransford & Stein, 1984; 
Sternberg, 1985; Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg 2003) are better equipped to 
describe how investigators approach social media. The first three steps of 
‘problem solving’ as defined by by Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg (2003) were 
recognised as being acted out by investigators. The first of these steps is a 
recognition that social media presents a problem, which was identified by all 
the interviewees. The second step is to identify the facets of the problem that 
social media presents. Ten were found and categorised. It was suggested 
that a lack of domain-specific knowledge did not hinder the ability of 
investigators to identify the facets of the problem that social media poses 
due to the ability of investigators being able to seek and obtain knowledge 
from various sources. This was also supported by the findings from the 
examination of the crime reports. This is in contrast to results obtained in 
studies more generally around the issue of problem framing (Chase & 
Simon, 1973; Simon & Simon, 1978; Lesgold, et al., 1988; Glaser, 1999) that 
were conducted under ‘laboratory conditions’. A number of these facets that 
framed social media as a problem were found to be unique in nature. Finally 
the third step - the identification of the goals of the problem solver was seen 
as discussed above in terms of four hierarchical aims that investigators 
pursue. The remaining steps of the ‘problem solving’ model correlate to the 
processes noted as occurring within normative, descriptive and heuristic 
decision-making models (Shogren, et al., 2008; Frauenknecht & Black, 
2010).  
It was demonstrated that investigators were seen to engage in four out of 
five of the steps of the decision-making model as put forward by 
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Frauenknecht & Black (2010) when considering the aim of collecting 
evidence for court. First this involved identifying options for how to access 
social media content, the tools appropriate to do so and the physical of way 
recording this content. Secondly there was a clear consideration by 
investigators of the implications of choosing a particular strategy and thirdly 
a recognition that some consequences were desirable whilst others were 
not. Finally, rules were used by investigators to inform their choice of how to 
deal with social media. It was commented on that the assessment of the 
likelihood of an outcome taking place – the remaining step of the decision-
making model was not noted, but neither was it explicitly addressed during 
the course of the interviews.  
The rules used to inform investigators’ choice of how to physically secure 
evidence were shown to be driven by heuristics both consciously and 
unconsciously. Specifically, these were Confirmation Bias, the Availibility 
Heuristic, and the Representativeness Heuristic. Types of tactics used by 
investigators to physically secure evidence were transposed from techniques 
used to collect other types of evidence. These included writing statements, 
photographing and printing off screen captures.  
Within these heuristics, models of professional learning were also noted and 
a striking feature of this was that knowledge that was transferred or shared 
between investigators did not appear to be questioned but was accepeted as 
being correct. One technique of physically securing evidence that was new 
and not previously employed by investigators in relation to other forms of 
evidence was the downloading of social media profiles onto an e mail 
address. A second example of professional learning was that investigators 
had stopped using personal devices to access social media profiles.  
When considering which tools to use to fulfil a particular strategy the 
Availibility Heuristic was again shown to be engaged. The ease of access or 
availability of equipment such as standalone computers or ease of 
submission and time taken for HTCU’s to provide evidence featured heavily 
in guiding investigator decisions. When making a decision however it was 
not simple the availability of tools that was considered by investigators. How 
quickly the investigation could progress, the effect on the victim, whether 
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they would allow their electronic device to be taken from them and the 
quality of the final evidential product were all considered. This showed that 
not only was the availability heuristic being engaged but that there were also 
conscious intertemporal choices being made. In making this decision, 
investigators were assigning desirability or lack of to the different possible 
outcomes. 
The greatest amount of conscious consideration was given to deciding which 
option to choose to access social media content and a greater number of 
rules appeared to be engaged. The gravity of the case and the likelihood that 
it would appear in court was at the forefront of officers’ thinking. 
Independence and completeness of evidence were seen as desirable. 
However the more arduous the process to obtain the evidence and the 
longer it took to do so the less desirable it was seen to be. Accessing social 
media profiles of victims or suspects by investigators whilst practiced by a 
number of investigators had a number of drawbacks. These included: it 
being against internal guidelines; ethical issues around collateral intrusion; 
how to evidence the content of the account once accessed; that it could 
draw accusations of tampering by investigators; and finally that it may fall 
under the auspices of RIPA 2000. 
Information relating to the decision making process with regard to keeping 
the victim engaged, identifying suspects and safeguarding was much less 
plentiful. The choices made by investigators were less complicated with 
fewer options to consider.  
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Chapter 6 - Research Evaluation 
 
1. Evaluation of the study 
The research used a grounded theory methodology (Glaser, 1978; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1994). Significant to this approach is that the researcher plays a key 
role in the emergence of the theory from the data. As such any prior 
knowledge that the researcher holds has the potential to impact on the 
interpretation of the data that is collected (Cutcliffe, 2000).  A certain amount 
of literature was reviewed around decision making processes prior to the 
collection and analysis of the data and the researcher was acutely aware 
that this may in turn impact on how the data was viewed by them. However, 
when the data was examined the theory that had been initially considered 
was clearly seen not to offer an explanation as to the processes that were 
observed. As a result, further theoretical concepts were sought to explain the 
behaviour of investigators and literature on ‘problem solving’ (Getzels, 1982; 
Simonton, 1999; Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003) was found to model what 
was observed well. Not only was ‘problem solving’ not reviewed in the initial 
literature review, but it was also not known to the researcher prior to the data 
collection phase. This was a significant endorsement first of the impartiality 
of the researcher in this study as a grounded theory practitioner and 
secondly for the grounded theory approach used in this research and the 
emergence of theory from the data collected. The impartiality of the 
researcher as an ‘insider’ was also considered as being able to negatively 
impact on the study. It was shown however that the initial focus of the 
researcher as treating social media as evidence or being able to have an 
impact on a case at court was narrow in scope and that three other 
objectives were identified as being pursued by investigators. Recognition of 
this in the data provides evidence that the researcher as an insider 
continued to be open to new ideas outside of their original conception of the 
issues present.  
Two separate sets of data were examined. Crime reports were considered 
as they offered a way of collecting data suited to the objectives of the study 
162 
 
without the preparation time required to construct a data collection 
mechanism. They appeared at the outset to offer the advantages of both 
primary and secondary data (Jupp, 1989; Kothari, 2004). However as has 
previously been noted in the literature (Alison, Snook, & Stein, 2001; Canter 
& Alison, 2003; Horvath & Brown, 2006; Feist, Ashe, Lawrence, McPhee, & 
Wilson, 2007) the reports were found to not contain the rationale for decision 
making around social media but rather only the strategies and tactics that 
were used. A total of 19 separate strategies and tactics were identified and a 
tentative hypothesis drawn that officer decision making around the number 
of them engaged to deal with social media depended on the importance of 
social media to a specific case. In other words whether it formed critical 
evidence, evidence or relevant material in the investigation. This hypothesis 
around the importance of social media to the investigation and its correlation 
to what strategy or tactic was pursued to evidence it was later found to be 
supported by the data from the interviews. There it was seen that there was 
an evaluation by investigators as to which strategy or tactic they would use 
depending on whether they believed that it would be relied upon in court and 
scrutisined or not. 
The crime reports also highlighted that attempting to show which type of 
investigations social media featured in was difficult, as government crime 
classification rules masked the number and types of crimes against which a 
record was created. Although this was the case, no other system of 
classification was identified that was superior. By looking more closely at the 
types of crime it was found however that the social media featured in three 
main types of offences. These were sexual, physical non-sexual and 
harassment crime categories. Identifying offence types where social media 
has a higher chance of featuring in, is useful signposting for investigators 
within any relevant guidelines. 
Both sets of data supported the notion that investigators were not hampered 
by a lack of knowledge around social media as has been previously 
proposed (Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Awan & Blakemore, 2016). Rather, the 
crime reports suggested an organisational structure that facilited knowledge 
sharing and this was further confirmed in the data from the interviews. 
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The second data set was obtained from conducting interviews with 
investigators. This data set provided greater validity to the research (Kirk & 
Miller, 1986; Winter, 2000; Golafshani, 2003; Gadd, Karstedt, & Messner, 
2011) as the findings drawn from the data in the crime reports were repeated 
in the data found in the interviews. This included challenging the notion that 
officers did not have sufficient knowledge to deal with social media, 
strategies and tactics noted for dealing with social media, and a correlation 
between the perceived importance of social media and how it was 
approached by investigators. The interviews however provide a much richer 
source of data for theory generation. This was because processes could be 
both observed and decision making rationale directly questioned. Problem 
solving models were found to describe the behaviour of investigators noted 
in the interviews.  
The literature review identified that ACPO (2012) were the most up to date 
guidelines aimed at investigators rather than forensic scientists describing 
how to deal with digital evidence and specifically social media. There were 
four main strategies / tactics identified in these guidelines, three of which 
were seen to be engaged in the crime reports and all four engaged by 
investigators in the data obtained from the interviews.  
Two police areas consented to participating in the study. Although the two 
data sets provide validity for each other, they do so only relation to the police 
areas from which the data was drawn. As such it is difficult to apply the 
findings universally across all police areas in England and Wales. This was 
exacerbated by 13 of the 14 participants in the interviews originating from 
one police area. There is thus an obvious scope for further research in 
examining data from a greater range of police areas and with a greater 
number of participants.  
 
2. Deductions from research 
There were a number of original notions found during the course of the 
research. The overarching theme connecting them was that social media as 
evidence or relevant material within investigations was a new and unique 
164 
 
issue that officers had not encountered previously. Investigators however, 
were using heuristics based on their experience of other forms of evidence 
to manage social media, which did not provide adequate strategies to do so. 
In so doing they risk evidence being collected that may subsequently be 
excluded in court. The most current guidelines (ACPO, 2012) were found to 
not adequately address the issue of social media or provide sufficient advice 
for investigators. Furthermore, the goals of investigators were found to be 
wider than that of evidence collection and diverged into suspect 
identification, victim engagement and safeguarding, objectives not 
mentioned or covered by current guidelines in relation to social media.  
To elaborate on the above, the research supported the conclusion that when 
faced with social media, interviewees were shown to mirror the steps 
identified as being followed by individuals when they encounter a new issue 
in problem solving models (Getzels, 1982; Simonton, 1999; Pretz, Naples, & 
Sternberg, 2003). This finding has significance and has not previously been 
noted. First, it identifies social media as a new issue and a new problem that 
has not been encountered before by investigators. Investigators identified it 
as a problem by defining ten separate facets to social media of which six are 
unique to it. Whilst these facets have already been described by academic 
researchers as differentiating social media from other forms of electronic 
evidence, these researchers are specialists in their fields and approach the 
issue from a systemic perspective rather than that of practitioners.   
Similarly, detectives themselves identified four goals that they aim to achieve 
– goal identification being a consequent step in problem solving models to 
defining the problem. This research confirms the view of earlier academics 
and academic literature that investigator and detective aims encompass the 
collection of evidence (Maguire, 2003; Stelfox & Pease, 2005; Tong & 
Bowling, 2006; Stelfox, 2009) and suspect identification (Isaacs, 1967; 
Greenwood, 1970; Greenwood, Chaiken, & Petersilia, 1976; Eck 1983). It 
also shows that the statutory requirements relating to safeguarding 
(Adoption and Children Act 2002; Children Act 2004; Laming, 2009) and 
victim engagement (Adler, 1991; Lees & Gregory, 1993; Temkin, 1999; 
Jordan, 2001; Horvath & Brown, 2009) are being adhered to by officers.  
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However, these four objectives have previously been identified by 
researchers or legisators from a top down perspective rather than by 
practitioners themselves. That practitioners themselves identify with these 
goals and order them in a particular way is a new finding.  
The ranking of these goals has not been noted or observed before. Although 
these four objectives were identified from the data through the coding 
process, it did not appear that investigators were consciously explicitly 
defining all four of them and ranking them in a certain order. There is an 
implication from this for the training of officers, that being to explicitly identify 
these objectives so that all four are conciously considered by investigators 
during the decision making process.   
Different strategies and tactics were noted as being employed by officers 
when coming across social media. These strategies / tactics were found to 
be more varied in scope than the four put forward in the ACPO (2012) 
guidelines. Heuristics, specifically the availability, confirmation bias and the 
representative heuristic were found to be the drivers of officers’ decision 
making rules as to which strategy or tactic they chose to use. The use of 
heuristics driving evidence collection in this way has not been previously 
noted. This is important as it shows that officers are relying on previous 
experiences of dealing with evidence that in many cases are not appropriate 
to dealing with social media, which is discussed further below.  
 
3. Drawing pedagogical implications 
Social media featured in 106 out of 600 crime reports examined. This 
constitutes just under 1/5 of the investigations examined, which is a notable 
amount. With the permeation of the internet through society, such numbers 
are only bound to rise in the future. Although social media features in the 
appendices to the guidelines (ACPO 2012) on digital evidence, neither the 
appendices nor the main body of the guidelines provide a clear strategy of 
how to deal with it and suggestions when instructing how to record it are at 
odds with the four principles that start and form the basis of the document. 
This research has shown that social media poses a problem for investigators 
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and as an issue has unique facets that have not been encountered before. 
Furthermore, officers are adapting their own solutions and in some cases 
using heuristics based on previous experiences of evidence collection, which 
may not be appropriate to social media. As such there is a very clear need to 
address and clarify in guidelines provided to officers this issue of how 
investigators first of all view and secondly approach social media in their 
investigations. Not doing so risks evidence not being collected in line with 
legislation such as RIPA (2000) and as a consequence being excluded in 
court.  
It was found that social media featured heavily in three crime categories. 
These were sexual offences, physical non-sexual assaults and harassment. 
The ACPO (2012) guidelines only refer to indecent images of children when 
discussing offences other than those where the cyberelement fully 
constitutes the crime as being offences where digital evidence might feature. 
These findings show however that social media is prominently present in a 
number of other offences categories. Making this clear in guidelines relating 
to social media would better alert officers to the crimes where social media 
might feature.  
There are references in the guidelines that identify some of the unique 
aspects that social media presents when compared to traditional evidence. 
These include first of all its transient nature and that evidence can be lost. 
Secondly, that the data itself is not in the main stored on the electronic 
device of the user and so cannot be seized and imaged in a traditional way. 
Thirdly that the provider of the service may be based abroad and 
furthermore not allow or give access to the data if is requested. Fourthly that 
the evidence may involve communications data that is in transit) and thus fall 
under the regulation of RIPA 2000. These features of social media 
encompass some, but not all of those highlighted by investigators in this 
research. As was discussed in the previous chapter a critical aspect of 
problem solving is first recognising that there is a problem and secondly 
defining the boundaries of that problem (Getzels, 1982; Simonton, 1999; 
Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003). Whilst all the investigators interviewed 
identified multiple facets of social media that made it unique, none of the 
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investigators identified all the facets. Clearly defining all the differences 
between social media and traditional digital evidence would assist 
investigators by giving them clarity that it constitutes a unique and new form 
of evidence to which the four principles at the start of the document are 
difficult to apply to. This would be crucial to developing guidance in relation 
to social media that was either part of revised ACPO (2012) guidelines or 
separate in its own right.  
That investigators were utilising the availability (Ask & Granhag, 2005; 
Rassin, Eerland, & Kuijpers, 2010), representativeness (Garb, 1996; 
Brannon & Carson, 2003; Moriarty, 2015) and confirmation (Klayman, 1995; 
Nickerson, 1998; Oswal & Grosjean, 2004) heuristics and previous data 
collection techniques for social media became very apparent during the 
research. However, it has been shown that social media forms a new and 
unique form of evidence, as mentioned in the above paragraph, and that 
previous data collection techniques are not always successful when utilised 
with regard to it. For example, the primary technique for securing digital 
material in the past and advocated by the ACPO (2012) guidelines was 
seizure and analysis of electronic devices. Due to the majority of social 
media content being held in servers outside of the jurisdiction of the UK law 
enforcement agencies (Duggan, Ellison, Lampe, Lenhart, & Madden, 2015), 
this strategy is unlikely to capture the information sought by investigators. By 
making this explicit, it would focus investigators on the necessity to approach 
social media in a different way rather than attempt to use techniques for the 
collection of other types of evidence.   
Having emphasised that social media is different, the differing goals of 
investigators should be acknowledged. Accessing the content of social 
media for safeguarding or maintaining victim engagement is not the same as 
accessing it for obtaining evidence for court or for identifying a suspect. The 
principles that form the basis of the guidelines are designed so that evidence 
can be accepted in court. If safeguarding is the principal aim however then 
these rules may not need not be adhered to. It is accepted of course that 
laws remain in place (RIPA 2000) that protect peoples’ right to privacy and 
that place constraints on how law enforcement officers act in relation to 
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communications data. However, there is also legislation present (Adoption 
and Children Act 2002; Children Act 2004; Laming, 2009) as discussed in 
the previous chapter that places obligations on the police to protect 
vulnerable adults and children. The aim of collecting evidence in a way that 
is acceptable to a court (which entails adherance to RIPA 2000) and that of 
safeguarding were identified by interviewees in some situations as 
competing with each other. Indeed, investigators stated that they would be 
content to explain any actions in court that were in contravention of 
guidelines if the aim was to ensure children’s safety. This is a significant 
finding as it shows investigators’ willingness to be accountable to the courts 
for their actions contravening guidelines, because of their professional 
judgement. As highlighted in chapter 2, that the aims of officers are 
competing has been previously noted in academic literature (Jordan, 2001) 
and this research supports those findings. Identifying differing aims and how 
it affects the way in which social media is approached would provide greater 
clarity for officers. As with the facets of social media it was not clear that 
investigators were explicitly consciously defining their aims or ordering them. 
By explicitly outlining them and ordering them, it would undoubtedly assist 
their decision-making processes. 
Guidelines (ACPO, 2012) state that social media providers would provide the 
best evidence but may also not provide data that is requested. On the other 
end of the scale they also suggest that investigators secure a copy of what 
they see as there may not be another opportunity to do so. Rather than 
leave these two opposites as unexplained they should be expanded on as 
they appear conflicting. First, the reason why evidence provided by the 
social media provider would constitute best evidence requires rationalisation. 
Explicit rationalisation of why a strategy should be pursued will assist officers 
in deciding whether or not to pursue it based on its merits. Investigators 
during the interviews stated that this was due to the independence of the 
evidence and that interference from the investigator could not be levelled at 
the evidence if presented in court.  
Secondly, the circumstances under which evidence is not likely to be 
provided by them must be explained. Investigators highlighted this as a 
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negative aspect of applying directly to the social media provider for 
evidence. If officers know the criteria and time frames under which service 
providers will release information, then they can make an informed decision 
to pursue or disregard this option on that basis. It is accepted that the criteria 
under which social media providers will supply content will vary depending 
on the jurisdiction in which they are based and on the social media provider 
themselves (Barnes, 2006; Hodge, 2006; Boyd & Ellison, 2007; Ward, 2011; 
Kardasz, 2012; Etzioni, 2016). A reference data base of social media 
providers encountered by law enforcement officers could be maintained that 
contains this information. Where a provider is unlikely to provide this 
information then a list of alternative strategies that could be employed would 
be listed. This is important as the investigators interviewed did not have 
confidence in the actions that they were pursuing.  
Two other tactics are put forward by the guidelines. The first is to save 
information from chat logs onto a removable media device and if this is not 
available to print off the chat logs. However, a situation could easily be 
envisaged from the scenarios spoken about during the interviews where this 
would not be possible. For example, a victim whose access to social media 
takes place on a smart phone. They victim has no other electronic device 
such as a computer or laptop from which to access social media. They do 
not have or are not prepared to provide a removable media device. They 
have no way to connect their device to a printer. Amongst the tactics used by 
investigators was that they had asked victims to e mail them files containing 
such chat logs. Such a tactic appears to afford the same benefits as saving 
the file to a removable device or printing off the file.  
In such a situation investigators, as has been demonstrated in interviews 
could also decide to access a user’s social media account themselves 
having obtained appropriate permissions from the user. However, the 
guidelines refer to ‘information in transit’ and suggest contacting the 
authorities’ bureau if this is the case. Accessing a social media user account 
where the data pertaining to that account is stored in the United States 
would mean that the data would have to travel from the data storage system 
of the social media provider to the computer that the investigator is using. 
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This has been noted as being telecommunications data that is being 
requested not only from a different physical location but one that is likely to 
be in a different legal jurisdiction (Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty, & Hegarty, 2010; 
Mason & George, 2011; Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty, & Lamb, 2011; Chung, 
Park, Lee, & Kang, 2012). If that is the case, then it may fall under the 
auspices of RIPA 2000. However, this is not clear in the guidelines. If that is 
what the guidelines are referring to, then it should be made explicitly clear to 
deter officers from accessing such accounts themselves. If it is not, then 
investigators should be given the freedom to access suspect and victims’ 
profiles if their consent is obtained. 
From the guidelines it was not clear in how many different ways evidence 
should be captured. Furthermore, investigators offered additional strategies 
and tactics for evidencing social media than the four put forward in the 
guidelines. By legitimising different forms of data gathering it may save 
police forces and investigators time and resources by not requiring evidence 
to be duplicated. For example, if it was made clear that a chat log from a 
social media account downloaded to an email account formed adequate 
evidence, it may be unnecessary to then also obtain that chat log from the 
social media provider themselves. Each such suggestion would need to be 
made in conjunction with persons who are experts in the field of digital cloud 
computing forensics. (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009; Damshenas, Dehghantanha, 
Mahmoud, & Solahuddin, 2012) with the technical implications of evidence 
collection techniques being considered. 
Another tactic offered by investigators that were not identified in the ACPO 
(2012) guidelines was for the victim to access the social media account in 
their presence on a computer that is capable of recording images on a media 
device or that is capable of printing. In order for this to happen that 
equipment needs to be readily available for investigators to use. One of the 
more noticeable complaints by investigators was that standalone computer 
to access social media were not easily accessible. For investigators to use 
them, such standalone computers would have to be readily available not 
only in intelligence offices where witnesses would not be able to be brought 
to but in dedicated rooms for witnesses. Stretched resources (Sommer, 
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2004; Hunton, 2009; Jewkes, 2013; Bryant & Stephens, 2014) mean that the 
availability of a strategy or tactic as found in this research, has a significant 
impact on whether it will be used.  
As a consequence of devices being triaged before being accepted for 
examination by HTCUs, there are circumstances as seen during the course 
of the interviews that mean that devices that may contain evidence will not 
be accepted by them. Investigators have a choice in those circumstances to 
either disregard these devices or examine them themselves, to ascertain 
whether there is evidence present on them. Rather than not acknowledge 
this or risk the loss of evidence a process could be put in place that 
formalises investigators ability to examine devices that are not accepted by 
HTCU.  
Two solutions could be considered. At the most inexpensive, investigators 
could examine devices themselves, maintaining their own audit trail until 
such a moment that they find evidence, at which point the device could be 
submitted to the HTCU. The success of these tactics would depend on 
whether the initial examination by investigators would be challenged at court 
for altering the evidence held on the device and the computer literacy of the 
investigator conducting the examination.  On the other end of the scale 
equipment could be provided and a number of investigators could be trained 
to image the memory of electronic devices. These images could then be 
examined for evidence. The option would incur a cost both in equipment and 
training but may be prove more robust to challenge at court. Consideration 
could be given to extending this process to circumstances where the devices 
require more immediate examination than HTCU resources allow for 
(Kshetri, 2009; Yar, 2013; Bregant & Bregant, 2014).  
4. Conclusion 
This study set out to ascertain the types of investigation that social media 
features in, the strategies that detectives use when they encounter social 
media in an investigation, to understand the decision-making process behind 
the choice of strategy and compare it against the most up to date guidelines 
available for investigators. It found that social media appeared in a 
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significant amount of investigations and across a broad spectrum of complex 
case types investigated by detectives. Further to this however, the data 
examined found these research questions to be incomplete in trying to 
understand how officers deal with social media. The initial focus of the 
research concentrated on social media as evidence or having the potential to 
impact on a case as relevant material. During the interviews this focus on 
social media as evidence was shown to be only one aspect of investigators’ 
goals. These goals also prominently included suspect identification, victim 
engagement and safeguarding with the collection of social media as 
evidence ranked the least important of the four.  
Where the initial research questions sought to simply identify strategies and 
why they were chosen, the data showed that there were further initial steps 
in investigators appraisal of social media. First, there was a recognition that 
it presented a problem and secondly defining its facets as an issue. These 
first two steps then assisted in informing strategies that would be chosen to 
deal with social media. The strategies and tactics that were used by officers 
were wider in scope than suggested in the guidelines. It was found that the 
decision rules on which the choice of strategy or tactic used was driven by 
heuristics. Ascertaining how social media is approached by investigators is 
crucial to providing advice and guidelines. The most up to date guidelines in 
the form of the ACPO (2012) guidelines were found to be lacking in both 
options and explanation of preferred choice of strategy or tactic. A number of 
recommendations are made based on the findings of this research on how to 
improve the guidelines. These focus on increasing investigators’ cognition of 
why social media forms a new and unique problem, formalising the aims that 
they have, and identifying strategies and tactics to deal with social media 
together with an explanation of the strengths and weaknesses of each. 
Finally, a number of practical observations are noted around submissions of 
digital evidence to HTCUs and the availability of digital forensic equipment at 
the disposal of detectives.  
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Glossary 
ACPO: The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) or in full ‘The Association of 
Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland’, was an organisation 
that was established in 1948 and for a significant period of time led the development 
of policing practices in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland (ACPO, 2005c; Parker, 
2013). Following the Parker Review into ACPO, it was replaced in 2015 by a new 
body, the National Police Chiefs' Council. ACPO did not have any powers to enforce 
its recommendations or any mandate to do so. However, in practice it allowed and 
facilitated national policy to be formed rather than individual police areas replicating 
work in the same fields (ACPO, 2005c; Parker, 2013).   
Aims:  This thesis refers to ‘aims’ in three different settings. First, the aims of the 
research. Secondly, the aims noted within the ACPO guidelines for investigators and 
thirdly the four aims of detectives identified from investigator interviews. In all three 
cases, the use of the word aim is used interchangeably with the words ‘goal’ and 
‘objective’, They are seen to represent an idea or desired possibility that can be 
attained through a course of action (Latham & Yukl, 1975; Hsiaw, 2010 Locke & 
Latham, 2013). It is noted that a distinction can be made between the word ‘goal’, 
‘aim’ and ‘objective’. This sees a sliding scale. On one end a goal can be understood 
to be a general statement of intent over a longer term. On the other an objective may 
be more specific and relate to a shorter time span in terms of achievement (Lindvall, 
1964, Saylor & Alexander, 1974; Wise, 1976), with an ‘aim’ sitting between the two 
(Taylor, 1997). Whilst noted, not uniquely (Percy, 1973; Hoffman, 1980) this 
distinction is not used in this research between the three terms. 
ASC: Refers to Avon and Somerset Constabulary. In 2017 ASC employed 2759 
police officers (Home Office, 2018). It is one of 43 separate semi autonomously 
administered police areas within England and Wales. It encompasses the counties of 
Somerset and South Gloucestershire, which includes within it the cities of Bath and 
Bristol as well as the towns of Weston-Super-Mare, Taunton and Yeovil. It is one of 
the largest police forces in England and Wales covering both urban and rural areas 
(HMICFRS, 2018b). Between the 1 October 2015 and the 31 March 2016 there were 
131, 226 crimes reported to the force (HMICFRS, 2018b). The area covered by the 
force is 1,844 square miles in which there are approximately 1.65 million residents 
mainly centred in the urban areas of Bristol and Bath (HMICFRS, 2018b). A 
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significant proportion of the population originates from an ethnic minority background 
(HMICFRS, 2018). 
Basic Command Unit: This is the largest organisational sub structure that police 
areas are divided into. It was introduced into policing and replaced the previous two-
tier structure of ‘divisions’ and ‘sub divisions’ (Loveday, 2006). 
CAIU: Refers to ‘Child Abuse Investigation Unit’. This is a specialist department of 
investigators and detectives concerned with investigation of crimes committed 
against children and child protection. Such units are present across forces in 
England and Wales (National College of Policing, 2015). 
CID: Refers to the ‘Criminal Investigation Department’. This was the successor to the 
Detective Branch in the Metropolitan Police and has become a term used for plain-
clothes police detectives in the UK (Newburn, 2007). The work of the unit 
encompasses the investigation of serious and complex crime (Maguire, 2003). 
Correlation: The word correlation has been used in this thesis specifically with 
regard to three variables and an association between them. The first two variables 
are that of frequencey and variation of strategies used by investigators in an 
investigation. An association is implied between these two variables and the third 
variable, that being importance of social media to the investigation. In other words 
whether it forms critical evidence, evidence or relevant material in an investigation. In 
using the term ‘correlation’, it is not used in the mathematical sense of there being a 
calculated correlation co-efficient and a linear relationship between two variables. 
There is no statistical dependance that has been calculated between these two 
variables and so what is noted is an association between variables that has not been 
quantified (Chen & Popovich, 2002; Liebetrau, 2018). What is meant by the term 
correlation in this research is that there is a tendency towards a concomitant or 
associated variation between two variables, where there is a causative connection. 
In other words where one variable causes a variation in another indirectly (Mari & 
Kotz, 2001; Chen & Popovich, 2002; Shevlyakov & Oja, 2016).  
CPS: Refers to the ‘Crime Prosecution Service’. This is an agency that is 
independent of the police and prosecutes criminal cases in England and Wales that 
have been investigated by the police and other agencies (Crown Prosecution 
Service, 2017). 
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Cloud Storage Systems: A repository or storage system for digital material that can 
be rented, bought or is provided by a third party (Garfinkel, 2010; Ward, 2011; 
DeSousa, 2013). 
DAIU: Refers to ‘Domestic Abuse Investigation Unit’. This is a specialist department 
of investigators and detectives concerned with investigation of crimes committed 
within a domestic setting. Such units are present across forces in England and 
Wales (National College of Policing, 2016) 
Decision Making: Decision Making for the purpose of this research is defined with 
five  distinct and separate stages:  
“a process used to make choices among contending courses of actions and includes 
the following steps: (1) identify possible options, (2) identify possible consequences 
for each option, (3) evaluate desirability of each consequence, (4) assess likelihood 
of consequences, and (5) use a “decision rule” that identifies the best option and 
maximizes well-being based on current beliefs and knowledge” (Frauenknecht & 
Black, 2010, p113). 
Detective: a warranted officer who has undergone and completed the second tier of 
the ‘professionalising investigation programme’. This includes completing the 
National Investigators Examination, attending a five-week course and undergoing a 
work-based assessment (National College of Policing, 2017a). 
Evidence in the investigation:  Evidence is defined within the ‘core investigative 
doctrine’ as material that is: 
“[…]sufficiently relevant to the facts in issue is admissible, subject to the exclusionary 
rules. The test for relevance is: ‘evidence which makes the matter which requires 
proof more or less probable’ (Lord Simon of Glaisdale in DPP v Kilbourne (1973) AC 
729, at p 756. The ‘facts in issue’ are those facts which the prosecution must prove 
in order to establish the guilt of a defendant” (ACPO, 2005, p.26).  
Evidence critical to the outcome of the investigation: This is not a category that 
is defined within professional literature. It is defined in this research as evidence as 
per the definition used above, without which a successful resolution of a case could 
not be reached. The test as to whether a resolution is successful or not is whether 
the CPS deem that a charge can be brought against a suspect based on the 
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evidence, or whether an investigator or supervisor can make a decision that no crime 
has taken place.  
GBH: refers to ‘Grievous Bodily Harm’. There are two offences created in which 
Grievous Bodily Harm can be inflicted or sustained both detailed under the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861 (s.18 and s.20). Under the act ‘grievous bodily harm’ is 
defined as ‘serious’ or really ‘serious bodily harm’.   
Goal: A goal represents an idea or desired possibility that requires a course of action 
in order to achieve it and commitment in doing so (Latham & Yukl, 1975; Hsiaw, 
2010 Locke & Latham, 2013). As such the achievement of a goal necessitates a 
process (Fried & Slowik, 2004) and when the term is used in this research it refers to 
an individual consciously setting it (Hsiaw, 2010; Locke & Latham, 2013). Within this 
research the term ‘goal’ refers to the four issues that investigators wish to achieve of: 
Safeguarding, Victim engagement, Suspect Identification and Collection of Evidence. 
It is noted that there are alternative ways of defining and viewing a goal from other 
academic fields including economics (Suvorov & van de Ven, 2008), engineering 
(Miller & Pribram, 1960) and education (Urdan & Maehr, 1995), which remove the 
concious element of goal setting by individuals.  
Grounded Theory: Grounded theory was adopted to analyse the primary data 
collected. This methodology is well-suited to building theory in a relatively 
unexplored field (Glaser, 1978; Schreiber, 2001; Goulding, 2002). The approach 
adopted in this research as to when a literature review was undertaken was that 
advocated by Strauss and Corbin (1990) and this extended to the coding approach 
used in examining the crime reports. Strauss and Corbin (1990) argued for the use 
of ‘axial codes’. These codes are theoretical codes that offer a structure or ‘skeleton’ 
for further codes that emerge from the data to be built around (Kelle, 2007). In 
coding data from the crime reports such axial codes were used. These codes 
centered around the importance of social media to a case, specifically whether the 
social media content formed ‘relevant material’, ‘evidence in the case’ or was 
‘evidence critical to the outcome of the case’. It was these codes that provided the 
framework for the inference drawn in chapter four, that the more important social 
media was to an investigation, the greater the frequency and variety of actions 
performed in relation to it. The 19 categories that emerged in the crime reports 
detailed in tables 8 through to 13 originated from what was written by investigators 
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and supervisors in the investigative logs contained in the crime reports. Each crime 
report that had a mention of social media in the three axial categories was 
anonymised and saved. They were then examined line by line by the researcher. 
Sentences, part sentences or words that appeared to the researcher as significant or 
forming concepts were recorded on a separate coding document. In practice this 
entailed the recording of any mention of social media and placing it in or creating a 
category for it. Practical text books on using grounded theory often suggest the use 
of ‘post it’ notes (Bringer, Johnston, & Brackenridge, 2004; Gabbay & Le May, 2004) 
and the physical writing of ‘memos’ (Holton, 2007; Lempert, 2007; Reichertz, 2007) 
to assist in the formulation of categories and dependency between them. Although 
post it notes were initially tried, the researcher found ‘microsoft word’ a much easier 
tool to use. Eventually the initial categories that were created were collapsed into 
larger more encompassing categories that formed the 19 seen in the 6 tables. The 
axial codes (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Goulding, 2002; Reichertz, 2007) then 
allowed the formation of an inferred link between the 19 categories and a process 
the investigators employed. As discussed in the literature review when the data from 
the interviews was coded, the technique became more in line with that advocated by 
Glaser (1992). Each interview barring one was recorded. The recording was then 
typed into a transcript by the researcher. As each transcript was created, sentences, 
part sentences and words were taken form it and grouped into categories on a 
separate ‘microsoft word’ document. As before the initial categories that formed were 
collapsed into larger ones. The categories that formed were so distintinct and strong 
that the ‘axial framework’ that was used to assist the coding process in the 
examination of crime reports was deemed to be constrictive rather than assisting in 
identifying links between categories.  
Heuristics: Heuristics describe rules that individuals fall upon when asked to make 
decisions often when faced with an inability to process all the information at their 
disposal. They explain some decision making, offering a quicker way for an 
individual to make a decision with less information whilst offering a degree of 
optimisation (Simon, 1955; Elio, 2002; Gilovich & Griffin, 2002; Snook & Cullen, 
2008). 
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HOCR: Refers to ‘Home Office Counting Rules’. These are provided by the Home 
Office to give consistency in crime recording across England and Wales and detail 
where there is statutory obligation to implement them (Home Office, 2014). 
HMIC: Refers to ‘HM Inspectorate of Constabulary’. This is an agency independent 
of the police that assesses individual police forces on a wide range of competencies 
and publish publicly available reports (HMIC, 2017). 
HTCU: Refers to ‘High Tech Crime Units’. These are specialised units within law 
enforcement agencies that deal with digital and technical aspects of policing and 
tackling technology related crime (Jewkes & Yar, 2008; Hunton, 2009; Awan & 
Blakemore, 2016).  
Inductive Reasoning: This is a method of reasoning or reaching conclusions based 
on the expanding of a particular observed set of circumstances into a generalisation 
(Sloman & Lagnado, 2005; Bryct, 2009a, Keane & Eysenck, 2010). As such an 
inductive argument (in contrast to a deductive one) cannot alone achieve certainty 
even if all the premises are true (Copi, Cohen, & Flage, 2007; Keane & Eysenck, 
2010). Rather an inductive argument can be classed along a scale from ‘strong’ to 
‘weak’. Inductive reasoning encompasses heuristics within it in that it can describe 
how individuals come to conclusions on limited experiences and make predictions 
based on current knowledge (Keane & Eysenck, 2010). It does not however 
completely overlap the concept of heuristics. Whilst heuristics describe the decision 
making of individuals based on previous experience, they may not include all of the 
individual’s current knowledge and experience. As such heuristics may distort an 
individual’s inductive reasoning by for example only identifying readily available 
knowledge to support a conclusion (availability heuristic) or identifying knowledge 
that confirms a conclusion that the individual is seeking to confirm (confirmation 
bias). Furthermore, heuristics need not require a conscious process of reasoning. 
Professional Learning cycles (Dewey, 1933; Argyris & Schön, 1978; Kolb, 1984; 
Gibbs, 1988; Johns, 1995; Brookfield, 1998; Thomspon, 2000; White, Fook, & 
Garnder, 2006) can also be seen to really upon inductive reasoning in that 
individuals learn from their experience and alter their predictions and choices based 
on their professional knowledge gained. The closeness of various models describing 
human thought processes, in this case inductive reasoning (Sloman & Lagnado, 
2005; Bryant, 2009a, Keane & Eysenck, 2010), heuristics, reasoning by analogy 
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(Holyoak, 2005; Bryant, 2009a) and professional learning models has been identified 
as showing that such models are somewhat arbitrary in delineating and 
camouflaging what are similar forms of thinking (Keane & Eysenck, 2010). Other 
theories of reasoning which are deductive in nature include ‘Rule’, ‘Evolutionary’ and 
‘Semantic’ models (Leighton & Sternberg, 2013). Rule models suggest that 
individuals have certain mental commands that are followed in reaching a decision. 
Evolutionary models propose that humans have evolved patterns of reasoning that 
have allowed them to meet specific needs during the evolutionary process, for 
example in constructing social contracts. In line with this, heuristics can also be seen 
to provide ‘rules of thumb’ which individuals follow in reaching an outcome. All of 
these models fall under the umbrella of ‘positive’ or ‘descriptive’ that seek to 
describe, understand and model the actual choices that are made by individuals 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Crozier & Raynard, 1997; Koksalan, 2011). Whilst not 
excluding the validity of these models or their potential application to decision rules 
employed by investigators during the problem-solving process, clearly identifiable 
examples of such rules were not visible in the data.  
Investigation: The two definitions of ‘investigation’ as detailed within CPIA (1996) 
have been adopted in this research:  
“For the purposes of this Part a criminal investigation is an investigation conducted 
by police officers with a view to it being ascertained— 
(a)whether a person should be charged with an offence, or 
(b)whether a person charged with an offence is guilty of it” 
Art. 22, CPIA (1996)  
Investigative actions: Investigative actions when referred to fall into the definition 
as put forward by the National College of Policing (National College of Police, 2018) 
Authorised Professional Practice:  
“any activity which, if pursued, is likely to establish significant facts, preserve material 
or lead to the resolution of the investigation. The volume of actions should be 
proportionate to the type of investigation” 
(National College of Police, 2018) 
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Investigative Strategy: An investigative strategy is referred to by the National 
College of Policing (National College of Policing, 2018) in the following way:  
“The purpose of an investigative strategy is to: 
• identify the most appropriate line(s) of enquiry to pursue 
• determine the objective of pursuing particular lines of enquiry 
• identify the investigative action(s) necessary to efficiently achieve the 
objectives, taking into account resources, priorities, necessity and 
proportionality 
• direct and conduct investigative actions to gather the maximum amount of 
material which may generate further lines of enquiry 
• understand and manage community impact.” 
and within the Murder Manual (ACPO, 2006) it is defined as:  
“the principal aim of the investigative strategy is to locate and gather 
Material” 
(ACPO, 2006, p.56) 
Both of these definitions identify with the strategies found during investigator 
interviews as shown in table 19 on page 136. These strategies determine the 
objective of obtaining access to social media content, take into account resources, 
the ability to gather the maximum amount of material and understanding community 
impact (shown in red and green within the table).   
Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub: A hub of public sector agencies located in the 
same physical location, sharing information and decision making with the aim of 
safeguarding vulnerable individuals (Home Office, 2014a).  
NDM: Refers to the ‘National Decision Model’. This is a framework put forward by 
the National College of Policing for officers to use when making decisions (National 
College of Policing, 2014a). The model was initially developed by the National Police 
Improvement Agency on behalf of ACPO (NPIA, 2012). The model is purported to be 
suiteable for all decision making in a police setting including operational and non 
operational situations. As such there may be an expectation that this model would 
have featured in investigators’ decision making and been either visible in the crime 
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reports examined or discussed during the interviews. Whilst envisaged by ACPO 
(2012) and the National College of Policing as being prescriptive in nature, the NDM 
is very similar to and overlays onto models of professional learning cycles (Dewey, 
1933; Argyris & Schön, 1978; Kolb, 1984; Gibbs, 1988; Johns, 1995; Brookfield, 
1998; Thomspon, 2000; White, Fook, & Garnder, 2006). These models are 
descriptive in nature rather than prescriptive, having been constructed following 
observations of how professionals in different fields make decisions. Whilst there 
was evidence of professional learning cycles utilised within the research, there was 
no direct evidence of the NDM being employed by investigators. It was not within the 
scope of this research to identify why this was the case. However that the NDM was 
not noted as being used is in line with the findings of the research, where social 
media was noted as being approached as a ‘fuzzy scenario’ (Pretz, Naples, & 
Sternberg, 2003), In such a scenario the problem is not clearly defined to the 
decision maker and requires first of all recognition that a ‘problem’ exists and then 
the subsequent defining of the problem’s facets (Bransford & Stein, 1984; Sternberg, 
1985; Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003). These steps are not present within the 
NDM. This is in contrast to a situation where the issue is distinct and decisions can 
be applied within clear parameters (Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003). 
National College of Policing: The National College of Policing was created in 2012 
as a professional body for the police service in England and Wales. It states that it’s 
functions are to develop knowledge, provide education and to set standards 
(National College of Policing, 2017).  
Normative / prescriptive models of decision making: These models of decision 
making look to identify the optimal decision given a certain set of circumstances 
(Crozier & Raynard, 1997; Camerer & Loewenstein, 2003). Such models can assist 
decision makers to identify this optimal choice where a decision is required. 
Objectives: This thesis refers to ‘objectives’ in three different settings. These are: 
the objectives of the research, the objectives noted within the ACPO guidelines for 
investigators and the four objectives of detectives identified from investigator 
interviews. In all three cases, the use of the word objective is used interchangeably 
with the words ‘goal’ and ‘aim’, Goals are seen to represent an idea or desired 
possibility that can be attained through a course of action (Latham & Yukl, 1975; 
Hsiaw, 2010 Locke & Latham, 2013) and is detailed above in the glossary. It is noted 
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that a distinction can be made between the word ‘goal’, ‘aim’ and ‘objective’. This 
sees a sliding scale. On one end a goal can be understood to be a general 
statement of intent over a longer term. On the other an objective may be more 
specific and relate to a shorter time span in terms of achievement (Lindvall, 1964, 
Saylor & Alexander, 1974; Wise, 1976), with an ‘aim’ sitting between the two (Taylor, 
1997). Whilst noted, not uniquely (Percy, 1973; Hoffman, 1980) this distinction is not 
used in this research between the three terms. 
Positive / Descriptive models of decision making: Positive or descriptive models 
seek to describe, understand and model the actual choices that are made by 
individuals (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Crozier & Raynard, 1997; Koksalan, 2011). 
Principles: In this thesis the term ‘principle’ refers firstly to the knowledge that 
investigators have as to the ‘principles of an investigation’ and secondly to the 
‘principles of digital investigation’ as set out in the ACPO (2012) guidance on digital 
evidence. The ‘principles of an investigation’ are set out by the National College of 
Policing (2018) in their authorised professional practice. The ACPO (2012) guidance 
on digital evidence describes ‘principles of digital investigation’ as ‘laws’ and ‘rules’ 
to be adhered to by an investigator when dealing with digital evidence. It describes 
these principles as being in place in order for investigators to show objectivity in 
court (ACPO, 2012).   
Problem Solving: The definition of problem solving as put forward by Pretz, Naples, 
& Sternberg (2003) was adopted. This model is represented in five clear and 
separate stages that an individual progresses through when encountering an 
unidentified problem, the model being cyclical in nature. These stages are as follows: 
a) Recognition that a problem exists, b) Defining or framing the problem, c) 
Identification of the goals, d) Developing a strategy to reach goals, e) Evaluation of 
actions in relation to the goals. In this definition, decision making is seen as being 
subsumed within the problem solving process but not fully constituting it (Wehmeyer 
and Shogre, 2008; Frauenknecht & Black, 2010). 
Ranked Aims: Refers to the ordering or aggregating of items by their importance 
through individual preference (Brams, 2008; Balinksi & Laraki, 2011; Langville & 
Meyer, 2012). Specifically in this thesis it is used as a term with regard to the four 
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aims of detectives when dealing with social media identified from investigator 
interviews. No conflict in ordering was noted between investigators.  
Relevant Material: The definition within Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996 (CPIA 1996) is used within this research: 
“it appears to an investigator, or the officer in charge of the investigation or the 
disclosure officer to have some bearing or on the surrounding circumstances unless 
it is incapable of having any impact on the case” (CPS, 2005, p36). 
Sampling: The sampling technique in this research falls under that of ‘systemic 
random sampling’ (Acharya, Prakash, & Nigam, 2013) or ‘consecutive sampling’ 
(Schuster & Powers, 2005; Bowers, House, & Owens, 2011; Sharma, 2017).  In this 
type of sampling the first date is selected at random and then ‘k’ number of samples 
are selected from this point onwards (Schuster & Powers, 2005; Bowers, House, & 
Owens, 2011; Acharya, Prakash, & Nigam, 2013; Sharma, 2017). The advantage of 
this system is that the cost is low in that the process of selecting a ‘probability 
sample’ is not incurred, either in design or in its implementation. It also has high 
internal and external validity and is better that convenience or snowball sampling in 
controlling sample bias. It is often considered as the best non-probability sampling 
method (Sharma, 2017). The disadvantage is that it is not a true probability or 
random sample and that it may be time or seasonally affected (Schuster & Powers, 
2005; Bowers, House, & Owens, 2011; Acharya, Prakash, & Nigam, 2013; Sharma, 
2017). 
Strategy: Strategy as a concept has been defined in various different ways (Gray & 
Williamson, 2002; Jarzabkowski, 2005) with many authors describing the difficulty in 
precisely characterising the term (Jarzabkowski, 2005; Dolman, 2005; Slack & 
Lewis, 2008) or eschewing doing so (Mills, Platts, Bourne, & Richards, 2002; Ayson, 
2004). The interchangeable nature of the meaning assigned to ‘strategy’ creates 
potential for any analysis of data against theoretical concepts to become confused 
(Frauenknecht & Black, 2010). To avoid confusion, as with ‘problem-solving’ a set 
definition of strategy was used in this research. The intention again was not to give 
preference to a particular definition of strategy over another, but rather set out the 
definition for the purpose of clarity. Freedman (2003) provides a detailed 
examination of the concept of a strategy and his observations on what constitutes a 
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strategy are adopted. Freedman (2003) argues that a strategy is more than simply a 
plan, but involves an objective whose attainment may involve an element of conflict. 
Without conflict, a strategy is simply a plan to achieve an objective. He describes two 
broad types of strategic planning. He first talks about innate decision making, skill or 
flair as a way of formulating strategy. This neatly describes heuristics (Elio, 2002; 
Gigerenzer, 2008) as a way humans navigate complex scenarios in a short period of 
time. He then describes a second method that involves a conscious analysis of the 
situation to achieve an objective where the situation is particularly complex. As is 
seen in the data, both situations are noted. Furthermore Freedman (2003) lays an 
emphasis on the means available to an individual to achieve his objective. This is 
clearly very pertinent in the decision-making processes that investigators go through, 
whether it is their consideration of the physical equipment at hand or their ability to 
obtain information from foreign jurisdictions. Freedman’s (2003) view on strategy 
sees it as a process that moves through various states. This characterisation can 
see strategy as compatible with the different stages of problem solving (Pretz, 
Naples, & Sternberg, 2003) that individuals move through.  
Tactics: As with strategy, the term ‘tactic’ has been described in many different ways 
and fields (Freedman, 2003; Gross, 2016). There is a delineation between tactics 
and strategy at the level at which an action or process is implemented. The term 
tactic was initially set and described in doctrines of war (Freedman, 2003; Gross, 
2016). In such doctrines where strategy concerns itself with the setting of overall 
objectives and pursuit of power, tactics are implemented in individual situations that 
cumulatively seek to achieve the strategy (Freedman, 2003; Gross, 2016). The term 
‘tactic’ in this thesis is used interchangeably with the term ‘tool’. They describe the 
way investigators achieve the overall strategy that is set and the physical way in 
which evidence is secured (as shown on table 18 on page 134).  
Tools: The term tool within this thesis is used interchangeably with the term ‘tactic’ 
as defined above. It is used to describe the way investigators achieve the overall 
strategy that is set and the physical way in which social media evidence is secured 
(as shown on table 18 on page 134).  
TVP: Refers to ‘Thames Valley Police. This is one of 43 separate semi 
autonomously administered police areas within England and Wales. It is the largest 
non-metropolitan police force in England and Wales and encompasses the counties 
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of Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire. It is divided into 12 local policing 
areas (Thames Valley Police, 2018). Between the 1st of April 2016 and the 31st of 
March 2017 there were 138, 710 crimes reported to the force (Thames Valley Police, 
2017). The area covered by the force is 2,216 square miles in which there are 
approximately 2.4 million residents mainly centered in the urban areas of Oxford, 
Milton Keynes, Aylesbury, Maidenhead and Slough. Around 15% of the population 
originate from an ethnic minority (HMICFRS, 2018c). In 2017 TVP employed 4186 
police officers (Gov, 2018). 
Victims’ Charter: This lays out the obligations that are incumbent on criminal justice 
agencies including the police to victims of crime. Key aspects of the code include 
defined entitlements for victims separated into different categories including children, 
young people, parents and businesses (Victims' Commissioner, 2018). 
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Appendix - Semi structured interview schedule used by the researcher  
Introduction 
Introduction of myself and the purpose of the interview 
Read through the participant information sheet. 
Read through the consent form and confirm that consent is being given by the 
individual to the interview taking place. 
Explain that the interviewer will take notes during the course of the interview. 
Ask whether the participant will consent to the interview being digitally recorded 
Confirm that consent has been given to digitally record the interview. 
Give an explanation of the format of the interview including the topics that will be 
covered. 
Explain that the hypothetical case scenario that will be put the interviewee is not a 
test. Explain that the scenario is reasonably involved and that a written sheet of the 
basic circumstances will be provided as an aid memoir. Invite the interviewee to use 
paper and pen if they wish to note the details of the scenario in order to assist them. 
Note that the interviewee is being given a short period of time to respond to a 
complicated scenario and that if this were a real life case, they would both be given 
more time to analyse the issue, as well as have the opportunity to consult both 
reference material and colleagues. 
Explain that they may be prompted for their rational behind the decisions that they 
have made. 
 
Part One – The extent to which social media features in investigations 
Describe the way in which you would define social media 
Tell me about your experience of the extent to which social media plays a part in 
your investigations. 
In what proportion of your investigations does social media feature? 
In those investigations, how frequently does it appear? 
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Estimate the proportion of your time that enquiries around social media take.  
In what proportion of your investigations would social media be classed as: 
 
1. relevant material 
2. Evidence within an investigation 
3. Evidence critical to the successful outcome of an investigation 
Describe the types of investigation that social media plays a role in. 
 
Part Two – Previous case dealt with not resulting in a prosecution 
The case 
Without giving me any details about the individuals involved or the exact location of 
incident, tell me about a case that you have dealt with, that featured social media but 
that did not result in a successful prosecution. 
How did social media feature in this case? 
When did you first become aware of the presence of social media in the case? 
How significant a part did it play in the investigation? 
 
Investigative strategy that was chosen 
How did you approach social media in this case?  
Describe the way in which you preserved the information provided by it or within it. 
Explain your reasons for choosing this approach. 
 
Other investigative strategies that were considered 
Describe any other approaches that you considered.  
If you did consider any other approaches, why did you do so.  
Explain the reasons for not choosing those approaches. 
With retrospect, were you comfortable with the approach that you did take. 
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In retrospect would you take a different approach. 
Did the approach you take impact on the result of the investigation. 
 
Considerations in the ACPO guidelines 
Describe any considerations that you had about seizing physical devices that may 
have assisted in preservation of evidence.  
Describe any consideration that you had with regard to obtaining advice (high tech 
crime unit / authorities bureau / other specialist dept.) around how to treat social 
media in this case.  
Describe whether you gave any consideration to preserving an audit trail of the 
actions you took.  
Describe whether you gave any consideration to whether your actions would alter 
any stored electronic data. 
Tell me about the reason for choosing this case as an example 
 
Part Three -  Investigative approaches taken with regard to cases that have 
resulted in prosecutions  
Without mentioning any specific cases, tell me about approaches to social media 
that you have taken in investigations that have resulted in a successful prosecution?  
Did the approach that you took in your opinion affect the outcome of those 
investigations?  
Explain the reason for adopting the strategies that you did. 
Did you consider any other strategies and if so what were they?  
Why did you not adopt the other strategies that you considered?  
In retrospect, would you adopt different strategies? 
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Part Four - Other information 
Tell me about any factors that have had an impact on how you approach social 
media.  
Has court, training, supervision, professional knowledge or previous experience had 
an influence on how you deal with social media? 
Tell me about the factors that influence how you deal with social media, for example 
time, resources, effort, professional knowledge, specialist resources.  
Tell me about anything else that you think is pertinent.  
 
Part Five – Open scenario 
With regard to social media and how the police deal with it: 
In the best possible world what would you hope for? 
In the worst possible world what are your greatest fears? 
What pivotal events from the past few years provide good lessons for the future? 
What major decisions with long‐term implications are faced at the moment? 
What major constraints do you experience inside/outside the organisation / system? 
If all constraints were removed, and you could direct what is done, what would you 
do? 
 
Part Six – Specific scenario: Harassment 
Process tracing: 
You’ve been asked to review / look at an investigation, which involves rape, 
grooming and sexual activity with a child with a social media aspect to it. The 
suspect is in custody during night time hours for grooming and they’re suspected of 
raping the victim, the victim of the grooming. The grooming has taken place over the 
suspect’s social media.  
In front of you on the table there are 2 columns. The first column looks at how you 
access the suspect’s social media. The second column shows options for how to 
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record the social media content once it is accessed. Could you have a look through 
the options in both columns. Any that pique your interest or that you would naturally 
seek out were this to be a real investigation, please pick up. Under some there is 
some further information that may assist you, under others the information is fairly 
generic. 
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